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The article reviews the main theoretical and empirical contributions about digital
news media and online political communication in Hungary. Our knowledge synthe-
sis focuses on three specific subfields: citizens, media platforms, and political actors.
Representatives of sociology, political communication studies, psychology, and lin-
guistics have responded to the challenges of the internet over the past two decades,
which has resulted in truly interdisciplinary accounts of the different aspects of dig-
italization in Hungary. In terms of methodology, both normative and descriptive ap-
proaches have been applied, mostly with single case-study methods. Based on an
extensive review of the literature, we assess that since the early 2000s the internet
has become the key subject of political communication studies, and that it has erased
the boundaries between online and offline spaces. We conclude, however, that despite
the richness of the literature on the internet and politics, only a limited number of
studies have researched citizens’ activity and provided longitudinal analyses.
Keywords: digitalization, internet, politics, social media, Hungary
1 Introduction
This article identifies the key issues and trends in online political communication in Hun-
gary over the past two decades by combining the approach of literature review and topic
review. Several knowledge-synthesis reviews have attempted to summarize all pertinent
studies related to the specific topic of the internet and politics (e.g. Jungherr, 2016; Sko-
ric et al., 2016), but country-focused overviews are rare. As some edited volumes suggest
(e.g. Aalberg et al., 2017; Eibl & Gregor, 2019), country-specific work makes a substan-
tial contribution to the literature. The latter highlights regional or contextual information
and improves the understanding of the consistencies and inconsistencies in diverse evi-
dence. This study adds to this area of scholarship with a view to improving the visibility
of country-focused topic reviews in the field of web-based political communication.
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On the one hand, it is our aim to provide an up-to-date and comprehensive audit of
the scientific literature on the digitalization of campaign communication, news media, and
citizen interaction in Hungary. The paper is designed to meet a key goal: to introduce the
most important findings of the literature about the internet and politics in Hungary for
the non-Hungarian speaking academic community. A review of international literature is
beyond our scope, and we concentrate only on those articles and books which deal with
Hungary. On the other hand, we pinpoint country specificities in relation to web-based
politics, such as the early advance of free online news media, and the extensive use of
Facebook since 2010. Beside the particular characteristics associated with Hungary, we
also identify gaps in research evidence that will help define future scientific agendas.
Therefore, our article might be especially useful to those scholars who consider Hun-
gary to be a relevant case for comparative work. In other words, this review provides
information that may justify the selection of this country for their academic projects.
First, as part of the introduction, we depict the key figures and the main trends related
to the internet and social media in Hungary. We then discuss online political communi-
cation by focusing on three key agents of interaction: citizens, news media, and political
actors. In the concluding session, underexplored and missing pieces of knowledge are pre-
sented that suggest new avenues for further research.
1.1 e context: key figures regarding internet penetration and social media use
in Hungary
In Hungary, computer and internet penetration have steadily risen in the past two decades.
The proportion of individuals who can access the internet at home via any type of device
and connection increased from 7 per cent (in 2000) to 81 per cent (in 2017). These figures
have always located Hungary in the cluster of low penetration countries in the EU28 (Tar-
dos, 2002; Csepeli & Prazsák, 2010). Although the level of internet penetration in Hungary
(81 per cent) is still below the mean level of EU member countries, the lag is rather modest,
and it is not far from covering the whole population (see Figure 1).
Now social media, especially Facebook, however, play a major role in online activities
in Hungary. As Figure 2 shows, use of Facebook is above the EU mean (54 per cent). Addi-
tionally, YouTube is also very popular (72 per cent) while the level of Twitter penetration
(15 per cent) is one of the lowest in Europe.¹
¹ Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2017. https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/
Digital%20News%20Report%202017%20web_0.pdf
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Figure 1: Internet penetration in EU28 countries (internetworldstat.com, 2017)
Figure 2: Facebook penetration in EU28 countries (interworldstat.com, 2017)
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According to the Reuters Institute Digital News Report, Hungary is second out of
twenty-three European countries that were examined in terms of the proportion of re-
spondents (64 per cent) who obtain political information from Facebook (see Figure 3).
Figure 3: Proportion of respondents who use Facebook for news (Reuters Institute Digital
News Report, 2017)
However, this is not tendency without precedent; online political information was im-
portant in Hungary well before the emergence of social media. In comparative research on
the 2004 EP election, Lusoli (2005) demonstrated that the proportion of citizens who use
the internet as a political information source was the second highest in Hungary amongst
EU25 countries. While these results indicate that internet and social media are more impor-
tant as political information sources in Hungary than in other countries, the most recent
data suggest that TV, radio, online news sites, and offline political conversations are still
more important in relation to how citizens gather political information than social me-
dia. In this regard, an age gap is identifiable: for those under 30 years of age, Facebook
has been identified as the second most important news platform next to TV (Table 1). As
for university students, Facebook is the most important information source for politics,
and political content hosted here can reach politically less interested peers (Bene, 2019).
However, while numerous citizens use Facebook as an information resource, only a mi-
nority engage in disseminating political information on this platform. Eighty per cent of
respondents never share political content on Facebook.
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TV Radio daily news- Facebook Websites offline con- N
papers versations
population 6.61 4.08 2.90 3.24 3.59 4.05 1990
(mean)
under 30 5.59 3.59 2.35 4.70 4.66 4.05 366
(mean)
Table 1. What role do the following information resources play in your political information
consumption? (0-10 scale) (Source: First wave of the survey of ‘Participation, Representation,
Partisanship. Hungarian Election Study 2018’ [NKFI-6, K–119603], December 2017 –
January 2018)
2 Citizens, social media, and political communication
The literature has primarily focused on the issues of the digital divide and its relation-
ship with social capital. Significant divisions in Hungarian society along the traditional
dimensions of social inequality (education, income, age, and domicile) in terms of both
penetration of the internet (Galácz & Molnár, 2003; Galácz & Ságvári, 2008) and usage
patterns (Csepeli & Prazsák, 2010; Nagy, 2008) have been reported. As for social capital,
research has found that a strong connection exists between social capital and internet us-
age (Albert et al., 2008; Molnár, 2004; Csüllög, 2012). However, these issues have mostly
been addressed in the context of Web 1.0.
While the political consequences of citizens’ online activity is a prominent topic in the
international research field (see Boulianne, 2009; Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2012; Skoric et al.,
2016) the topic has received little scholarly attention in Hungary. The empirical findings
discussed above show that the internet and social media play an important role in political
information consumption, while the political effect of consuming online news is highly
underexplored. Amongst the few examples, Dányi and Altorjai (2003) have investigated
what factors affect the ‘e-democratic attitude’ – which refers to the belief that the internet
enables citizens to participate in politics. It has been observed that it is the use of internet
as an information source that shapes this attitude. Fourteen years after this study, it was
demonstrated that the political attitudes of individuals who gather political information
from Facebook are significantly shaped by their peers who actively express their opinions
on this platform (Bene, 2017a). The political perceptions of those who actively search for
politics on Facebook are in line with those of individuals who actively engage in political
information dissemination on this platform. Consequently, the appropriation of Facebook
for political information-seeking purposes strengthens the political influence of the mi-
nority of peers who are politically active on social media.
In line with international research findings (e.g. Bakshy et al., 2015; Barnidge, 2017;
Beam et al., 2018; Heatherly et al., 2017), it has also been shown that the patterns of politi-
cal information consumption on social media are fairly heterogeneous. Polyák and his col-
leagues (2019) found that cross-cutting exposure is a rather common experience on Face-
book, and the majority of users are not frustrated by seeing political content they disagree
with. Janky and his colleagues (2019) also demonstrated that information consumption
is more heterogeneous on Facebook than when people obtain their political information
from professional media outlets or offline conversations. Interestingly, the same study also
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showed that on Facebook cross-cutting exposure is more typical for right-wing voters than
left-wing users (Janky et al., 2019). It is not only Facebook that is able to cut across par-
tisan lines: Matuszewski and Szabó (2019) demonstrated that Twitter networks also show
intense political heterogeneity. These findings are especially important in Hungary, as the
level of cross-cutting exposure was found to be extremely low in comparison with other
European countries before the emergence of social media (see Angelusz & Tardos, 2009;
Castro et al., 2018).
Concerning internet-based discourses, Kiss and his colleagues systematically moni-
tored citizens’ online political communication. Nasty remarks, ad hominem argumenta-
tion, and a lack of a respectful tone dominated online exchanges, although some elements
of rational and logical reasoning were also present on these platforms (Kiss & Boda, 2005).
More importantly, online conversations have been found to be autonomous in relation to
the choice of topics (i.e. independent of mass media agendas) (Szabó & Kiss, 2005). Further-
more, this political communication facilitates the manifestation of latent social conflict by
providing an impersonal space where members of social groups can publicly express and
discuss their grievances against other social groups (Bene, 2013). However, it is not only
the object of these conversations that matters, but also the subjects themselves. The large
segment of people who actively discuss political issues online are political opinion leaders
in offline contexts and can develop their persuasive abilities and find new information and
arguments during online debates (Bene, 2014).
While studies have emerged about Facebook, our knowledge about political conver-
sations on social media in Hungary is still limited. One promising leap forward has been
made by a research project involving psychologists and linguistics. Public comments writ-
ten in response to political posts on Facebook were investigated using novel socio-psycho-
logical measures. Data suggest that comments associated with sentiments of communitar-
ian thinking were more frequent during the campaign period for the general election of
2014 (Miháltz et al. 2015).
The effects of digital media usage on political behavior are an under-examined topic.
Kende and her colleagues (2016) applied a psychological approach to investigate the ef-
fects of the usage of social media on offline collective action among university students.
They claim that it is not the usage of social media in itself that is positively related to
participation in collective action, but a special form of it: the use of social media for so-
cial affirmation. The latter occurs when students actively express their identities on social
media. Nemeslaki and his colleagues (2016) addressed the rather practical issue of online
voting and its effects on attitudes toward voting. The opportunity for online voting in-
creases the level of intention to participate, but this is mediated by the level of trust in the
internet, ease-of-use, and performance expectancy about online voting systems.
3 News media, internet, and social media platforms
The first websites with professional news content appeared in the late 1990s in Hungary
(Szabó, 2008), and the scholarly community responded to the challenge of the digitalization
of media in the early years of 2000. The specificity of the Hungarian case is that pioneer-
ing online news portals were established independently and separately from preexisting
publishing houses. The established press entered the online world only later.
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The first wave of studies saw the impact of the internet on traditional media as a battle
between new and old forms of communication. Building on the branch of international
literature which argued that new technologies seemed to threaten to put an end to jour-
nalism and do away with traditional journalistic roles (Harper, 1996; Morris & Ogan, 1996;
Schultz, 2000; Deuze, 2001; Klotz, 2003: 31–34), the internet was discussed as one of the
main contributors to the crisis of journalism and the decline in the readership of the writ-
ten press. Initially, conceptual and normative reflections dominated the disputes about
the topic, and it was mostly techno-optimistic approaches to the internet that were intro-
duced. As for such optimistic accounts, scholarly speculation included the scenario that
the internet would transform political communication with its decentralized, accessible,
and endless flow of interaction. Grass-roots initiatives and professionals outside of the big
media corporations were seen as the winners of the technological turn (Dessewffy, 2002;
Dányi et al. 2004: 19; Szabó & Mihályffy, 2009: 94). However, the realist approach drew
attention to the role of elites in the diffusion of new technologies, suggesting that news
corporations would be likely to capitalize on using the internet in Hungary as well (Kiss,
2004). Interestingly enough, no significant techno-pessimistic voices were represented in
the scholarly discussion: little concern was raised about the quality of web-based news
production or about the polarizing effects of online self-segregation.
The second wave of research provided data-driven reflections about online platforms
and their role in the media environment in Hungary. Conforming to the business-as-usual
type of arguments (Margolis & Resnick; Boczkowski, 2004; Bressers, 2006), such empirical
evidence moderated the claim of revolutionary change in news media by demonstrating
that television was, and still is, the primary source of political information amongst vot-
ers.² The convergence of online and offline news media appeared as the main paradigm,
leading to the production of case studies and comparative examinations of political cover-
age, user-generated content, digital journalism, and news consumption in the international
literature (Achtenhagen & Raviola, 2009; Chao-Chen, 2013; Doudaki & Spyridou, 2013) –
and Hungarian studies likewise confirmed these claims (Polyák, 2002; Kumin, 2004; Csigó,
2009; Szabó & Mihályffy , 2009; Koltai, 2010; Aczél et al., 2015).
Research on news media portals highlighted the fact that political topics and elec-
tions have been heavily covered on the internet in Hungary as well. On the one hand,
such coverage has included following the agendas of parties and regularly reporting about
campaign events; on the other hand the agenda-setting capacity of the portals has also
been demonstrated (Szabó, 2010; Szabó, 2011). Three distinctive elements of this coverage
have been revealed: first, online news has tended to focus on polling data and almost ex-
clusively reported on candidates instead of policy programs (Szabó, 2010; 2011). Second,
laypeople’s experiences with campaigns have been actively presented with the involve-
² A médiafogyasztás jellemzői és a hírműsorok általános megítélése Magyarországon (The char-
acteristics of media consumption and the general opinion of news bulletins in Hungary), Na-
tional Radio and Television Commission (Országos Rádió és Televízió Testület, ORTT), January
2007, p. 10. See http://ortt.hu/elemzesek/21/1175188490mediafogyasztas_jellemzoi_20070329.pdf; Map-
ping digital media: Hungary (country report). A report by the Open Society Foundation. 2012.
p. 17. See https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/mapping-digital-media-hungary-
20120216.pdf; A politikai tájékozódás forrásai Magyarországon. A médiastruktúra átalakulása előtti
és az utána következő állapot (The sources of political information in Hungary. The situation be-
fore and after the changes in the media structure), see http://mertek.eu/sites/default/files/reports/
hirfogyasztas2016_0.pdf.
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ment of user-generated content related to politics (videos, photos, text messages from the
readership) (Szabó, 2008). Third, stylistic features have been studied as typical elements of
online portals. Most of the news items were written with reference to the personal expe-
rience and values of the journalists, with no claims to objectivity (Szabó, 2008; Szabó &
Kiss, 2012). This is especially true of publications by radical-right outlets (e.g. kuruc.info,
and hunhir.hu), which have been particularly important for the radical-right parties and
movements, since the latter have limited access to mainstream media (Róna, 2016: 52).
The second wave of studies confirmed that traditional media outlets (except for tele-
vision), especially printed press products, have lost their audiences, while the number of
visitors to websites has steadily increased (Bodoky, 2007; Szabó, 2008). However, explana-
tions for this tendency vary (the global financial and economic crisis, freely available web-
based news, an apolitical or apathetic audience). As the number of internet users increased,
so did the size of audiences for online platforms. Between 2005 and 2011, the top online
news sources about politics tripled their average number of visitors.³ Notwithstanding the
fact that television channels should be considered the main source of political information
of voters,⁴ experts assessed online media portals as being significant competitors of tradi-
tional outlets (Popescu et al., 2012: 37). Mostly due to the fragmented media environment
(incl. online news portals), audience selection and the gatekeeping efforts of journalist
have become equally important when talking about politics in Hungary (Merkovity, 2012:
134–137).
The third wave of studies claimed that online media had become fully integrated into
the mainstream news process (Tófalvy, 2017). Researchers of the third wave include a
group of international academics who have emphasized that the public sphere today is
highly fragmented into different but interconnected spaces for public communication, me-
dia platforms, audiences, and agendas (Blumler, 2013; Dubois & Blank, 2018). Nowadays,
the public sphere is argued to be an ecosystem with multiple discussion fora, in which
consumers’ choice of news and other selection processes shape the dynamics of political
communication (Thorson & Wells, 2016; Van Aelst et al., 2017). Such evaluations are sup-
ported by a study on Hungary that demonstrates that web-based portals are considered a
reliable source of political information by traditional media outlets as well (Szabó & Bene,
2016). A recent analysis pays particular attention to the political connections of the owners
of internet-based and traditional media, which factor has been evaluated as an indicator
of political control over the media in Hungary.⁵ It is confirmed that strong governmental
and economic pressures challenge the editorial freedom of the digital press, but that the
online sphere is still plural, with a wide range of news portals/blogs. It is safe to say that
the vast majority of the online news portals in Hungary have an identifiable sympathy
or antipathy towards former and current governments, and politically like-minded media
outlets and audiences tend to cluster. However, the phenomenon of cross-readership is
³ Mapping digital media: Hungary. A Report by the Open Society Foundation. https://www.
opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/mapping-digital-media-hungary-20120216.pdf
⁴ A politikai tájékozódás forrásai Magyarországon. A médiastruktúra átalakulása előtti és az utána
következő állapot (The sources of political information in Hungary. The situation before and after the
changes in the media structure), see http://mertek.eu/sites/default/files/reports/hirfogyasztas2016_0.pdf
⁵ Az újságírók sajtószabadságképe 2016-ban (The perceptions of journalists about media freedom in 2017).
See http://mertek.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/ujsagirok_sajtoszabadsag_2016.pdf
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significant, and multiple voices can be heard in digital spaces,⁶ which mitigates concerns
about partisan-based selective exposure in Hungary.
The relatively low cost of internet-based content production has facilitated the discur-
sive dissemination of right-wing radicalism. In contrast to the mainstream media, online
spaces have facilitated platforms fully controlled by content producers, supporting the
breakthrough of the ‘communicative quarantine’ related to right-wing radicals (Norocel
et al., 2017).
So far, little knowledge is available about the relationship between social media (Face-
book, Twitter, Youtube, and Instagram) and news journalism. There is a pressing need to
investigate how mainstream media outlets use social media channels to influence news
saturation and distribute our news (Ferencz & Rétfalvi, 2011). The effects of such new
tools in civil engagement and participation in the flow of political communication also
requires testing, as do innovative forms of investigative journalism. Further studies might
also include measures of virality and the discursive connectivity between social media and
traditional formats of news media. Data-driven analysis of the dissemination of fake news
is also crucial. The impact of social media on the daily work of journalists is also amongst
the rather under-researched topics in this field in Hungary (for an exception, see Barta,
2018).
4 Politics and Social Media
One of the most widely investigated topics in the Hungarian literature is the use of online
tools by political actors. Similarly to international patterns (see Stromer-Galley, 2014), po-
litical parties started appearing online in 1996, and by the time of the national election of
1998 all parliamentary parties owned webpages (Dányi, 2002). At this time, however, the
phenomenon did not trigger political science research, and scholars turned their attention
to online politics only following the general election of 2002. Although scholars reported
that parties and politicians’ websites still played a marginal role in the election campaign of
2002 (Dányi & Galácz, 2005), this was the first campaign when the political importance of
digital technologies was clearly revealed. During the tight electoral competition between
the two rounds of elections, citizens actively engaged in creating and spreading political
messages through SMS and e-mail. Sükösd and Dányi (2003) showed that mobilization-
related content, humorous messages, fake news, and negative campaigning were widely
disseminated through the viral chains of digital networks. Before new online tools became
widespread, several pieces of research focused on examples of their innovative usage. In
the campaign of 2006, the most important innovation in the field of online politics was
that the then prime minister, Ferenc Gyurcsány, started a personal blog that became a
crucial communication platform, enjoying significant public and media attention. Ferenc
Gyurcsány, who later won the election, employed a highly personal, diary-like style on
the blog (Horváth, 2007). In response to this challenge, the leader of the conservative force,
Viktor Orbán, started to run a videoblog in 2007 (Kitta, 2011). Social media sites as cam-
paign tools first appeared during the run-up to the election of 2010. The winner of the
⁶ Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2017. Hungary, pp. 74–75. https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/
sites/default/files/Digital%20News%20Report%202017%20web_0.pd?utm_source=digitalnewsreport.org
&utm_medium=referral
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latter, Fidesz, and its leader Viktor Orbán, reached the most people on Facebook, but the
two new parties, Jobbik and LMP, who managed to enter parliament, also strongly relied
on social media (Mihályffy et al., 2010). By the time of the election of 2014, social media,
especially Facebook, had become established campaign tools (Bene, 2020). A comparative
study about the EP election of 2014 found that the evaluation of new media campaign
tools reached the second highest value among Hungarian campaign managers of the 12
countries that were examined (Lilleker et al., 2015).
Studies that attempted to map the political social media sphere showed that politicians’
social media activities were rather centralized: first the party, and then leaders opened
Facebook pages, then candidates later created Facebook accounts for their constituencies,
whilst Twitter penetration has remained fairly low (Kitta, 2011; Balogh, 2011; Merkovity,
2018). In the last couple of years, Facebook use has become normal among politicians. In
2018, almost all candidates from parties with measurable electoral support⁷ had a Facebook
page, but only a small minority of them had Instagram accounts, while Twitter penetration
remained insignificant (Bene & Farkas, 2018). Turning to an assessment of performance on
Facebook, research demonstrates that in 2014 – during the first election when Facebook
was intensively used by political actors – left-wing politicians were more successful in
terms of triggering reactions (Bene, 2020), but by the time of the 2018 elections Fidesz per-
formed better in some dimensions, such as the number of likes and overall activity. While
Viktor Orbán is still the most followed Hungarian politician on Facebook, most politicians
who have a large number of followers are members of the opposition (Bene & Farkas, 2018).
Having said that, it seems that politicians from different parties follow similar strategies
on Facebook, with only minor differences in their social media communication strategies
during the 2014 election (Bene, 2020).
Beyond the issue of the adoption of new online tools, several important topics from
the international research field have also been addressed. The scholarly literature on digital
campaigning has primarily focused on parties’ websites. Consistent with international ten-
dencies (e.g. Davis, 1999; Stromer & Galley, 2000; Jackson, 2007) parties’ sites are charac-
terized by top-down communication; they are highly informative, but offer limited oppor-
tunity for interaction (Kiss & Boda, 2005; Dányi & Galácz, 2005; Merkovity, 2011). Vergeer
and his colleagues’ (2012) comparative work on the EP campaign of 2009 found that Hun-
garian parties’ and candidates’ websites barely use social networking features, but they
are the most personalized out of the 17 countries involved.
Political websites, however, are not the only spaces where interactions between politi-
cians and citizens can take place. Merkovity (2014) examined Hungarian MPs’ propensity
to respond to e-mail messages. The study found that 27 per cent of MPs were willing to
answer e-mails sent by the researcher, and women and politicians from opposition parties
were more likely to reply than men and MPs from government parties.
Recently, social media interactions and virality have received scholarly attention. The
distribution logic of social media is virality (Klinger & Svensson, 2015), as political ac-
tors can reach a wider population if they can trigger reactions from their followers. Bene
(2018) demonstrated that the number of shares on candidates’ Facebook posts have a minor
but significant effect on the number of personal votes. Koltai and Stevkovics (2018) found
that the number of likes on political leaders’ and parties’ Facebook pages could some-
⁷ Fidesz-KDNP, Jobbik, MSZP-P, DK, LMP, Együtt, Momentum, MKKP (N = 586)
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what predict their general popularity. Further, it was found that textual Facebook entries
with negative messages and mobilization content are more likely to be liked and shared
by followers (Bene, 2017b). Viral posts are characterized by intense negativity and moral
critiques of opponents (Bene, 2017c). Additionally, it has been demonstrated that patterns
of user engagement are highly similar across political camps: followers of right-wing and
left-wing politicians engage with the same types of posts (Bene, 2020). The results show
that users share such posts without individual contribution or comment; they do not dis-
tort the original messages when they disseminate them (Bene, 2017c).
The equalizing nature of digital campaign tools (see Gibson & McAllister, 2015; Koc-
Michalska et al., 2016) has been scrutinized. It was observed that the minor parliamen-
tary parties had more sophisticated websites than the biggest parties (Kiss & Boda, 2005).
Moreover, they spent more money on online campaigning than the leading parties (Kiss
et al., 2007). Another argument for the equalization potential of the internet comes from
the legislative elections in 2010. The year 2010 was the first time since the regime change
in Hungary when parties without parliamentary experience managed to enter parliament.
Moreover, the radical right party, Jobbik, received nearly 17 per cent of party list votes, but
the newly formed green anti-establishment party LMP also passed the electoral threshold.
Both parties heavily employed social media during their campaigns (Mihályffy et al., 2011),
and attracted and reached more social media supporters than the majority of established
parties and politicians (Kitta, 2011). The internet played an important role in the success of
Jobbik and research has investigated the online network of radical-right subcultures that
have evolved around the latter party (Jeskó et al., 2012; Malkovics, 2013).
Internet-based campaign tools, especially social media, are important for minor politi-
cal actors. Bene and Somodi (2018) interviewed minor parties’ (LMP, DK, PM, Momentum,
Együtt) campaign managers, who unanimously stated that social media is one of their most
important campaign tools, and they use it to increase their public visibility through viral
posts. However, smaller parties and less well known politicians have fewer followers on
social media platforms, and spent less money on online and social media campaigns than
more established political actors (Bene & Somodi, 2018). For example, on Facebook, the
most important social media platform, the Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán soon
acquired a large number of followers (Kitta, 2011), and since then no political actor has
approached his number of followers (Bene & Farkas, 2018).
Over the last few years, increasing attention has been paid to digital-media-enabled
collective action, which is also a much-discussed topic in the international literature (see
Bennet & Segerberg, 2014; Bimber, 2017; Karpf, 2016). According to Mátay and Kaposi’s
analysis (2008), online communication played a major role in the organization of the anti-
government protests in 2006. The latter argued that offline collective action was enabled
by the revolutionary rhetoric and language developed in the online sphere that facilitated
the bridging of ideological gaps between different segments of protest participants. The
Facebook-based, horizontal activist network (‘One Million for the Freedom of Press in
Hungary’ movement), which organized a large-scale, offline series of anti-government
protests between 2011 and 2012, has been studied by Wilkin and his colleagues (2015).
Dessewffy and Nagy (2016) investigated the Facebook-based grassroots migrant solidarity
group Migration Aid. The group used social media to organize civic responses to the mi-
gration crisis in 2015. It’s flexible ‘rhizomatic’ structure enabled this organization to react
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quickly to contextual challenges and to interconnect low- and high-threshold online and
offline activities. Another example of citizens’ digitally enabled collective action is the anti-
billboard campaign of the Hungarian joke party ‘Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya Párt’ (Hungarian
two-tailed dog party) (Nagy, 2016). After the government initiated an anti-migration bill-
board campaign, several citizens started to transform and abuse the billboards in order to
distort their messages. The counter-billboards caricatured the original campaign, and drew
strongly upon humor, citizens’ co-creation efforts, and crowd-sourcing. This digitally en-
abled offline action was able to successfully interfere with and modify the government-
driven hegemonic public discourse (Nagy, 2016). However, these case studies also show
the limitations of digitally enabled collective action: each of these collective activities was
successful within a short time period, but this organizational method was not able to pro-
mote long-term, sustainable civic action.
5 Conclusion
This article has provided a comprehensive review of online news media and political com-
munication in Hungary. Two main specificities were identified concerning digitalization in
Hungary: one is the relatively large amount of academic reflection about the relationship
between the internet and democracy in the early years of 2000; the other is the relative
lack of data-driven exploration of the political consequences of social media. From the mid-
2000s onwards, the field became thoroughly internationalized in terms of the reception of
Anglophone-oriented literature. The instrumentalization of the new communication tools
by political actors and the convergence of old and new media have been deeply investigated
in the Hungarian context. While the digital activities of political parties and developments
in online media are amongst the fashionable topics of political communication research,
the citizen perceptive has only recently been discovered. In terms of methodology, both
normative and descriptive approaches have been applied, mainly using single case studies
and cross-case comparative methods. Longitudinal analyses are, however, sorely lacking
in the assessment of the evolution of digital political communication in Hungary. Criti-
cal issues of online polarization, attitudes, and affective polarization in the discussion of
politics also remain under-researched in Hungary. In addition, there is a pressing need for
comparative analyses in order to help comprehend regional specificities and differences in
the perspectives of Central and Eastern European countries.
The digitalization of political communication has created an opportunity for communi-
cation scholars to develop new concepts, new methods, and new tools for research. Various
challenges are faced by investigators who undertake political communication research. The
main theoretical challenge is conducting integrative analysis in political communication
studies to overcome the limitations of the classic producer (actor) – content – audience (re-
ceiver) types of approaches. While most theories of digital media point to the oscillation be-
tween producers and users, textual and visual materials, and originality and repetitive use
(Van Dijck, 2009; Bechmann & Lomborg, 2012; Dean, 2018), studies about digital campaign-
ing and online news media still adhere to a linear model. So far, the biggest methodological
challenge has been involving the techniques of computational social science. Investigating
the digital footprints left behind from politics-related social media activity with the aid of
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big data would demand specialized technological knowledge and skills, and this is yet to
be accomplished.
We hope that the trajectory of research we have depicted will be helpful in identifying
the research gaps and in advancing our knowledge about online politics in Hungary.
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Hungary as a Norm Entrepreneur in Migration Policy
Veonika Cina*







This paper analyses Hungary as a small state within the EU and the policy it ap-
plied during the refugee crisis of 2015/2016 that changed the landscape both on the
European and Hungarian level. During the crisis, Hungary acted as a small, interest-
maximizing Member State constrained by domestic political interests, and it not only
refused to participate in common European policy proposals aimed at solving the cri-
sis, but it also engaged in unilateral actions perceived as solutions, such as erecting a
border wall on the southern border of Hungary. This paper examines how Hungary
acted during the refugee crisis with the help of small state theories. Presenting the
events, legislative changes and discourses surrounding migration policy in the past
years will show that Hungary managed to take advantage of the refugee crisis by
acting as a norm-entrepreneur by articulating its own views and convictions about
the right way to solve the crisis, and also about the future of the EU as a whole. Many
EU Member States joined Hungary in its migration strategy, so it became the leading
country of the anti-immigration block in Europe.
Keywords: Hungary, refugee crisis, migration, sovereignty, norm advocacy, small
states
1 Introduction
This paper discusses migration and asylum policy in Hungary in light of European Union
regulations, with a special focus on the refugee crisis of 2015/2016, which changed the
landscape on both the European and Hungarian level. The research examines what kind
of policy Hungary followed towards the EU with regard to this issue from the perspective
of the theory of small state studies. During the crisis, Hungary acted as a small, interest-
maximizing Member State constrained by domestic political interests. It not only refused
to participate in common European policy proposals aimed at solving the crisis, but it
also engaged in unilateral actions perceived as solutions, such as erecting a border wall
on the southern border of Hungary. This paper seeks an answer to the question how did
Hungary as a small EU Member State act during the refugee crisis. The research presumes
that the Orbán government managed to take advantage of the refugee crisis by acting as
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a norm entrepreneur – a smart small-state strategy – which gave the Prime Minister the
opportunity to articulate his own views and convictions about the right way to solve the
crisis, and also about the future of the EU as a whole. Norm entrepreneurship refers to the
strategy when a country takes a certain stance regarding a specific policy and successfully
convinces others of its own normative convictions. Many EU Member States joined Hun-
gary in its migration strategy, so it became the leading country of the anti-immigration
bloc in Europe. At the same time, the research will reveal that while some interest-driven
strategies can be explained by small state theories, there are a number of symbolic, rogue¹
Member State actions that cannot be accounted for even by the academic literature. This
paper will try to provide conclusions about Hungary’s performance as a small EU Member
State in the policy area of migration and asylum. It will apply an inductive method: show-
ing the impact of specific Hungarian migratory regulations and actions on the EU level of
handling the migration crisis. First, the theoretical background of small state studies will
be presented. Then, the Hungarian regulations concerning migration policy in light of the
EU regulations and their changes due to the crisis will be examined. Last but not least, the
paper will show how Hungary took advantage and became a norm entrepreneur in this
policy area during the crisis.
2 Small states – norm entrepreneurs
Generally, small state studies offer a framework for analysis within the discipline of IR/Eu-
ropean studies that gives the researcher valuable insight into the behavior of states. Nev-
ertheless, some researchers are doubtful about this argument and ask whether the concept
of smallness is a useful analytical tool at all (Baehr, 1975: 455–456). Others claim that small
state studies are relevant only to the extent that they allow us to understand the behavior
of states in international politics (Conrad, 2013). In my view, if only the latter statement
is true, then the researcher can still gain a lot from turning towards small state studies be-
cause the latter represent a useful analytical tool or conceptual framework for analyzing
certain types of country behavior and strategies, both on the individual level in the in-
ternational arena and within international organizations. Although small state studies are
frequently criticized due to the broadness of the category of ‘small’ and the diverse nature
of states that belong to the group, I argue that the approach is a good starting point for
analysis because the small state concept can facilitate understanding of the behavior of the
examined state (Gerger, 1975). This is especially true in the case of the European Union. Al-
though small Member States outnumber large ones, the latter are generally believed to be
the engine of policy-making, leaving the small ones at the margins of theoretical and em-
pirical attention in terms of their role in EU governance. Researchers who deal with small
states argue that these countries are worth examining because they are likely to show
some commonalities that are different from those of large states, thus it can be expected
that their behavior will be different as well (Thorhallsson, 2000). Authors usually identify
the main characteristics of small countries that put them in a special, usually more diffi-
cult situation in the international arena than their larger peers. These characteristics are,
for example, vulnerability (Bailes & Thorhallsson, 2013), openness (Katzenstein, 2003: 9)
¹ ‘Rogue’ in this paper refers to a policy of a country that runs counter to mainstream, rule-abiding, norm-
respecting Member State action in the European Union.
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and a lack of resources (Panke, 2012: 329). One of the most prominent researchers of small
EU Member States, Diana Panke, derives all her arguments from the presumption that
small EU Member States face structural disadvantages in relation to exerting influence in
EU policy-making (Panke, 2008). The main components of the disadvantage of the smaller
ones, thus their most important characteristics, are their lack of political power, their in-
sufficient resources to develop policy expertise, the fact that they joined the EU recently,
and their lack of expertise and proficiency to operate as policy forerunners (Thorhallsson,
2000; Panke, 2012). The existence of this structural disadvantage is the central tenet of re-
search that focuses on small states and it determines the common thread in most small state
studies: scholars who research this topic usually try to discover how the latter countries
can manoeuver in their narrow or broad spheres of interest, and how they can success-
fully influence international (or European) policy making or promote their own interests.
There are certain conditions under which small states can successfully pursue their ob-
jectives in the EU. The main researchers of the topic outline strategies for small Member
States and the circumstances under which they can exercise influence despite their disad-
vantages in the EU. These are, in particular, being an old Member State (Panke, 2010: 799),
possessing policy expertise (Börzel, 2002; Jakobsen, 2008), having good economic, insti-
tutional and administrative capacities (Campbell & Hall, 2009: 547), creating coalitions or
partnerships (Meerts, 1997: 463), and having a unified national position (Kronsell, 2002),
among others. Many researchers consider institutional aspects, such as holding important
positions in the EU (e.g. the Council Presidency) (Luther, 1999: 65), having close ties with
the European Commission (Bunse et al., 2005), and applying the ‘community method’ in
decision-making (Veebel, 2014: 161) to be important, too. Political elites can also play a
huge part in defining the strategies of small states (Campbell & Hall, 2009).
Although this paper examines Hungary as a small state within the EU, it is not evident
that Hungary actually belongs to the category of small countries, therefore it is necessary
to define what qualifies as ‘small’ in the current research. Diana Panke identified the al-
location of votes among states in qualified majority voting in the Council, and defined as
small those states with fewer votes than the EU average (Panke, 2010). Based on this cate-
gorization, she identified nineteen small states (20 after the accession of Croatia in 2013).
This paper uses Panke’s understanding of ‘small,’ because the distribution of votes in the
Council reflects the size and population of the Member States, so it is a clear and compre-
hensive categorization. Although since the introduction of the double majority system in
2014, the system of weighted votes is no longer applied in the EU, Panke’s categorization
still can be used. The old QMV system is still a good basis for differentiating between small
and large EU members as it forms the basis of a clear and comprehensive system of catego-
rization that reflects size and population. Based on these terms, Hungary can be identified
as a small Member State of the EU.
A distinct type of small state behavior discovered in the 1990s–2000s within small state
studies is the ‘smart state strategy’ (Arter, 2000: 677). Scholars argue that smart states are
able to ‘exploit the weakness of small states as resource for influence’ by having well-
developed preferences, being able to present their initiatives as being the interests of the
whole EU, and being able to mediate (Grøn & Wivel, 2011). The concept has been fur-
ther developed by Caroline Howard Grøn and Anders Wivel (2011), who argue that cer-
tain developments in the EU introduced by the Lisbon Treaty undermine the traditional
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small state approach to European integration (Grøn & Wivel, 2011). Therefore, the authors
identified the characteristics of an ideal smart strategy that small states should apply in
order to accommodate and ‘take advantage of the new institutional environment.’ They
created three variations of ideal smart state strategies: the state as lobbyist, the state as a
self-interested mediator, and the state as a norm entrepreneur. Gunta Pastore (2013) also
examined the recent behavior of small states, focusing mainly on the youngest EU Member
States, and found that these countries moved closer towards a small state smart strategy,
which includes compromise-seeking behavior, persuasive deliberation, lobbying, and us-
ing coalitions. This paper aims to prove that norm entrepreneurship is a strategy Hungary
started to apply in 2015 during the refugee crisis in Europe that helped Prime Minister
Orbán to become an advocate for national sovereignty and – from a certain perspective –
the ‘protector of the EU’ from ‘the migrant invasion’ (kormany.hu, 2018).
3 Migration and refugee regulations in Hungary aer the refugee crisis
The Hungarian migratory framework introduced during the refugee crisis is based on cer-
tain provisions of the Hungarian Fundamental Law (formerly, the Constitution) and sev-
eral legal acts that modified the pre-crisis migration system of the country. The Funda-
mental Law of Hungary outlines that Hungary is obliged to provide asylum to displaced
persons (Article XIV (3)), and that it is prohibited to expel anyone to a country in which
they would be in danger. Thus, Hungary fulfilled its obligations stemming from inter-
national law about providing asylum before the crisis escalated. However, the seventh
modification of the Hungarian Fundamental Law enacted some changes, and assessed that
those citizens who arrived in Hungary through safe states were not eligible for asylum
(Paragraph 4). Moreover, the Fundamental Law also declares that ‘foreign people cannot
be resettled into Hungary’ (Paragraph 1). These changes were enacted in 2018 and raise
questions about Hungary’s compatibility with international law and European migratory
standards.
The refugee crisis of 2015/2016 resulted in general hostility towards immigrants on the
side of the Hungarian government and the general population; moreover, the previously
well-functioning Hungarian migration system was also modified (Hungarian Helsinki Com-
mittee, 2017). The most frequent decision of the Hungarian authorities regarding asylum
applications between 2013 and 2016 was either rejection or termination. This meant that
there was hardly any substantive decision-making in the system, and that in the major-
ity of cases evaluation and asylum applications were left to another Member State (Nagy,
2016: 1037). The unusually low rate of recognition was alarming compared to the previous
years (Nagy, 2016: 1039). A government decree (No. 301 of 2007, November 9) dealing with
the procedure and support for applicants was amended 17 times between 2014 and 2019
(Tóth, 2019: 130). The possibility for potential refugees to acquire international protection
was decreased both through physical and administrative means, while illegal border cross-
ings were criminalized, the circumstances of those who were let into the country did not
meet the minimum humanitarian standards, and solidarity and cooperation with the EU
regarding the matter were reduced to a minimum (Vető, 2017). In 2015, the Hungarian
government spent 84 billion HUF on migration control and more than 100 billion HUF
in 2016 (Tóth, 2019: 131). The Hungarian Helsinki Committee, in a paper that analyzes
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the Hungarian way of handling the refugee crisis and provides suggestions for an effec-
tive and sustainable refugee system, argues that the main purpose of the re-calibration
of the Hungarian refugee system during the crisis was first of all to prevent the entry of
refugees to the country; second, to stop refugees from applying for asylum; and third, to
urge refugees to move towards Western Europe as soon as possible. The Committee claims
that the Hungarian legislation and government actions are contrary to international law,
and that Hungary is neglecting its obligations stemming from EU membership and the
Schengen zone (Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 2017). In 2015, a record number of asy-
lum claims were filed in Hungary (177,135 applications), four times more than in 2014. This
increase was not accompanied by an increase in financial assistance for this policy area,
but instead Hungary tried to handle the situation by creating a physical barrier first, and
then by legal mechanisms (Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 2017: 8). The following pages
describe the most important actions of the Hungarian authorities in relation to their at-
tempt to stop migration: namely, creating a list of safe third states, erecting a border wall,
and creating transit zones.
3.1 Safe third states
One of the most significant changes to the Hungarian migratory system was induced by
Act CVI of 2015 on the amendment of Act LXXX of 2007 on Asylum. This law allowed the
government to adopt a list of safe third states. In July 2015, government Decree 191/2015
promulgated the list of safe third countries and the list of safe countries of origin. The two
lists were identical. The first major change in the refugee status determination procedure
came in July 2015 through Act CXXVII of 2015 on the establishment of a temporary secu-
rity border-closure, and on the amendment of laws relating to migration. This law aimed at
accelerating and simplifying asylum procedure in general, but the more significant compo-
nent of it was the construction of a physical barrier at the Serbian-Hungarian border. More-
over, the act imposed shorter deadlines for the authorities to decide on asylum-seekers’
cases and for applicants’ right to remedy, expanded the list of potential places they could
be detained, and also had the effect that persons could be removed from the country be-
fore the first judicial review of their applications had even started (Nagy, 2016: 1046). It is
important to note here that these acts were not new to the EU acquis, and it was within the
right of the country to promulgate them. However, Hungarian legislators chose the options
least favorable to asylum seekers. They also put a huge burden on Serbia by designating it
a safe country, thereby forcing it to process hundreds of thousands of applications (Nagy,
2016: 1046). In this case, it is very hard to define where the line is between fulfilling the
country’s commitments to Schengen by protecting the EU’s borders, and making the lives
of refugees harder. Creating the list of safe states was not a violation of EU law, meaning
that it falls within the category of interest-based Member State action. However, if we take
into account the burden this imposed on Serbia and the effect it had on refugees, together
with other acts of the Hungarian government, it may be categorized as rogue Member
State action. In March 2020, the first Chamber of the CJEU found in a preliminary ruling
procedure that refusing to process an asylum seeker’s application for international pro-
tection because they had arrived to Hungary through a safe state ran counter to Directive
2013/32/EU (Court of Justice of the European Union, 2020).
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3.2 Border wall along the Serbian and Croatian border
In autumn 2015, the construction of a wall on the Southern borders of Hungary started, and
this action was followed by certain legislative acts aimed at reducing the number of immi-
grants, without taking humanitarian aspects into consideration. In 2016, a second portion
of the wall was built in order to stop immigrants entering from the Western Balkans route,
and to keep the problem outside Hungary by pushing the whole issue towards Serbia and
Romania (Tóth, 2019: 129). The wall – stretching along more than 170 kilometers of the Ser-
bian and Croatian border – was intended to prevent refugees from entering the country,
and crossing the wall was declared a crime by authorities. These measures resulted in a dra-
matic drop in asylum applications between October 2015 and January 2016, which clearly
shows the impact of the ‘fences’ (Nagy, 2016: 1040). This strategy is called externalization
in the academic literature. It is important to highlight that Hungary was a policy promoter
in its erection of a fence (or a norm entrepreneur, in other words). Hungary saw an op-
portunity to act against mainstream EU policies and become a leader of anti-immigrant
voices in the EU. This happened on the one hand by refusing to participate in the manda-
tory relocation mechanism of the EU, and on the other hand by erecting the fence along
the Southern border of Hungary. These activities indeed served as examples that could be
followed by fellow EU Member States. The former position was indeed adopted by some
of the V4 countries, and the latter by many more EU countries: by the end of 2018, 10 out
of the 28 EU members had erected different kinds of border walls (Stone, 2019). It is im-
portant to highlight that no legal criticism may be levelled against the fence itself, as it is
defined as a means of protecting the border of the EU in a crisis situation.
3.3 Transit zones
Act CXL of 2015 on the amendment of certain acts in connection with mass migration was
the second major change introduced to Hungarian asylum law during the refugee crisis.
It adopted an overarching legal framework that amended and affected several other acts
(the Asylum Act, Criminal Code, Borders Act, etc.). The basis of the acts was declaring a
‘crisis situation caused by mass immigration’ through which the government could justify
its unusually strict policy against asylum seekers. Transit zones were established with the
purpose of hosting public officials responsible for managing refugee status determination
procedures. However, access to the zones was limited: officials had the authority to de-
cide how many people they would permit to enter a container where the administrative
procedures were handled (Nagy, 2016: 1064). A new border procedure was introduced that
was only applicable in the transit zone. This process combined detention without court
oversight through the imposition of a very rapid procedure involving permitting no real
access to legal assistance, and making the use of legal remedy almost impossible (Nagy,
2016: 1048). In addition, a number of criminal procedural rules were changed in a way that
removed the protection from immigrants accused of crimes related to the irregular cross-
ing of the fence (Nagy, 2016: 1049). Some researchers argue that, as surprising as the latter
initiative may seem, from a legal point of view these acts could be passed because both the
Geneva Convention and UNHCR are unclear in relation to this area. In 2016, the UNHCR
concluded in its country paper that it ‘considers that Hungary’s law and practice in rela-
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tion to the prosecution of asylum seekers for unauthorized crossing of the border fence [is]
likely to be at variance with obligations under international and EU law’ (UNHCR, 2016).
Act CLXXV of 2015 is called the Protection of Hungary and Europe against the in-
troduction of a compulsory implemented quota, even though it concerns the reception of
asylum seekers and the burden sharing of a common European refugee policy. This is part
of the government’s campaign of deception towards its citizens, which targets refugees
and blames the EU’s migration policy, both of which are clear manifestations of symbolic,
rogue behavior. This law entrusted the government to turn to the CJEU for the annulment
of Council decision 2015/1601, pursuant to Article 263 TEU, as will be discussed later (Tóth,
2019: 136).
The rhetoric behind the government’s actions was that the country wants to stop illegal
migration, while providing proper treatment to those people who have legal documenta-
tion for applying for asylum. However, this standpoint did not take into consideration the
fact that many refugees could not possibly have the necessary papers due to the condi-
tions under which they were forced to flee their home countries. Moreover, the criminal-
ization of refugees is contrary to the Geneva Convention (Hungarian Helsinki Committee,
2017: 9).
By the end of 2016, several legislative changes had entered into force in Hungary. Act
XCIV of 2016 (which entered into force in July) legalized the pushing back of refugees to
the non-Hungarian side of the wall without any legal procedure or remedy. Anyone caught
within an 8 km radius of the fence was ‘escorted’ back to the southern side of the wall.
This practice, according to the Helsinki Committee, violated Hungarian, European, and
international refugee law (Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 2017: 9) and detention during
the border procedures might be considered to be a ‘legally indefensible punishment’ (Nagy,
2016: 1065). In May 2020, the CJEU’s decision in two joint cases about the transit zones was
published. It stated that ‘the placing of asylum seekers or third-country nationals who are
the subject of a return decision in the Röszke transit zone at the Serbian-Hungarian border
must be classified as “detention”’ (Court of Justice of the European Union, 2020). The Court
held that persons seeking international protection can be detained, but only for a maximum
of four weeks. Moreover, the body also made remarks about the conditions in the transit
zones, namely Röszke. The CJEU found that the conditions prevailing in the Röszke transit
zone qualified as deprivation of liberty, primarily because the persons concerned could
not lawfully leave the zone in any direction. As a result of the judgement, the Hungarian
government decided to close the transit zones on the Hungarian-Serbian border (About
Hungary, 2020). With this decision, although the government decided to comply with the
CJEU ruling, it also made asylum applications more difficult. Since then, asylum seekers
have only been able to submit their applications at Hungary’s foreign missions. The closing
of transit zones might also be problematic from the perspective of the Asylum Procedures
Directive, which outlines that asylum applications should be handed in at the border of
the given country. If Hungary continues to ‘outsource’ this task to its foreign missions, it
may even face another legal procedure for violating EU law.
The European Commission launched an infringement procedure about the new Hun-
garian asylum law in December 2015, referring Hungary to the CJEU in July 2018 (Eu-
ropean Commission, 2018). In an opinion delivered in June 2020, Advocate General Priit
Pikamäe argued that ‘there has been a failure to fulfil obligations for breach of ensuring
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effective access to the asylum procedure, and for breach of the procedural safeguards re-
lating to applications for international protection, to the unlawful detention of applicants
for that protection in transit zones and to the unlawful removal of illegally staying third-
country nationals’ (Court of Justice of the European Union, 2020).
The Hungarian government’s most significant measures and the reaction of the inter-
national community to them prove that Hungary’s policy-making during the refugee crisis
can be evaluated in two distinct ways. In some cases, Hungary acted within its sovereign
Member State rights, and was even protected by EU or international law (such as the case
of erecting the border wall). However, in other cases it took advantage of the ineffective-
ness of EU normativity and engaged in rule-breaking behavior that violated common EU
values and principles (for example, in how Hungary placed the burden on Serbia by declar-
ing it a safe state, or the rhetoric it used against ‘migrants’ during the crisis). Although the
CJEU acted in some cases and urged Hungary to change its policies – for example, in its
judgement about the transit zones leading to their closing – such pronouncements may
not be enough to provide for the effective legal protection of asylum seekers, and nor are
they strong enough to address rogue Member State behavior. Closing the transit zones
might have stopped the detention of refugees, but it did not make their asylum applica-
tions any easier. This is further proof that the legal toolkit of the EU that can be applied to
stop violations of EU law might be limited.
4 Hungary and the refugee crisis: evaluating the strategy of the Hungarian
government
Hungary, being a transit, source, and destination country of regular and irregular migra-
tion (IOM, 2019), was among the first Member States to respond with strict measures to
stop immigrants: by building a fence on its southern borders, modifying the applicable
criminal and administrative laws, linking the phenomenon of immigration directly to ter-
rorist activities, and arguing that Hungary would protect its borders (and those of the EU
as well) at all costs (Euronews, 2019). Moreover, the anti-immigration stance also appeared
in Prime Minister Orbán’s rhetoric. In a speech delivered to the assembly of the Hungarian
diplomatic corps in August 2014, he promised ‘rock-hard official and domestic policy not
supporting immigration at all’ (kormany.hu, 2014).
4.1 Hungary as a norm entrepreneur in the area of migration
The refugee crisis provided a great opportunity for the Hungarian government to stick to
its ‘thematized realism.’ This is a kind of realism that appears only in certain strategically
important policies. While Hungary aspires to defend its national policies and interests in
cases such as immigration, with other less significant policies that do not have much of an
external component, it complies with EU rules and values.
Based on the above-mentioned measures of the Hungarian government, it is apparent
that Hungary became a norm entrepreneur in the years of the European refugee crisis. Ac-
cording to Björkdahl, norm entrepreneurship is an activity through which actors ‘success-
fully convince others of their own normative convictions, thereby creating an ideational
basis for changing the institutional environment and/or specific policies.’ Norm promotion
does not require the same hard power resources that great powers possess, thus ‘norm ad-
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vocacy is a strategy to gain influence often used by otherwise powerless actors’ (Björkdahl,
2008). Gron and Wivel argue that when small states decide which policy areas they are go-
ing to focus on, they should take into consideration the dominant discourses in the EU
(Grøn & Wivel, 2011). In this case, the discourse focused on the crisis situation that the
refugee influx was causing in Europe and the apparent incapability of the Dublin system
to regulate migratory flows in Europe. Björkdahl also argues that norm advocacy becomes
even more convincing if the advocate acts as a forerunner in the given policy area, and
complies with the norms it propagates (Björkdahl, 2008). During the refugee crisis, the
‘right’ or ‘desirable’ behavior that Hungary tried to promote was the utmost protection of
national sovereignty and the European borders through stopping ‘illegal’ migrants from
entering the EU through Hungary. Some experts even talk about the ‘Orbanization of Asy-
lum Law,’ because the attitude of Hungary in handling the migration crisis spread to other
EU Member States as well. S. Peers argued in relation to the EU–Turkey deal in 2016 that
certain policies of the EU ‘copy and entrench across the EU the key elements of the Hun-
garian government’s policy, which was initially criticized: refusing essentially all asylum-
seekers at the external border and treating them as harshly as possible so as to maintain the
Schengen open borders system’ (Peers, 2016). It is interesting to add here that although the
Visegrád countries seemingly acted similarly in handling the refugee crisis and rejected
the idea of compulsory relocation, in general the group is not homogenous. Hungary and
Poland acted quite differently from the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Moreover, out of the
four, Hungary could be considered the most radical, with its ‘total denial of the fact that
irregularly arriving persons may need protection within the EU’ (Nagy, 2017: 2).
4.2 e defense of Member State sovereignty as the key Hungarian card
While before January 2015 asylum seekers and ‘illegal’ migrants were not yet mixed up in
the rhetoric of Hungarian government officials, the Charlie Hebdo attack brought about
a change in this regard, and after that every would-be immigrant, regardless of whether
they sought protection, was considered undesirable (Nagy, 2016: 1053). The anti-immigrant
campaign of the Hungarian government was accompanied multiple times by a so-called
‘National Consultation’: this involved the government sending out letters together with
a questionnaire to Hungarian citizens about ‘immigration and terrorism’ (kormany.hu,
2019). Moreover, in May 2015 a billboard campaign was also started, in which posters
alongside Hungarian main roads portrayed immigrants as criminals. The billboards also
included messages or notes ‘addressed to immigrants’ such as ‘if you come to Hungary,
you should respect our culture,’ and ‘if you come to Hungary, you cannot take our jobs.’
The language of the billboards was Hungarian, which is a clear indication of the real target
audience of the campaign (Nagy, 2016: 1054). In June 2017, Viktor Orbán compared the flow
of refugees to the Ottoman invasion (Tharoor, 2015) and emphasized that ‘No nation may
be given orders about who it should live alongside in its own country, as that can only
be a nation’s sovereign decision’ (kormany.hu, 2019). These rhetorical elements, however,
were totally unfounded: Hungary was mainly a transit country, so the majority of asylum
seekers did not want to stay in the country but to continue on their way to other parts
of Europe; moreover, most of the asylum claims were not properly processed due to the
newly introduced Hungarian measures throughout 2015 (Nagy, 2016: 1040). One could thus
argue, as Boldizsár Nagy does, that immigration was actually a ‘total non-issue’ in Hungary
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(Nagy, 2016: 1040). However, the use of the concept of sovereignty combined with the
hostile rhetoric towards refugees was a deliberate decision by the Hungarian government,
as it served the purpose of covering its rogue, symbolic politics. The government could
easily argue that what Hungary did was not against EU values and norms, but served to
protect national identity and sovereignty.
Hungary’s particularist stance on the topic of European migration policy not only be-
came manifest in hostile rhetoric and domestic actions against refugees, but the country
also tried its best to reject the EU’s attempts to reform its migration and refugee policy,
and it did so most intensively in relation to the so-called ‘quota system.’ At its Justice and
Home Affairs Council meeting on 22 September 2015, EU ministers adopted the decision
to distribute 120,000 persons in clear need of international protection among 26 Member
States of the EU (Council of the European Union, 2015). The Hungarian governing party
had serious doubts about the legitimacy of the content of the Council Decision, mostly
because they considered the whole idea of the quota system to be senseless and danger-
ous. Moreover, leading Hungarian politicians considered the Decision to be against EU
law because it was not approved through a just legal process, national parliaments not
being included in the decision-making (Fidesz.hu, 2016). On the day of the contentious
Council meeting, the Hungarian Parliament adopted a resolution with the title ‘Message
to the leaders of the European Union’ which was designed to send a symbolic message
to the leaders of Europe about the extreme threat immigration poses to the continent. On
6 November 2015, in line with a motion by Fidesz, the Hungarian Parliament accepted a
resolution which considered the Council’s Decision to be illegitimate and in breach of the
principle of subsidiarity.
On 17 November 2015 the Parliament enacted the already mentioned Act CLXXV
‘about acting against the compulsory settlement quota in defense of Hungary and Eu-
rope.’ The law confirms the illegitimacy of the September Council Decision based on the
principle of subsidiarity and calls on the Hungarian government to launch a legal proceed-
ing before the European Court of Justice based on Article 263 TEU. The newly accepted
Hungarian law argued that the EU’s quota plan would increase crime, spread terrorism,
and endanger Hungary’s cultural values. Hungary’s Minister of Justice László Trócsányi
emphasized that ‘although Member States have agreed to give up their sovereignty to a
certain extent in return for EU membership, they still kept some rights to themselves,
such as regulating who they allow to enter their country and who they want to keep out’
(Magyar Idők, 2015).
As a result, on 3 December 2015 Hungary filed a lawsuit against the Council before the
CJEU (Hungary v Council Case C-647/15). In the motion, Hungary claimed that the Court
should annul the contested Council Decision, or as an alternative annul it insofar as it
referred to Hungary. By choosing to turn to the CJEU, Hungary wished to set a precedent
in relation to protecting an EU Member State’s sovereignty, and affirm ‘its position as a
Member State which regards the Union primarily as an arena for vindicating its national
interests, and which is not hesitant to prioritize its own interests, mainly in areas which
fall within competences retained by the Member States, over those of other Member States
and of the Union’ (Varju & Czina, 2016).
By bringing this case before the CJEU, Hungary also wanted to set a precedent in
defense of Member State sovereignty and interests. Thus, the Hungarian government par-
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ticipated before the EU court based on two sources of motivation: the desire to defend
domestic national interests, and to promote a national vision in Europe (with the aim of
influencing EU law or practices) (Granger, 2014). In addition, the Orbán-government’s hard
stance on immigration was part of a consciously built political campaign based on Member
State unilateralism combined under the broad rhetorical umbrella of national self-defense,
and also coupled with creating a ‘Hungarian solution’ to the migration crisis on the Euro-
pean political agenda (Varju & Czina, 2016). ‘While pleasing the domestic electorate was
also on the agenda, the adoption of the parliamentary resolution and the act calling for the
government to act before the EU Court of Justice was a calculated step towards making
[a] case to establish [the] fatal legal deficit [in] the contested Council Decision of violating
the rights of national parliaments and the principle of subsidiarity’ (Varju & Czina, 2016).
In October 2016, Hungary conducted a referendum about the ‘quota-system’ of the EU,
in which Hungarian citizens were asked whether they agreed with the obligatory settle-
ment of foreigners in Hungary by the EU without the consent of the Hungarian Parlia-
ment (Vető, 2016). The referendum was mainly symbolic and part of the Hungarian anti-
immigration campaign, which is proved by the fact that the timing of the referendum was
completely outdated. It was held on 2 October, which was weeks after the Bratislava Sum-
mit that basically rejected the compulsory relocation system based on country quotas. The
referendum was ultimately ruled invalid because participation did not reach the 50 per
cent threshold, although 98 per cent of respondents answered ‘no’ to the question (Nagy,
2016: 1073). Despite the result, the Hungarian government went on with its campaign and
inserted a clause on the prohibition of compulsory settlement into the Hungarian Fun-
damental Law during its seventh amendment. It can be argued that the referendum was
counter to the principle of loyal cooperation, as outlined in article 4(3) TEU (Nagy, 2016:
1074).
Hungary was not the only EU Member State to choose the path of law to contest an EU
decision regarding the refugee crisis. Robert Fico, the Slovakian prime minister, announced
as early as in October 2015 that his country would file a complaint against the Council on
the subject of handling the migration crisis. The Slovak politician claimed that the Council
decision should have been taken unanimously (Robert, 2015). Slovakia finally initiated
legal action before the CJEU on December 3 (Slovakia v Council, Case C-643/15), which
also called for the annulment of the September Council Decision. The CJEU handled the
Slovak case together with the Hungarian one. In July 2017, Advocate General Yves Bot
issued his opinion on the two cases, proposing that the Court should dismiss both actions
and ordering the two countries to pay their own costs (Bot, 2017). In September 2017, the
Court dismissed both cases in their entirety and declared that relocation was lawful and
obligatory. After this failure, Hungary still continued its anti-immigrant campaign and
launched a National Consultation on the ‘Soros Plan,’ asking citizens in questionnaires
whether they agreed with the compulsory relocation of immigrants among EU Member
States (Juhász et al., 2017: 22). In December 2018, the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and
Regular Migration (GCM) (IOM, 2019) was accepted by 152 UN Member States. Several EU
Members did not join the pact: Slovakia did not vote, Hungary, the Czech Republic and
Poland voted against it, and Austria, Bulgaria, Estonia, Italy, Latvia and Romania abstained
from voting (Gotev, 2018).
In December 2017, the Commission referred Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic
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to the CJEU for non-compliance with their legal obligations concerning relocation (Euro-
pean Commission, 2017). The infringement procedures which started against these Mem-
ber States in June that year were escalated to Court level because the replies provided by
the countries were not found to be satisfactory by the Commission. The Council Decisions
regarding this matter required all EU countries ‘to pledge available places for relocation
every three months to ensure a swift and orderly relocation procedure’ (European Com-
mission, 2017). However, none of the three Member States relocated any refugees (either
ever, or for more than a year), and they did not pledge to do so, which is why the Commis-
sion forwarded the case to the CJEU. The hearings about the so-called ‘Quota case’ started
in May 2019. In April 2020, the Court came out with its judgement in these joint cases,
and ruled that ‘[b]y refusing to comply with the temporary mechanism for the relocation
of applicants for international protection, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have
failed to fulfil their obligations under European Union law’ (Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Union , 2020). There was much more at stake in this procedure than just enforcing
compliance with EU law, and the three Member States in question must have been aware of
this when they failed to fulfil their obligations. The CJEU’s condemning judgement can be
considered a strong message to Member States, because the need for adherence to EU val-
ues, such as the rule of law, was thereby confirmed. However, it should also be mentioned
that the principle of loyalty was not mentioned in the judgement.
5 Conclusion
Hungarian refugee policy after 2015/2016 set a dangerous precedent for Member State
unilateralism, as not only asylum law, but several rules pertaining to the Single European
Market were also violated (Ziegler, 2019: 33). Small state theories come to our rescue in ex-
plaining some of the Hungarian governments’ interest-based acts during the refugee crisis,
and we can determine that Hungary indeed acted as a norm entrepreneur in projecting its
own views about refugees onto other EU Member States. However, the paper also shows
that small state behavior did not always prevail, but when the normative leverage of the
EU was weak, it gave way to rogue, symbolic Member State conduct (such as generally re-
ferring to people in need as ‘migrants,’ and thus invoking a hostile environment towards
them in Hungary).
The potential breaches of EU and international law prove the lack of willingness on
the side of Hungary to implement the appropriate measures and ensure the fulfilment of
obligations stemming from the Treaties, secondary legislation, and other acts, like the relo-
cation decision (Nagy, 2016: 1080). The essence of being a member of an organization is the
understanding of its members that they are forming an alliance with the goal of pursuing
a common endeavor. These virtues however, are no longer present in Hungary’s attitude
towards the EU. ‘Mutual trust between Member States and trust in the EU institutions on
which the EU is built are crumbling. This is the cumulative result of the inability and oc-
casional reluctance to perform by the EU Member States at the external borders combined
with the free-riding attitudes and restrictive practices of others, including Hungary and
some other Visegrád countries’ (Nagy, 2017: 15). The latter countries’ refusal to partici-
pate in the fair sharing of responsibility through offering protection to asylum seekers,
and their poor performance in returning those not in need of protection undermines the
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efforts of those countries that have sought an EU-wide solution based on loyalty and sol-
idarity (Nagy, 2015: 15). The present author agrees with Nagy, who argues that Hungary
once was an eminent member of the European club in the field of asylum, but it has per-
formed a U-turn and become a renegade, not only by destroying its own asylum system,
but also by blocking the solidarity measures of the EU (Nagy, 2017: 413). Moreover, it has
done so by applying a successful small state strategy – norm advocacy, which might set a
dangerous precedent in other policy areas within the European Union.
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Cyberbullying is a global phenomenon that affects 10–40 per cent of youth (Hinduja
& Patchin, 2014) and has severe consequences such as depression, anxiety, and suici-
dal thoughts. A large and growing body of literature discusses and assesses programs
aimed at preventing cyberbullying, to which the present article aims to contribute.
My purpose was to examine whether prevention programs that have certain features
– in particular, social-emotional learning, a whole-school approach, mentoring and
education on online safety, and cyberbullying – are more effective than others. This
ambition is novel in the cyberbullying literature. The analysis is based on the re-
sults of 23 impact evaluation articles that examined 15 school-based cyberbullying
prevention programs or program variants. It was found that programs that include
social-emotional learning and mentoring are more effective at reducing perpetration,
whereas those including education about e-safety and cyberbullying are more effec-
tive at reducing victimization. The policy implications and limitations of the study
are also discussed.
Keywords:Cyberbullying prevention, Meta-analysis, Social-emotional learning, Men-
toring, Education on e-safety and cyberbullying
1 Introduction
The phenomenon of cyberbullying arose with the diffusion of personal ICT devices and
internet and social media, and had become a severe, global problem by the beginning of the
twenty-first century. Cyberbullying has attracted considerable attention from both poli-
cymakers and researchers. Numerous prevention programs have been implemented and a
large body of related research has been conducted. Cyberbullying studies usually cover the
topics of possible consequences, risk factors, underlying psychological processes, preva-
lence, or similarities/differences with traditional bullying. Other studies discuss potential
coping strategies or policy instruments for tackling the problem. There is a growing body of
cyberbullying program evaluation literature and meta-analyses have also been conducted.
41 cbeblling peenion
Although cyberbullying may occur in settings outside of schools, the phenomenon is the
most severe and the most prevalent among schoolchildren (Cassidy et al., 2013). In the
present study, I focus only on cyberbullying among children and adolescents in reference
to school-based prevention programs.
In the cyberbullying prevention literature, there are two distinctive streams. One dis-
cusses potential intervention strategies and program elements (such as Ang, 2015; Betts,
2016; Chisholm, 2014) on the basis of mostly behavioral-psychological arguments. The
other stream examines prevention programs on a quantitative basis, in the form of ei-
ther impact assessments or meta-analyses (Gaffney et al., 2019; van Cleemput et al., 2014).
However, to my knowledge, the two streams have not been connected yet, and no studies
have examined the effectiveness of different program elements or strategies on an empir-
ical basis. The purpose of the present article is to fill this gap.
In Section 2, I briefly discuss the phenomenon of cyberbullying. In Section 3, I present
a framework of risk factors related to cyberbullying and prevention program elements that
may address them. Then, in Section 4, on the basis of the preceding discussion, I formu-
late the research question and the hypotheses. In Section 5, I describe the methodology.
I then present the findings of the analysis in Section 6. Finally, in Section 7, I discuss the
implications as well as the limitations of the study.
2 e phenomenon of cyberbullying
It is debated whether cyberbullying is a form of traditional (face-to-face) bullying, or if
it is a distinct form of behavior. Definitions of traditional bullying and cyberbullying are
rather similar. According to a consensual definition, bullying is intentional, aggressive, and
repetitive behavior involving a power imbalance between the perpetrator(s) and the victim
(Smith, 2016). Cyberbullying, on the other hand, is most commonly defined as ‘willful and
repeated harm inflicted through the medium of electronic text’ (Patchin & Hinduja, 2006:
152).
There seems to be clear evidence of the relationship between traditional bullying and
cyberbullying. Cross et al. (2015) conducted a longitudinal study and found significant
overlap between traditional bullies and cyberbullies/victims. Others, such as Hinduja and
Patchin (2008) and Mehari et al. (2014), also identified an overlap between face-to-face
bullying and cyberbullying. Dooley et al. (2009) point out that the overlap suggests that
the core behavior of bullying is more important than the medium through which it is
carried out.
On the other hand, several important characteristics suggest that digital technologies
fundamentally alter the process of bullying (Englander, 2017). For instance, as opposed to
traditional bullying, in the case of cyberbullying harm may be repeated even though this
is not intended by the perpetrator (e.g. a Facebook post with harmful content may spread
without the bully’s intention). Other studies (Hinduja & Patchin, 2014; Cassidy et al., 2013)
emphasize that since cyberbullies are not confronted with the immediate negative effects
of their act on the victims, and since the digital environment gives a sense of anonymity (al-
though the identity of the bully is usually known to victims), cyberbullies deindividualize
their victims and tend to be less empathetic. It is also an important difference that, unlike
traditional bullying, cyberbullying does not stop when school ends (Hinduja and Patchin,
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2014). Due to the widespread use of the internet and smartphones among youths, victims
may be faced with the harmful content at any time. Hinduja and Patchin (2014) also argue
that due to these attributes, cyberbullying may cause more harm than traditional bullying.
The negative effects of cyberbullying on victims are severe. Multiple studies (among
others, Cassidy et al., 2013; Betts, 2016) have found that victims of cyberbullying may ex-
perience depression, anxiety, frustration, and low self-esteem. Gámez-Guadix et al. (2013)
examined the relationship between substance use and cyberbullying and found a signifi-
cant correlation between them. As for the potential causal relation between cyberbullying
and suicide, Hinduja and Patchin (2010) found that cyberbullies were more likely to re-
port having attempted suicide than those who were neither bullies nor victims. On the
other hand, Cassidy et al. (2013) concluded that, despite famous cases, there is no evidence
that cyberbullying alone, without the presence of other important causes, leads to suicide.
Raskauskas and Stoltz (2007) argue that victims may also experience feelings of hopeless-
ness and powerlessness as they fear that the relative anonymity of the aggressor makes it
impossible to stop the bullying.
Cyberbullying may take various forms, and may be carried out with different tools.
The most common forms of cyberbullying include posting unkind or harmful comments,
photos or videos, sharing embarrassing gossip, name calling, or creating defamatory voting
polls. As for the tools of cyberbullying, the most common ones are social media platforms
(such as Facebook or Instagram), instant messaging applications (Whatsapp, Viber), video
sharing servers (Youtube), e-mail servers, blogs or other websites, and online multiplayer
games. The literature also mentions phone calls and text messages as potential channels
of bullying, but in modern times these means are less relevant. For a more detailed list of
possible forms and tools, see Chisholm (2014).
Numerous studies have examined the prevalence of cyberbullying. According to a sur-
vey ordered by the European Parliament (2016), more than two-thirds of 20,000 respon-
dents from 24 countries had encountered cyberbullying in some form.¹ As for the propor-
tion of victims, most studies estimate that between 10 and 40 percent of 10 to 18-year-old
children and adolescents have been cyberbullied, while slightly fewer have bullied others
(Hinduja and Patchin, 2014). However, Chisholm (2014) argues that surveys may underes-
timate the actual prevalence of the phenomenon.
3 Cyberbullying prevention
In order to elaborate and evaluate cyberbullying prevention programs, it is essential to
examine the related risk factors associated with cyberbullying; that is, the factors that
increase the likelihood of becoming a cyberbully and/or a victim. Cyberbullying preven-
tion efforts should address these risk factors in order to reduce the prevalence of the phe-
nomenon. As noted above, although it is debated whether cyberbullying is a type of tra-
ditional bullying or a distinct behavior, there are surely important similarities between
the two phenomena. Therefore, the risk factors of face-to-face bullying are also likely to
be relevant in the case of cyberbullying. It is widely agreed upon that a lack of empathy
and a bad school atmosphere that tolerates or endorses aggression are highly important
risk factors (Casas et al., 2013; Hinduja & Patchin, 2008; 2011; Cassidy et al., 2013). Other
¹ They have bullied others, have been cybervictimized, have seen or heard of it.
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studies also outline psychological problems (Ang, 2015), proactive aggression (Calvete et
al., 2010), and bad parent-adolescent relationships as risk factors for cyberbullying (Ybarra
& Mitchell, 2004).
There are several risk factors specific to cyberbullying. Many studies outline the im-
portance of insufficient privacy concerns and excessive internet usage (Hinduja & Patchin,
2011; Casas et al., 2013; Ang, 2015). Insufficient privacy concerns may include the disclo-
sure of private or sexual content or the use of weak passwords, increasing the likelihood
of victimization. In addition, excessive internet use increases the probability of both be-
coming a bully and a victim. Several studies (Casas et al., 2013; Machmutow et al., 2012;
Kowalski et al., 2012) have shown that there is a causal relationship between traditional
bullying and cyberbullying; therefore the former can also be regarded as a risk factor of
the latter.
I now turn to the discussion of cyberbullying prevention programs and potential pro-
gram elements. First, it is important to clarify the notions of ‘prevention program’ and
‘program element.’ The term ‘coping strategy’ is often used in the literature as an equiva-
lent of prevention program. However, sometimes the notion also includes any action that
stakeholders (teachers, parents, victims, etc.) undertake to prevent or to deal with cyber-
bullying. In order to avoid this obscurity, here I only use the term prevention program,
which I define as any intervention that schools, NGOs, local or central governments imple-
ment to reduce the prevalence of cyberbullying. I define program elements as constituent
parts – or in other words, components – of prevention programs.
The large overlap between the risk factors associated with face-to-face bullying and
cyberbullying suggests that traditional bullying prevention programs may be efficient
against cyberbullying as well (Casas et al., 2013). Accordingly, many scholars suggest im-
plementing traditional anti-bullying program elements in cyberbullying prevention pro-
grams. Among others, Cassidy et al. (2013) and Ang (2015) argue that empathy training
may be an effective way to reduce cyberbullying. While more empathetic students are less
likely to engage in cyberbullying, they are also more likely to support their bullied peers.
Hutson et al. (2018) argues that program elements that foster social and communication
skills should also be included in prevention programs. These elements are commonly re-
ferred to as social-emotional learning (hereafter SEL) (Smith & Low, 2013).
Other sources argue that the systemic, or whole-school approach (hereafter WSA),
which has proven to be effective at tackling traditional bullying, should also be applied
in cyberbullying prevention programs (Ang, 2015; van Cleemput et al., 2014). WSA means
that, besides students, parents, teachers and other school personnel (most of all, psycholo-
gists) are also included in prevention programs. Hinduja and Patchin (2014) argue that the
involvement of school personnel might improve the school atmosphere, whereas training
for parents might foster closer monitoring of adolescents’ online activities and better co-
operation between parents and their children in relation to creating rules about internet
use.
In the case of other kinds of educational programs, such as crime prevention or assis-
tance for disadvantaged children, the effectiveness of peer mentors has been researched,
and some supporting evidence has been found (Wood et al., 2012; Ciocanel et al., 2017). As
for cyberbullying prevention programs, some scholars, such Cassidy et al. (2013), argue
that children respond positively to peer-led interventions.
ineecion. ea eopean jonal of ocie and poliic, 7(1): 40–58.
44 on hajnal
Some specific program elements (related to the digital world) are also needed to foster
the effectiveness of prevention programs. Cassidy et al. (2013) argue that it is important to
educate children about online safety and netiquette to improve their privacy concerns and
skills and thus reduce the risk of victimization. Hinduja and Patchin (2014) point out that
educating students about the phenomenon and its severe consequences may deter poten-
tial bullies and encourage positive bystander behavior. Table 1 summarizes the main risk
factors and the program elements that may address them. I note that the above presen-
tation of risk factors and program elements is not exhaustive; my purpose was rather to
present the most important ones, and to provide a general framework for addressing the
issue of cyberbullying prevention.
Lack of Bad school Excessive Insufficient
empathy atmosphere internet privacy
usage concerns
SEL program elements X X
Teacher involvement X
Education of parents X
Mentoring² ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Education about online safety X
Education about cyberbullying X X
Table 1: Main program elements and the risk factors they address (source: author)
4 Resear question and hypotheses
It seems to be clear that prevention programs can significantly reduce the prevalence of
both cyberbullies and cybervictims. Van Cleemput et al. (2014) conducted a meta-analysis
of eight studies that evaluated cyberbullying prevention efforts and found that the average
effect was significant and positive in terms of both reducing perpetration and victimization.
A more recent meta-analysis (Gaffney et al., 2019) reviewed 24 similar articles and found
that prevention programs reduced the number of bullies by 10–15 per cent, whereas that
of victims by 14 per cent, on average. The reviewed programs varied significantly in terms
of both program elements and effectiveness.
These two studies did not seek to identify why a program is more or less effective,
unlike in the work of Hutson et al. (2018), the latter who conducted a systematic literature
review to examine which program elements are the most prevalent in prevention programs
that have been implemented and inferred the effectiveness of the elements based on their
prevalence. They ignored, however, the extent to which these programs were effective (or
ineffective). The present study aims to fill the gap between these efforts and to identify key
features that make programs more effective on an empirical basis. I thus formulate my main
research question as follows: Which design features foster the effectiveness of cyberbullying
prevention programs?
² Mentoring may affect all risk factors, depending on the content of the mentoring sessions (e.g. awareness
raising mentoring sessions, empathy training with mentors, etc.).
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Note that in the analytical part of the article I introduce the term ‘design feature’; this
is a broader concept than program element and may refer to different program character-
istics such as elements, sets of similar elements, or approaches. The identification of key
program features allows for a meaningful classification of prevention programs and the
investigation of the reasons that make programs more or less successful.
Before turning to the presentation of the hypotheses, I outline an important distinction.
A prevention program may be effective at reducing the prevalence of perpetration and/or
victimization. Although the two might coincide, it is also possible that a given program is
only effective in one of these two areas.
Based on the discussion in Section 3, I identified four key program features that may
foster the effectiveness of prevention programs, which are (i) social-emotional learning
(SEL); (ii) the whole school approach (WSA); (iii) mentoring; and (iv) education about
cyberbullying and e-safety. In line with these features, I formulated four hypotheses, as
follows:
H1: Prevention programs that include SEL (social-emotional learning) are more likely to be
effective at reducing perpetration than those that do not.
Since social emotional learning and empathy training in particular address the risk
factor lack of empathy, programs with an SEL focus are expected to be more effective at
reducing perpetration.
H2: Prevention programs that adopt WSA are more likely to be effective at reducing both
perpetration and victimization than those that do not.
Teacher and parent involvement addresses risk factors (bad school atmosphere and ex-
cessive internet usage) that are related to both perpetration and victimization, thus WSA
programs are expected to be more effective in both areas.
H3: Prevention programs involving peer mentors are more likely to be more effective at reduc-
ing both perpetration and victimization than those without peer mentors.
Mentoring may affect all risk factors and therefore programs adopting this feature are
expected to be more effective in both areas.
H4: Prevention programs that include e-safety and cyberbullying related elements are more
likely to be effective at reducing victimization than those that do not.
Although raising awareness about the severe consequences of cyberbullying may also
foster the more empathetic attitude of potential bullies, education about e-safety and the
phenomenon in general is expected to reduce the risk of becoming a victim.
5 Data and method
Victor (2008) discerns three main types of meta-analyses. On the one hand, the evidence-
based approach adopted from medical sciences seeks to address the question ‘What works?’
using quantitative methods. On the other hand, the theory-driven approach addresses the
question ‘What works and why?’ typically by applying qualitative methods. Finally, these
approaches may be mixed. The present article takes this last approach. The following anal-
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ysis was conducted as follows; First, I collected quantitative data about the effectiveness of
the selected prevention programs. Second, I operationalized the four key program features
and classified the programs. Third, I tested the hypotheses.
As mentioned above, Gaffney et al. (2019) conducted a meta-analysis of cyberbullying
impact evaluations. Since the article is recent, and its selection criteria are identical to those
required in the present study, I relied on their results. The authors applied the following
criteria: studies that were included had to ‘(1) use an adequate operational definition of
cyber-bullying; (2) describe the evaluation of an intervention or prevention program im-
plemented with school-aged participants; (3) include experimental and control conditions;
(4) measure cyber-bullying behaviors using quantitative measurement instruments; and,
(5) have been published from 2000 onwards’ (Gaffney et al., 2019: 136). The authors identi-
fied 3994 articles and screened 192. They included 24 articles in the systematic review. The
authors also provide a list of excluded articles and the reasons for their exclusion.
Odds-ratios (OR) were used to determine the impact of the examined programs with
regard to both perpetration (OR_p) and victimization (OR_v). OR in general refers to the
likelihood of the occurrence of a certain event in the experimental group divided by the
likelihood of the occurrence of the same event in the control group. OR>1, therefore im-
plies a positive program impact, whereas OR<1 implies a negative program impact. While
odds-ratios are used to measure the effect size of programs when the pre-intervention
odds-ratios are not equal in the intervention and in the control group, OR values can be
calculated as the difference of the logarithm of post and pre intervention OR values. For
the present analysis, the odds-ratios and standard errors calculated by Gaffney and col-
leagues (2019) were used. Some programs or program versions were evaluated in different
studies. In such cases, the effect sizes were combined using standard error weighting (for
details, see Farrington & Ttofi, 2009).
In order to operationalize the four key program features (in line with the four hypothe-
ses), I created four binary variables and defined the necessary and sufficient program el-
ement(s) for each. I relied on the program elements that Hutson et al. (2018) list in their
meta-analysis (in italics in the listing below).
SEL (Social-emotional learning: SEL=1 if a program includes both empathy learning and
social/communicational skills elements; SEL=0 otherwise.
WSA (Whole-school approach): WSA=1 if a program addresses stakeholders other than
students (parent involvement and/or teacher education); WSA=0 if the program ad-
dresses students only.
MENT (Peer mentoring): MENT=1 if includes peer mentoring; MENT=0 if it does not.
CYB (Education about cyberbullying and online safety): CYB=1 if a program contains at
least two of the three following elements: education about digital citizenship, aware-
ness raising, and education about cyberbullying; CYB=0 if a program contains fewer
than two of the above elements.
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In the case of studies that were included in Hutson et al.’s meta-analysis, data about
the presence of the program elements were extracted from there. In other studies,³ the
presence of program elements was examined on the basis of the related articles. Table 2
displays all the variables and the description of the program elements on the basis of Hut-
son et al.
Variable Variable Related program Description
name name element
– short – long
Dependent variables
OR_p Odds ratio of – Effect size measured byperpetration odds ratio of perpetration
OR_v Odds ratio of – Effect size measured byvictimization odds ratio of victimization
Independent variables
SEL
Teaching youth effective and
Communication/ appropriate skills for com-
Social-emotional social skills municating in a social setting,
learning either online or in personTeaching youth to look at the cyber-
Empathy training bullying situation from the perspec-
tive of the persons involved
WSA
Parent education Educating parents aboutWhole-school important cyberbullying topics
approach Teacher involvement Having teachers moderate
in bullying situation the cyberbullying situation
MENT Peer mentoring Peer mentors takingpart in the program
CYB
Digital citizenship
Using technology in a
responsible way or being
Education on a good citizen online
cyberbullying and Awareness raising Increasing knowledge and
online safety awareness of cyberbullying
Education on Teaching youth what cyberbully-
cyberbullying ing is and other information rela-ted to cyberbullying awareness
Table 2: Dependent and independent variables
(source: author’s compilation based on Hutson et al., 2018)
To test the hypotheses, I examined whether the mean effect sizes of prevention pro-
grams in different subgroups differ significantly. Each subgroup is defined by a program
design feature (such as the presence or absence of social-emotional learning). The relia-
bility of estimated effects sizes differs from study to study. In order to account for this
variance, I calculated weights so that more reliable studies (observations) received a larger
weight. To do so, in line with Farrington and Ttofi (2009) and Borenstein et al., (2011), I
³ Namely: DeSmet et al. (2018) – Friendly Attac; Williford et al. (2013) – KiVA; Chaux et al. (2016) and
Schultze-Krumbholz et al. (2016) – Mediaheroes; Espelage et al. (2015) – Second Step; Gradinger et al.
(2015); Gradinger et al. (2016) – ViSC.
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first calculated inverse effect size variances for each study. These were used to weight the
observations. In the next step, for each program design feature (H1 to H4) differences be-
tween the mean effect sizes of subgroups were calculated. In the third phase, I tested (for
each hypothesis H1 to H4) whether the mean differences between effect sizes in the two
sub-groups were significant. These differences were tested using Z test scores (Borenstein
et al., 2009) (confidence level=95 %). The above procedure was applied to both outcome
variables used in the study (perpetration as well as victimization). The formulas that were
used can be found in Annex 1, whereas a more detailed description and rationale for the
weighted mean effect size and mean difference calculus is provided in Borenstein et al.
(2011: Ch. 19).
Studies (n=23) Design⁴ Programs or program
versions (n=15)
Athanasiades et al. (2015) RCT Tabby
Chaux et al. (2016) RCT Mediaheroes
Cross et al. (2016) RCT Cyber Friendly
Del Rey et al. (2012) QE ConRed
Del Rey et al. (2016) QE ConRed
DeSmet et al. (2018) RCT Friendly Attac
Espelage et al. (2015) RCT Second Step
Fekkes et al. (2016) RCT Skills for Life
Garaigordobil and Martínez-Valderrey (2015) RCT Cyberprogram 2.0
Garaigordobil and Martínez-Valderrey (2016) RCT Cyberprogram 2.0
Gradinger et al. (2015) RCT ViSC (Aus)
Gradinger et al. (2016) RCT ViSC (Aus)
Menesini, Nocentini, and Palladino (2012) QE NoTrap! v1
Ortega-Ruiz et al. (2012) QE ConRed
Palladino et al. (2012) QE NoTrap! v2
Palladino et al. (2016) QE NoTrap! v3
Pieschl et al. (2017) QE Surf Fair
Roberto et al. (2014) RCT Social Networking Safety
Promotion and Cyberbully-
ing Prevention Promotion
Schultze-Krumbholz et al. (2016) RCT Mediaheroes
Shaw et al. (2015) RCT Cyber Friendly
Solomontos-Kountouri et al. (2016) QE ViSC (Cyp)
Williford et al. (2013) RCT KiVa
Wölfer et al. (2014) RCT Mediaheroes
Table 3: Included studies and programs (source: own. Identical to the articles revised by
Gaffney et al, 2019)
⁴ RCT=randomized controlled trial; QE=quasi-experimental
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6 Findings
The list of the articles that were included and the programs examined by them is pre-
sented in Table 3. Twenty-three studies were included⁵ in the meta-analysis that had been
published between 2012 and 2017. The studies examine 15 different programs or program
versions. Two program versions were considered identical if the values of the four group-
ing variables were equal (this was the case with the Australian and the Cypriot versions
of ViSC). In such cases, as described in Chapter 4.2, weighted mean effect sizes were com-
puted. Some articles presented the same evaluation data. Figures 1 and 2 display all OR
values with 95 % confidence intervals as well as mean effect sizes (using the fixed effects
model⁶) for both perpetration and victimization, whereas the values (effect sizes and some
statistics) are presented in Annex 2.
Figure 1: OR effect sizes with CI95% intervals for perpetration (source: author’s calculations
based on Gaffney et al., 2019)
⁵ Gaffney et al. (2019) included 24 articles, but for Harshmman (2014) the necessary data was not available.
⁶ For details see Farrington and Ttofi (2009).
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Figure 2: OR effect sizes with CI95% intervals for victimization (source: author’s calculations
based on Gaffney et al., 2019)
H1: Prevention programs that include SEL (social-emotional learning) are more likely to be
effective at reducing perpetration than those that do not.
Programs including SEL are found to be more effective at reducing perpetration (mean
difference=0.33; CI: 0.29-0.38; p<0.01), therefore H1 is confirmed. The difference is rel-
atively large: programs with SEL elements reduce the risk of bullying by 38 per cent,
whereas the same proportion is only 4 per cent in the case of other programs. However,
the difference is insignificant (p=0.81) in the case of victimization.
Mean OR Z SE p n CI95%low CI95%up
SEL=0 1,04 0,92 1,05 0,36 7 0,95 1,14
SEL=1 1,38 5,56 1,06 0,00 6 1,23 1,54
Mean difference 0,33 3,77 1,08 0,00 13 0,29 0,38
Table 4: Test scores for perpetration – grouping: SEL (source: author’s calculations)
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Mean OR Z SE p n CI95%low CI95%up
SEL=0 1,24 5,38 1,04 0,00 9 1,14 1,34
SEL=1 1,21 2,62 1,08 0,01 6 1,05 1,40
Mean difference 0,02 0,24 1,09 0,81 15 0,02 0,03
Table 5: Test scores for victimization – grouping: SEL (source: author’s calculations)
H2: Prevention programs that adopt WSA are more likely to be effective at reducing both
perpetration and victimization than those that do not.
Programs that addressed only children did not differ significantly from those that in-
volved teachers and/or parents either in regard to perpetration or bullying. H2 is therefore
rejected.
Mean OR Z SE p n CI95%low CI95%up
WSA=0 1,23 3,04 1,07 0,00 6 1,08 1,40
WSA=1 1,14 3,04 1,04 0,00 7 1,05 1,24
Mean difference 0,09 0,97 1,08 0,33 13 0,08 0,11
Table 6: Test scores for perpetration – grouping: WSA (source: author’s calculations)
Mean OR Z SE p n CI95%low CI95%up
WSA=0 1,16 1,81 1,08 0,07 8 0,99 1,36
WSA=1 1,25 5,75 1,04 0,00 7 1,16 1,35
Mean difference 0,09 0,82 1,09 0,41 15 0,07 0,11
Table 7: Test scores for victimisation – grouping: WSA (source: author’s calculations)
H3: Prevention programs involving peer mentors are more likely to be effective at reducing
both perpetration and victimization than those without peer mentors.
Programs involving peer mentors are more effective at reducing perpetration (mean
difference=0.30; CI95%: 0.26-0.35; p<0.01), but the difference is insignificant when victim-
ization effect sizes are compared (p=0.68). In the case of perpetration, the difference is
rather large: programs with mentoring decrease the chance of bullying by 35 per cent,
whereas those without mentoring decrease the chance by only 4 per cent. H3 is therefore
partially confirmed.
Mean OR Z SE p n CI95%low CI95%up
MENT=0 1,04 0,89 1,05 0,38 8 0,95 1,14
MENT=1 1,35 5,40 1,06 0,00 5 1,21 1,50
Mean difference 0,30 3,53 1,08 0,00 13 0,26 0,35
Table 8: Test scores for perpetration – grouping: MENT (source: author’s calculations)
Mean OR Z SE p n CI95%low CI95%up
MENT=0 1,22 4,80 1,04 0,00 10 1,13 1,32
MENT=1 1,26 3,58 1,07 0,00 5 1,11 1,43
Mean difference 0,04 0,42 1,08 0,68 15 0,03 0,05
Table 9: Test scores for victimisation – grouping: MENT (source: author’s calculations)
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H4: Prevention programs that include e-safety and cyberbullying related elements are more
likely to be effective at reducing victimization than those that do not.
The difference between programs focusing on e-safety and cyberbullying and pro-
grams that put less emphasis on these aspects was found to be significant with regard
to victimization (mean difference=0.22; CI95%: 0.19-0.26; p=0.01) and insignificant with
regard to perpetration (p=0.68). The 0.22 difference in odds-ratios means that the impact
of CYB=1 programs is 22 percentage points higher than the impact of CYB=0 programs
in terms of the risk of becoming a victim. The results are in line with the expectations,
since education about online safety and cyberbullying mostly affects risk factors related
to victimization. Accordingly, H4 is confirmed.
Mean OR Z SE p n CI95%low CI95%up
CYB=0 1,18 3,38 1,05 0,00 8 1,07 1,30
CYB=1 1,14 2,51 1,05 0,01 5 1,03 1,27
Mean difference 0,03 0,42 1,07 0,68 13 0,03 0,04
Table 10: Test scores for perpetration – grouping: CYB (source: author’s calculations)
Mean OR Z SE p n CI95%low CI95%up
CYB=0 1,11 1,84 1,06 0,07 9 0,99 1,23
CYB=1 1,33 6,24 1,05 0,00 6 1,21 1,45
Mean difference 0,22 2,58 1,07 0,01 15 0,19 0,26
Table 11: Test scores for victimisation – grouping: CYB (source: author’s calculations)
7 Implications and limitations
Cyberbullying is a severe and widespread phenomenon of the twenty-first century. The
elaboration, implementation, and evaluation of prevention programs related to cyberbul-
lying is therefore highly important. The aim of the present study was to connect the litera-
ture that discusses school-based cyberbullying prevention strategy options with empirical
findings of impact assessments of prevention programs. My purpose was to examine the
program features that may increase the effectiveness of cyberbullying prevention pro-
grams on an empirical basis. This is novel in the literature: although meta-analyses have
examined the impacts (Gaffney et al., 2019), as well as the program elements (Hutson et
al., 2018) of previous prevention programs, the two efforts have not been connected so far.
My results confirm some of the suggestions presented in the cyberbullying literature.
First, programs with a strong social-emotional learning emphasis and those involving
peer-mentors are more likely to be effective at reducing perpetration. Second, programs in
which education about online safety and cyberbullying are emphasized are more likely to
be effective at reducing victimization. The effect size of programs involving parents and/or
teachers, on the other hand, was not found to be significantly higher with regard to either
perpetration or victimization. These results suggest that:
(i) Similarly to traditional bullying programs, SEL is a key design feature in the case of
cyberbullying, and should be included in prevention efforts;
(ii) Mentoring is also an effective way to tackle bullying, and
(iii) Education about e-safety and awareness raising about cyberbullying may effectively
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help victims. This implies that although traditional bullying prevention program elements
may also be effective against cyberbullying, specific cyberbullying-related measures may
be equally useful.
Although the review presented here provides fairly strong evidence for the above state-
ments, it is important to discuss some limitations of the study. First, the number of studies
included in the sample was relatively small. Therefore, the reliability of the quantitative
analysis is limited. Second, the simplistic methodological approach (z-test comparison of
the subgroups), although robust, may hide more complicated causal relations (such as in-
teractions). Finally, the effectiveness of interventions, as well as program elements, may
depend largely on contextual factors (such as geographical and time scope, age, etc.). These
aspects may be addressed once there is a sufficiently large body of evaluation literature
that would allow for the inclusion of other independent (contextual) variables and for the
application of more sophisticated statistical methods.⁷
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Difference = ORsubgroupA −ORsubgroupB(3)





P-value of the significance of the difference:
p = 2(1− Φ|z|)(5)
ineecion. ea eopean jonal of ocie and poliic, 7(1): 40–58.
58 on hajnal
Annex 2: Effect sizes and main statistics of the impact evaluations
Perpetration Victimization
Program n OR CI95% CI95% Z P OR CI95% CI95% Z P
(low) (up) (low) (up)
ConRed 891 1,08 0,79 1,48 0,48 0,63 1,29 0,94 1,77 1,59 0,11
Cyber 2893 1,10 0,94 1,29 1,16 0,25 1,20 1,03 1,40 2,27 0,02
Friendly
Cyber- 176 4,05 2,08 7,88 4,12 0,00 2,53 1,31 4,87 2,78 0,01
program 2.0
Friendly 216 2,05 0,15 27,75 0,54 0,59 1,83 0,25 13,62 0,59 0,56
Attac
KiVa 5651 1,02 0,86 1,21 0,23 0,82 1,40 1,24 1,58 5,59 0,00
Mediaheroes 1657 1,70 1,32 2,19 4,08 0,00 1,23 0,86 1,75 1,15 0,25
Combined
NoTrap! 1 174 0,85 0,41 1,78 -0,43 0,67 0,77 0,37 1,62 -0,69 0,49
NoTrap! 2 375 1,27 0,80 2,01 1,02 0,31 1,53 0,95 2,46 1,76 0,08
NoTrap! 3 892 1,67 1,37 2,04 5,03 0,00 1,68 1,17 2,40 2,81 0,01
Combined
Second Step 1 510 0,96 0,77 1,19 -0,37 0,71 0,82 0,63 1,06 -1,52 0,13
Skills for Life 1 394 . . . . . 0,70 0,25 1,99 -0,67 0,50
Social 418 0,69 0,33 1,46 -0,97 0,33 1,49 0,86 2,58 1,42 0,16
Networking…
Surf Fair 150 0,83 0,42 1,63 -0,54 0,59 2,05 1,06 3,98 2,12 0,03
Tabby 263 . . . . . 1,26 0,74 2,15 0,85 0,40
VISC 3 511 1,05 0,90 1,22 0,62 0,54 1,02 0,87 1,19 0,22 0,83
Combined
Mean ES . 1,16 1,08 1,25 4,19 0,00 1,23 1,15 1,32 5,98 0,00
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Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have recently witnessed a surge in protest, mo-
bilization, and debates about marriage, abortion, gender, and feminism. This politics
of morality has been notably more successful in the east than in the west of Europe:
Most CEE countries have legally or even constitutionally precluded any chance of
adopting same-sex marriage, some have rejected the Istanbul Convention, and many
parliaments have debated ‘gender’ in a hostile manner. The rising conservative voice
in politics appears to signal a sort of illiberal, conservative turn in post-Communist EU
Member States. Most research on morality politics thus focuses on the conservative
backlash in CEE or global conservative religious networks, while leaving particular
Central European political dynamics aside. This article intends to shift the focus from
the ideological or religious aspects of conservative mobilizations to the role morality
politics has played in the context of increased political competition on the right and
the rise of populism. Looking at actors, strategies, discourses, and the timing and con-
text of individual types of mobilizations in CEE permits the analysis of the political
logic of morality politics and especially an exploration of the instrumental nature of
conservative mobilizations in detail.
Keywords: Politics of morality, Central and Eastern Europe, conservativism, mobi-
lization, Christianity, populism
1 Introduction
In 2013, 80,000 marched ‘for life’ in the eastern Slovak town of Košice. When in 2019,
50,000 marched again in Bratislava, a Catholic website boasted: ‘The Košice miracle has
[been] reproduced!’¹ In more secular Prague, 3,000 and 10,000 ‘opponents of abortions




in 2013 and 2019 (respectively) too.² Under slogans such as ‘life is joy’ and ‘I choose life
not death,’ pro-life groups, supported by the Roman Catholic Church (RCC), more or less
explicitly demanded a restriction or ban on abortions, support for large families, and a cap
on the demands of sexual minorities. Massive public opposition to abortion is surprising,
to say the least, in both countries. The interruption of pregnancy was legalized through-
out communist Eastern Europe in the 1950s, while induced abortion numbers have fallen
significantly since the 1990s (Kocourková, 2019). The right to abortion remains supported
by Czech and Slovak public opinion.³ Elsewhere too, the issue of abortion has been re-
politicized recently.
Since around 2012, conservative mobilizations have increasingly marked the political
landscape throughout Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Issues that may have been con-
sidered politically marginal, long resolved, or far too moralizing (such as access to abortion,
sexual education, the definition of marriage, and religious or ‘civilizational’ identity) have
been subjects of political conflict. Traditions, values, and social norms are being debated in
public gatherings, media debates, and during electoral campaigns. The ‘politics of morality’
regularly overshadows social and economic political issues.
According to the Hungarian historian Andrea Pető, the politics of morality is a ‘new
political phenomenon’ with priorities very different from earlier public demands: people
mobilize against international agreements, attend religiously motivated political events,
and petition on behalf of majorities against individual or minority rights (Gelnarová &
Pető, 2017). Large mobilizations against ‘gender,’ same-sex marriage, and abortions started
in 2012–2013 and have not since ceased. The politicization of moral norms has polarized
political landscapes into ‘liberal’ and ‘traditionalist’ or conservative camps. Legal, and in
some countries even constitutional changes have redefined public norms. Public discourse
has become markedly more conservative as the framing of women and minority rights
has changed. Significantly, after decades of a socially liberal, secular order, petition- and
protest-based campaigns are being carried out with an unprecedented level of conservative
enthusiasm.
Yet the intensity of mobilization in this politics of morality does not seem to be cor-
related to the political relevance or practical policy impact of the demands. The question
is therefore why have conservative issues and conservative values started to matter, and
what explains their relative success in CEE? Two answers are at hand: populism, and the
conservative reaction. Populist parties have made broad use of morality issues and their
socially conservative positions in association with the new Global Right. The role of conser-
vative Catholic civil society has recently been studied and conceptualized as a conservative
turn in CEE (Kuhar & Patternotte, 2017; Bluhm & Varga, 2019; Köttig et al., 2017).
While the politics of morality has indisputable religious and ideological dimensions,
this article is intended to focus on a different perspective and analyze the current conser-
² https://rcmonitor.cz/evropa/7281-Pochod-pro-zivot-v-Bratislave-%E2%80%93-kosicky-zazrak-se-
opakoval
³ Support for ‘the right to abortion’ stands at 70 per cent in the Czech Republic (2019) and 65 per
cent in Hungary (2015), while 51 per cent of Slovaks do not consider abortion wrong for socioe-
conomic reasons (2020). See: Czech Radio: https://www.irozhlas.cz/zpravy-domov/cvvm-temer-tri-
ctvrtiny-cechu-souhlasi-s-pravem-na-interrupci-a-vice-nez-60_1706152333_pj, IPSOS for Hungary:
https://www.ipsos.com/en/global-attitudes-abortion, and Dennikn.Sk for Slovakia: https://dennikn.sk/
1902200/vacsina-slovakov-interrupcie-za-istych-okolnosti-nepovazuje-za-nespravne-grafy/?ref=mwat.
ineecion. ea eopean jonal of ocie and poliic, 7(1): 59–77.
61 ne poliic of moali in cee
vative shift; that is, the concrete dynamics of morality policies, i.e. their actors, strategies,
alliances, and the timing and the political context of large mobilizations.
The argument developed here is that the arguable successes of Central European con-
servative mobilizations are also due to the special role the politics of morality has played
in the peculiar context of right-wing populist politics. The largest mobilizations emerged
at roughly the same time, around similar issues, and with a shared vocabulary and similar
political dynamics, usually involving a fragmented right-wing opposition or a governing
populist party.
The aim here is first to define the new morality politics and its forms and conceptu-
alizations in CEE, and the methodology employed in the present argument. The second
part will identify the main actors and their discursive strategies. The third chapter will
analyze political opportunity structures – i.e. recurring patterns in the political dynamics
of morality politics.
2 Approaing Central European politics of morality
Conservative protests and mobilizations against gender, abortion, same-sex marriage, etc.
are part of a wider politics of morality. This term describes actors, discourses, and events
linked to attempts to regulate moral issues through ‘morality policies.’ The term morality
policies came into circulation in the late 1990s in US American political science (Mooney,
1999) and refers to political mobilization and conflict in relation to ‘a set of atypical items,
known as “morality issues”’ (Engeli et al., 2012: 1), such as abortion, reproductive rights,
same-sex marriage, euthanasia, etc. Morality policies generate conflicts around basic moral
values, do not allow for a compromise, and are both socially salient and technically simple
(Mooney, 2001). These issues typically include principled positions, for example, in relation
to the prohibition of drugs, alcohol, religious dissent, or abortion (Mooney, 2001). Morality
policies are distinct from social and economic issues due to their ‘reference to fundamen-
tal decisions about death, marriage and reproduction, which is what connects them to the
existing conflict between secular and religious political groups’ (Engeli et al., 2012: 26). In
the context of CEE, the politics of morality has been explored by the anthropologist Joanna
Mishtal. Trying to understand why liberalization and democratization have led to ‘declin-
ing tolerance for reproductive rights, women’s rights, and political or religious pluralism’
in Poland (Mishtal, 2015: 2), Mishtal explored the Catholic Church’s return to social and
political prominence. As she studied the ‘religious and moral governance promoted in the
name of Catholic-nationalist state-building’ (Mishtal 2015: 13), her concept of a politics of
morality helped conceptualize the redistribution of political power through the moraliza-
tion of public norms.
Borrowing from Mishtal, the concept of a politics of morality used here is defined not
only in relation to efforts to pursue various morality policies, but also in association with a
certain type of power politics. When political actors systematically politicize moral issues
in order to change public norms through legislative and judicial action or through public
awareness campaigns, they engage in promoting not only certain morality policies, but
also particular discourses, moral authorities, and political coalitions. This broader mean-
ing reflects a shift from the occasional salience of moral issues as analyzed by Engeli et
al. in 2012 in Western Europe, to a constant presence of politically polarizing politics of
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morality in CEE. This article will not deal with all politics of morality, but with a very
concrete, conservative type of contemporary politics of morality that differs from earlier
conceptualizations, as described below.
2.1 e new politics of morality
The wider context of the early politics of morality was defined by the so-called culture
wars of the 1980s and 1990s in US politics (Hunter, 1991). In response to the social and
racial liberalization and the normalization of the counterculture of the 1960s and 1970s,
the evangelical right attempted to prevent or reverse federal norms regulating the racial
desegregation of schools, gay rights, abortion, multiculturalism, and feminism. In the dis-
tinct context of Western Europe, morality policies were concerned with the legal and moral
consequences of technical progress in bioethics, and with an increase in the acceptance of
euthanasia and prostitution. In most countries, and especially in the Netherlands, morality
issues were defined by the opposition between the secular, permissive, modernizing part
of the political spectrum and the defensive Christian Democrats (Engeli et al., 2012).
More recent European morality politics is markedly different. Rather than controver-
sially debating minor but ethically puzzling liberal or progressive issues, the new politics
of morality is driven by a proactive conservative camp that seeks to prevent or reverse
liberal legislation, or to incapacitate its effects through sophisticated advocacy and legal
action. The conservative agenda has been set by the Catholic Church, activists, and by
professionalized civil society organizations (CSOs), rather than by political parties.
The new politics of morality first appeared in Catholic European countries in the mid-
2000s, in response to the socialist government’s adoption of a same-sex marriage law in
Spain (2004), in protest against sex education in Croatia (2006) and Italy (2007), and against
same-sex marriage in Slovenia in 2009 (Patternotte & Kuhar, 2018: 7). Conservative mo-
bilizations have had a transnational dimension since 2012 – after the success of a French
protest movement called ‘Demonstration for all’ (La Manif pour tous, LMPT). LMPT mo-
bilized hundreds of thousands for about two years to protest the legalization of same-sex
marriage during F. Hollande’s presidency. Because it managed to reach out far beyond
the fundamentalist Catholic camp, also attracting moderately conservative and right-wing
publics, LMTP proved the mobilization potential of this broadly conservative politics of
morality (Paternotte & Kuhar, 2018: 8).
The new European politics of morality shares several features with the latest muta-
tion in US American conservative activism: individual mobilizations are ad-hoc, narrowly
focused on one issue, and expressed in a civic language of rights (Gayte, 2019). On a dis-
cursive level, the former promotes a reformulation of social norms in a traditionalist, yet
secular sounding vocabulary. It further puts liberal assumptions about the primacy of indi-
vidual rights over collective norms into question, and seeks to delegitimize state interven-
tion in certain spheres (gender-related policies, the definition of family, and sex education).
2.2 e mobilizations
The new politics of morality entered CEE via Western Europe after protests against the
adoption of same-sex marriages in Spain and France. Despite mass mobilization, these
protests did not succeed in reversing this legislation. By comparison, conservative mobi-
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lizations in CEE have been noticeably more successful when it comes to sustained mass
mobilizations, political change, and discursive shifts.
CEE’s politics of morality developed around three main issues: same-sex marriage,
‘gender,’ and abortion. Opposition to same-sex marriage is the most salient issue in CEE
morality politics. There were four massive petition-based campaigns for legislative change
and subsequent referenda in Croatia, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Romania between 2013 and
2018. In 2013, the Croatian organization ‘In the Name of the Family’ collected almost
750,000 signatures, or those of about 1 in every 5 voters, for a referendum on a constitu-
tional law that was intended to adopt a heterosexual definition of marriage. Since Croatia
lowered the threshold for ensuring the validity of EU accession referendum the year be-
fore, the referendum for defining marriage as a ‘union of man and woman’ passed with the
participation of 40 per cent of voters (Petričušić et al., 2017). In 2012, this was preceded by
a successful petition campaign in Slovenia that led to a referendum in which 55 per cent of
voters rejected the new civil code that would have opened the way to same-sex marriage.
In 2014, 400,000 (more than 10 per cent of all voters) signed a petition for a referendum
in Slovakia, the latter who overwhelmingly voted in favor of an exclusively heterosexual
definition of marriage, and rejected the adoption of children by homosexual partners and
compulsory sex education in schools, but which initiative failed on account of the low
level of participation (21 per cent) (Rybar, 2016). The last referendum took place in 2018
in Romania, where 3.2 million people (i.e., about 17 per cent of the electorate) signed a
petition. The referendum had a similar result to the Slovakian one. In the Czech Republic,
a conservative petition against same-sex marriage bill was a reaction to an earlier petition
in support of the bill. It matched the number of signatures of the former and succeeded in
stalling the bill.
Even when ultimately unsuccessful, these massive campaigns have had a profoundly
polarizing effect and succeeded in firmly marking out gay rights as a divisive and politically
risky topic. They have also stigmatized the concept of ‘gender,’ which has become a battle-
field of its own. Because of the few mentions of the latter in the ‘Convention on preventing
and combating violence against women and domestic violence’ (the so-called Istanbul Con-
vention, adopted by the European Council), opposition to its ratification started in 2012
in Poland (Graff & Korolczuk, 2015: 178). In 2013, Catholic bishops, the Law and Justice
Party (PiS), and conservative groups engaged in public opposition to ‘gender ideology.’ In
Slovakia too, the bishop’s conference decried ‘gender’ as a dangerous ideology. Demon-
strations against the Istanbul Convention started in 2015, after a failed referendum, and
continued until 2019, when the Slovak parliament rejected the ratification a month before
the elections. Five thousand people protested its ratification in Croatia, while ratification
was also stalled due to conservative opposition in the Czech Republic.
Finally, pro-life events have regularly been held throughout CEE for almost a decade.
‘National marches for life’ have been massive in Slovakia and Croatia and are growing
in the Czech Republic. An organization based in France, One of Us, has counted 150 pro-
life events in Poland and a convention was held in Budapest in 2017 under the slogan
‘The new world order: Life and Family. The core of our cultural debate.’⁴ Abortion is an
ongoing political issue in Poland, despite the ban on on-demand abortions in 1993.⁵ The
⁴ https://oneofus.eu/
⁵ https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-52301875
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new populist government in Slovakia reintroduced a bill restricting access to abortions
after a similar bill was narrowly rejected in 2019.⁶ In Croatia, on-demand abortions are
legal but largely inaccessible, as most authorized doctors refuse to perform them using
their right to conscientious objection.⁷
2.3 Aims and methods
There are two perspectives about the new conservative mobilizations, which focus either
on ‘conservativism’ or on mobilizing. The literature usually stresses either their discursive
content, or their social-movement character.
Leading Central European academics have argued that the underlying logic of anti-
gender campaigns is ideological. E. Kováts sees anti-gender discourse as an accessory to
the populist far-right ideology that uses ‘gender’ as ‘a tool to create a them-and-us divide
to delegitimize opposing groups in society and politics’ (Kováts, 2017: 184). Korolczuk and
Graff argue that the new conservativism uses the politics of morality as a basis for a new
illiberal and authoritarian universalism ‘that replaces individual rights with rights of the
family as a basic societal unit and depicts religious conservatives as an embattled minority’
(Korolczuk & Graff, 2018: 798). Anti-genderism is framed as an instrument of an illiberal
ideology as it provides a powerful ‘anticolonial framing’ for the new Right. Conservative
mobilizations are analyzed ‘as symptoms and consequences of deeper socio-economic, po-
litical and cultural crises of liberal democracy’ (Kováts, 2017: 185), since ‘antigenderism has
become a new language of resistance to neoliberalism’ (Korolczuk & Graff, 2018: 800).
So far, only one monograph, ‘Anti-Gender Campaigns in Europe. Mobilizing Against
Equality’ has offered a transnational comparison of conservative mobilizations (with con-
tributions by Kováts, Korolczuk, and Gra). This more restricted perspective shows the
new politics of morality as a distinct, cultural phenomenon – namely, as a conservative
backlash against societal liberalization buttressed by a transnational advocacy network, a
shared discourse, and a common repertoire of action. The editors frame conservative mobi-
lizations around their most salient feature, the anti-gender discourse, and trace them back
to a specific, Vatican-inspired, Catholic reaction to women’s emancipation (Kuhar & Pa-
ternotte, 2015). In a separate text, the authors warn against conflating the Global Right and
populism with this distinctly Catholic phenomenon (Patternote & Kuhar, 2018: 8). From
the latter’s perspective, the morality politics of anti-gender activism is a religion-centered,
modern, discursive phenomenon, and a transnational social movement of a conservative
type.
While the two perspectives are important pieces of the puzzle, neither deals with the
concrete political context of Central Europe and the breadth of CEE’s politics of morality.
As Kuhar and Paternotte note, the development of conservative mobilizations is ‘uneven’
in Europe as state-church relations, timing, and discursive opportunities differ (Kuhar &
Paternotte, 2015: 265–267). This is why this paper does not focus solely on the discursive
or the transnational dimension of conservative mobilizations, but will fill this gap and
attempt to answer questions pertaining to the latter’s political opportunities and contex-
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is their relationship? Are they ideologically driven, or opportunity-motivated? Is recent
morality politics an ideological expression of an illiberal backlash? Or is it a tool of the
populist repertoire?
This analysis assumes that an actor-centered analysis will permit a better definition
of the phenomenon of the new politics of morality to be created. The study thus builds
on the repertoires and opportunity structure of several major conservative mobilizations.
This actor-centered perspective relies on conceptual tools of social movement theory, es-
pecially the perspective of transnational activism, discursive strategies, opportunities and
constraints, and framing (Tilly, 1995; Kitschelt, 1998; McAdam & Tarrow, 2019). By iden-
tifying major events, their actors, their strategies, and their political opportunities, the
study aims to analyze the various types of political logic of those who engage in a politics
of morality. The study also uses extensive textual analysis of publications by influential
actors (particularly G. Kuby and Catholic Church positions), as well as image archives and
participant observation from several conservative mobilizations.
3 Conservative mobilization in CEE
Before exploring the political logic of conservative mobilizations, the related actors and
strategies and goals need to be identified.
3.1 Actors
The politics of morality is implemented by several types of actors: single-issue Catholic
advocacy organizations, transnational conservative networks that provide discourses and
strategies, and finally, right-wing and centrist populists who make use of the mobilizations.
3.1.1 Catholic civil society
The Catholic Church contributed decisively to the successful mobilization of all the men-
tioned petition campaigns (Rybar, 2016). Croatian, Slovak (and Czech) episcopal confer-
ences have stigmatized ‘gender,’ allowed priests to collect signatures for petitions,⁸ encour-
aged believers to vote in referenda,⁹ and helped organize the National Marches for Life.¹⁰
But churches are not the primary agents in the morality mobilizations. A specific feature of
the above campaigns is the leading role of professional conservative religious civil society.
The new type of CEE Catholic political activism was pioneered by the Croatian activist
Željka Markić. A daughter of Catholic activists who have led a center for a natural family
planning since the 1970s, Markić founded a small, single-issue organization ‘In the Name
of the Family’ (U ime obitelji, INF) in 2013 and carried out the hugely successful referendum
petition in Croatia.¹¹ This model was followed by the ‘Coalition for Children’ in Slovenia,
the ‘Alliance for the Family’ in Slovakia, an eponymous organization in the Czech Republic,
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The associations themselves do not represent a mass movement. They are (or were)
small umbrella organizations which, nevertheless, had a clear agenda, mastered their me-
dia presence, and succeeded in gathering broad support from churches, religious societies,
and from conservative or populist politicians. They nevertheless are specific morality en-
trepreneurs with strikingly similar names, programs, and strategies. Their logos, design,
and online presentations (Paternotte & Kuhar 2015: 269) echo those of the original French
organization.¹² Their secular discursive strategy suggests an organic coherence between
individual manifestations of the recent politics of morality. Their objectives are limited to
achieving single, clear-cut legislative goals. All formulate these goals concisely and non-
ideologically; they do not in any way underline their Catholic identity, and they generally
adopt the civil language of rights and a positive, almost festive outlook.
The temporal proximity and the nature of mobilization strategies also suggest that
conservative mobilizations against same-sex marriage are part of a larger campaign, mod-
elled after the LMPT.¹³ The broad involvement of Željka Markić helps with mapping the
transnational context of morality campaigns.¹⁴ Assuming the role model of the successful
Catholic activist, Markić supported other campaigns through a series of seminars in 2015
in Slovakia¹⁵ and in 2018 in Romania.¹⁶ She is further active in relation to advising pro-life
activists at the European and global level. Markić is also a European Dignity Watch (EDW)
lecturer and participant at Alliance Defending Freedom (ADF) conferences.
3.1.2 e conservative Internationale
EDW and ADF are examples of professional lobbies that have helped spread an American
type of politics of morality within the EU. EDW gathers together a range of American and
European conservative organizations that are working towards a conservative redefinition
and restriction of sexual and reproductive rights. The list includes the European branch
of the American Center for Law and Justice; the influential conservative Polish Catholic
think-tank Ordo Iuris, which in 2016 submitted a bill aimed at totally criminalizing abor-
tion in Poland; the Spanish organization CitizenGO, which provides technical support to
conservative online petitions; and a host of other traditionalist groups. Their representa-
tives meet regularly at traditionalist conferences, EU lobby groups such as Agenda Europe,
and the Russian-sponsored World Congress of Families (Datta, 2018).
EDW is a lobbying group that provides advice and advocacy on the issues of ‘fam-
ily defence’ and the ‘right to life’ – that is, on abortion, euthanasia, and gay rights.¹⁷ A
prominent anti-human rights organization,¹⁸ EDW advocates the notion of human dignity
¹² lamanifpourtous.fr
¹³ Tajni plan obiteljaša: Žele zabraniti razvod, pobačaj, kontracepciju, prenatalnu dijagnostiku…, Fak-
tograf.hr, 28. 4. 2018, https://faktograf.hr/2018/03/28/agenda-europe-istanbulska-konvencija-obiteljasi/
¹⁴ https://balkaninsight.com/2018/11/21/new-world-order-the-natural-family-franchise-goes-global-11-
05-2018/
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instead of human rights, elevates the ‘complementarity of sexes’ over gender equality, and
promotes the absolute protection of life and of ‘traditional families’ rather than individual
rights to sexual self-determination. EDW has monitored European referenda, agreements,
and EU legislation with regard to morality policies. It was also involved in the European
Citizens’ Initiative ‘One of us’ – a pro-life petition which received over 1.7 million sig-
natures in 2013.¹⁹ AFD, in turn, is a conservative legal advocacy group that has, among
other groups, participated in prominent freedom-of-religion cases at the European Court
of Human Rights, such as Lautsi v. Italy in 2011.
The rise of the new politics of morality is related to the consolidation of a professional-
ized transnational conservative civil society (Datta, 2018). Since around 2013, the network
has helped build up capacities for communicating, mobilizing, and setting agendas. Impor-
tantly, this conservative network has adopted formerly liberal strategies to achieve social
change: these include single-issue mobilizations, the building of large coalitions, legal ac-
tion, positively formulated goals, and a civic, secular language of rights.
3.1.3 Right-wing populists
Conservative mobilizations have rarely originated within political parties. Rather, Catholic
activists have sought support from the political class by building single-issue coalitions
against the policies of liberal or leftist governments. During the time of the four men-
tioned referenda, right-wing parties were in opposition and all supported the motions.
In Poland and Hungary, where, under populist governments, conservative mobilizations
cannot feed on the opposition logic, morality politics is nevertheless very present. It is
used as a top-down populist governance tool. In Hungary, there is little pro-life or anti-
gender civic activism, but a ‘palpable anti-gender discourse’ (Kováts & Pető, 2017: 117).
The conservative discourse has developed in right-wing media around issues of sexual ed-
ucation, sexual minorities, and the translations of G. Kuby since 2013. It has been given
a prominent place by the Fidesz government, originating both from Fidesz’s small coali-
tion partner, KDNP (the Christian Democratic People’s Party), and from Orbán himself.
Orbán’s government introduced the ‘fundamental right to life from the moment of con-
ception,’ restrictively defined marriage in the Hungarian constitution of 2012 (Grzebalska
et al., 2017: 72), closed the last gender studies department in Budapest,²⁰ made abortion less
accessible, etc. Conservative morality politics help Orbán profile himself as a pro-natalist
illiberal – for example, by hosting the US and Russian-sponsored World Congress on Fam-
ilies.²¹ In Poland, PiS has emphasized its anti-abortion stance several times since 2016 and
used aggressive anti-LGBT rhetoric since 2019 as a way of opposing liberal centrist polit-
ical adversaries – especially the mayor of Warsaw, who emerged as the most serious PiS
presidential candidate. The move of PiS was supported by some 60 per cent of municipali-
ties who adopted ‘resolutions against LGBT propaganda.’ These resolutions were proposed
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3.2 Discursive strategies
Besides legislative changes, the most consequential achievement of conservative mobi-
lizations is a discursive shift in the framing of social issues. Criticism of purported ‘gender
ideologies’ has permitted the integration of various conservative elements into churches,
civil society, and the general public within a new, secular master frame of the new politics
of morality.
3.2.1 e hostile takeover of ‘gender’
The concept of ‘gender ideology’ first appeared in public in France during the mobiliza-
tions against gay marriage in 2012, and shortly after in CEE. The phrase ‘gender theory’
sounds like a neutral description of what gender studies, feminism, and queer theory do.
However, its roots date back to the late 1990s, when the term ‘gender’ was appropriated by
church theologians and Catholic publicists, and negatively redefined in a broader Catholic
environment.
The concept of ‘gender ideology’ is central to the RCC’s response to the international
acceptance of women’s rights and gender equality in the 1990s, after the term ‘gender’ was
first officially mentioned in a UN document. In 2003, the Pontifical Council for the Family
issued a Lexicon and in 2004 a Letter to the Bishops on the cooperation between men and
women, in which the concept of gender was criticized as an ideology (Anić, 2012: 29). All
discourses and policies whose perceived impact was the ‘denaturalization of the sexual or-
der’ (Garbagnoli, 2016) were categorized as ‘gender theories.’ Church documents define the
term ‘gender’ as ‘culturally formed sex,’ which is supposed to replace the natural, essential
sex binary with sexual fluidity. Since then, ‘gender,’ consistently referred to as ‘gender ide-
ology,’ has been systematically targeted by conservative critics of feminism studies as sign
of global Marxist elites purportedly seeking to eradicate the sexual differences between
men and women (Case, 2011: 805) The strongly simplified, decontextualized, and alarm-
ing interpretation of the concept has since the early 2000s been popularized as ‘gender
ideology’ by several Catholic lay publicists: namely, Dale O’Leary (Gender Agenda, 1997),
Tony Anatrella (Gender, la controverse, 2011), and Gabriele Kuby (Gender. Eine neue Ide-
ologie zerstört die Familie, 2014). The lay publicists have translated Church social doctrine
into a secular language and made ‘gender theory’ a central concept in the new morality
politics.
In Central and Eastern Europe, the term ‘gender ideology’ was introduced by the Ger-
man Catholic publicist Gabriele Kuby. Her extensive and seemingly academic book e
Global Sexual Revolution: Destruction of Freedom in the Name of Freedom explains modern
social ‘evils’ such as high divorce rates, sexual permissiveness, and the social acceptability
of homosexuality as due to the liberalizing effects of the sexual revolution of the 1960s.
Kuby’s arguments are not original. Her book is an extensive, eclectic, and sometimes al-
most copy-paste compilation of the arguments of the above-mentioned Catholic publicists
and of Vatican documents. It has become the single most cited text of reference for con-
servative activists.The national-conservative intellectual think tank, the European Conser-
vative, offers a more elaborate discourse, especially concerning the criticism of liberalism,
reformulation of human rights, and the apologies of Orbán, Marion LePen, Salvini and PiS,
and warrants special study.
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Kuby brought conservative discourse into Central Europe and has been credited with
starting the politics of morality in Slovakia (Farkašová, 2019) and with strengthening the
conservative discourse in Hungary (Kováts & Pető, 2017: 121). Her books have been trans-
lated into two dozen languages (incl. Hungarian, Czech, Croatian, Slovak, and Polish) and
the author has undertaken several lecture tours hosted in church venues in CEE (Slovakia
in 2012, 2013, and 2014; Croatia in 2013; Romania and the Czech Republic in 2014).²³ The
book met with considerable success. The Czech translation sold out; Croatian Catholics
found in Kuby’s books an ‘authentic Catholic answer’ to the issues of gender and sexual
revolution (Anić, 2012: 33). In Hungary, she was named visiting professor at one of the
National Bank’s foundations (Kováts & Pető, 2017: 117). Kuby has actively participated in
petition-based campaigns in Croatia, and later in Slovakia. Most importantly, a plethora of
religious periodicals and local parish web pages have published translations of interviews
or excerpts from her books, and Church officials have reproduced her arguments.
3.2.2 e culturalisation of Christianity
Kuby’s texts and interviews have played the role of a cultural critique of rapid social change
and have helped many conservatives to make sense of civilizational issues for which the
Church itself has no simple answer. Post-communist Europe was expected to be especially
open to a conservative Reconquista because it has not been through the so-called sexual
revolution to the same extent as Western Europe. In Kuby’s words, ‘Eastern European
countries were saved by Communism from the cultural revolution in the West in 1968.’²⁴
Kuby uses a secular language and strongly stresses her secular concerns: the atom-
ization of society, the weakening of social cohesion, and ‘neoliberal’ exploitation. Both
G. Kuby and T. Anatrella associate ‘gender’ with an ambivalent genealogy: they portray
the latter as a project of left-wing ideology, so-called cultural Marxism, which undermines
the dignity of traditional social roles, aims to break social hierarchies, and subverts social
norms in order to make individuals more manipulable by world capital. Hence, Kuby’s
popularization of the Catholic response to liberalization genderism cannot be reduced to
a religious narrative. It is also a traditionalist critique of neoliberalism and globalization
(Graff & Korolczuk, 2018: 815). In Kuby’s texts, traditionalism is the answer to both the
spread of social liberal norms and the effects of a globalized neoliberal capitalism.
It is no paradox if the formulation of the traditionalist answer is thoroughly secular. In
his analysis of the Catholic response to secularization in the wake of the 1960s, Olivier Roy
explored the options of the Catholic ‘lay offensive.’ In his view, the Catholic Church could
choose to reconquer politically lost positions and impose its norms through an alliance
with the state (such as it attempted in Croatia and Poland through international treaties), or
to withdraw into Christian communities (such as in ‘The Benedict Option’ of Rod Dreher)
– or engage in a spiritual Reconquista. For Roy, the Vatican has chosen the third way.
However, the Church has now to work with a secularized, individualized, pagan society.
Hence it must ‘reconstruct religion starting from […] culture’ (Roy, 2019: 146).
This culturalization of religion is what Catholic lay activists work towards. They for-
²³ https://web.archive.org/web/20150419183951/https://res.claritatis.cz/cr/6792-ztrata-svobody-ve-jmenu-
svobody-globalni-sexualni-revoluce
²⁴ My čekali svobodu. Rozhovor s Gabriele Kuby, immaculata.minorite.cz/images/immaculata/pdf/IM133
.pdf
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mulate a nostalgic vision of a religious past in a secular language, based on a pessimistic
cultural diagnosis and provided with a political response: the traditionalist reaction. This
reaction explicitly formulates Christianity as a cultural identity – an identity attached to
the symbols of Christianity, rather than to its spiritual substance and practice. The pol-
itics of morality has thus become the most actionable element of ‘Christianist’ activism
(Brubaker, 2017a).
3.2.3 ‘Gender’ at the core of the politics of morality
Since 2013, the discursive take-over of ‘gender’ has succeeded. The simplified and nega-
tively charged notion of ‘gender ideology’ has largely established itself as a neutral, de-
scriptive term in the public sphere. ‘Gender’ and ‘gender ideology’ have been systemati-
cally conflated and ‘gender ideology’ has become the main ideological motor of the new
morality politics.
The Church actively spread moral panic concerning ‘gender’ through widely read epis-
copal letters in 2013. The Polish Episcopal Conference wrote: ‘Gender ideology is the prod-
uct of many decades of ideological and cultural changes that are deeply rooted in the Marx-
ism and neo-Marxism endorsed by some feminist movements, and the sexual revolution.
[…] It maintains that biological sex is not socially significant and that cultural sex, which
humans can freely develop and determine irrespective of biological conditions, is most im-
portant. […] The danger of gender ideology lies in its very destructive character both for
mankind, personal contact, and social life as a whole’ (Kolorczuk, 2014). T. Pieronek, a Pol-
ish bishop, caused a short-lived scandal by describing ‘gender ideology’ as ‘a worse threat
than Nazism and Communism.’²⁵ Slovak and Croatian episcopal letters followed suit.
In the Czech Republic, during a national holiday sermon in St. Wenceslas in 2019, Petr
Piťha, a priest and a former minister of culture, characterized the Istanbul Convention as
a ‘perfectly perverted law, which is […] directed against the traditional family. […] The
proposed laws and their proponents have adopted the ideology of Marxism and Nazism.
[…] Either we are free […] or we are not. Now, for example, we are supposed to adopt the
Istanbul Convention in the name of a powerful pressure group of genderists and homosex-
ualists.’²⁶ This remarkable speech was later criticized by several Church voices informed
about gender issues, such as Tomáš Halík.²⁷
Alarming pastoral letters proved to be consequential interventions concerning the def-
inition of marriage, women’s rights, and the scope of human rights. Invoking a bias against
minorities, Czech Republic’s new ombudsman, Křeček, refused to deal with ethnic and sex-
ual minority rights. The Slovak ombudswoman’s annual report was rejected by parliament
for her defence of abortion and sexual minorities.²⁸ The director for gender equality at the
Slovak Labour ministry quit because the new Labour minister forced the office ‘to accept
the comments of the Conference of Bishops of Slovakia, who are trying to erase gender




²⁷ Klaus hájí neobhajitelné (říjen 2018), http://halik.cz/cs/clanky-eseje/clanek/465/
²⁸ https://dennikn.sk/1892658/spravu-ombudsmanky-poslanci-potopili-zastavala-prav-zien-a-lgbti-ludi/
²⁹ https://spectator.sme.sk/c/22408264/director-of-gender-equality-department-quits.html
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The reach of the politics of morality was thus strengthened by a unified, traditional-
ist discourse of conservative civil society that caused shifts in the public framing of ‘lib-
eral’ issues. The conservative framing of gender equality and minority rights has created
a platform for right-wing and populist groups to unite against their liberal or centrist ad-
versaries. Coding policies in terms of morality issues whenever they include reference to
‘minority,’ ‘gender,’ ‘abortions,’ and ‘LGBT’ issues has become a tool for political struggle.
4 Morality politics and political context and opportunities
The relative success of a politics of morality and its ongoing salience is certainly due
to the professionalization and breadth of its actors, of the effective discursive strategy
and a multi-layered discourse that combines civilizational, cultural, and political criticism,
and moral appeal. However, traditionalist answers hardly seem sophisticated or engaging
enough to constitute an ideological alternative to liberalism. In fact, the ideological con-
tent is thin or shallow, and the diagnosis of civilizational evils is arguably dilettante and
naively moralizing. Its appeal is clearly other than ideological, and the reasons for its suc-
cess need to be sought elsewhere – namely, in the political dynamic of the contexts and
opportunities of conservative mobilizations.
4.1 e symbolic politics of moralist mobilizations
A surprising feature of the massive mobilizations during the four referenda campaigns is
their symbolic character. Unlike in Western Europe, the campaigns did not protest an ac-
tual plan to adopt same-sex marriages (with the possible exception of Slovenia). The three
remaining states did not allow registered partnerships, and had already defined marriage
exclusively as between a man and a woman. In Slovakia, a constitutional definition of fam-
ily was adopted a year ahead of the referendum. Only in Slovenia and the Czech Republic
was a vote on a same-sex marriage bill a real possibility, but this has so far been fended off
by a conservative opposition. Hence, the referenda did not seek any fundamental change.
So it cannot be said that the campaigns have failed: symbolically, they were very success-
ful. They confirmed the existence of popular opposition to liberal norms and the public
role of churches. They also introduced a traditionalist language into public debates.
The politics of abortion also has a strongly symbolic character. A legal ban on abor-
tions is unrealistic outside of Poland, despite regular National Marches for Life. However,
in Slovakia, for example, further administrative restrictions on abortions have a good
chance of being adopted after Slovakia elected a thoroughly conservative parliament in
2020. In Poland, the conservative government has tried to extend the ban to cover health-
threatening pregnancies, causing strong protests in 2016.³⁰ The symbolic, discursive, and
moralizing character of conservative campaigns is also an expression of political power.
As Joanna Mishtal has shown, having dominance over reproduction behavior is more im-
portant to the conservative establishment than the actual incidence of abortion. Illegal
abortions continue to be carried out in massive numbers in private clinics, which covertly
advertise their services. This breach of law rarely gets prosecuted. Anti-abortion campaigns
³⁰ https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/23/abortion-poland-mass-protests-against-tightening-
of-law
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have been accessory to what Mishtal calls a Church-led moral governance that produces
docile men and women within a larger religious-nationalist state building project (Mishtal,
2015). A more subtle form of conservative moral governance is in the making elsewhere.
Access to abortions in Slovakia and Croatia became difficult after many private and pub-
lic clinics started refusing to carry them out on conscientious grounds. Hungary has, too,
imposed lengthy administrative procedures on abortion.
4.2 Unifying the right-wing opposition
The second striking character of conservative mobilizations is their role in structuring the
right-wing political spectrum in opposition and in government. The political context of
conservative mobilizations shows three rather contingent features.
First, all four major petition campaigns in CEE (and the French and Spanish protests)
took place under socialist governments, and were backed by a fragmented right-wing op-
position. The mobilizations helped unify the right-wing camps behind a broadly conceived
conservative proposition. Second, the governments were led by nominally socialist parties
(SDP and Smer governments in Croatia and Slovakia, SDP-supported governments in Ro-
mania and Slovenia). Those were direct or indirect heirs of former communist parties that
later turned into champions of Europeanisation. The right-wing opposition adopted the
rhetoric of protecting freedom, family, and tradition against the purported cosmopolitan
liberalism of left-wing governments. These center-left parties could be framed as ‘socially
liberal.’ The conservative cultural framing of liberalism made parallels between commu-
nist and post-communist social engineering as destructive of national churches and ‘tra-
ditional values.’ Third, these socialist parties have also presided partly or fully over the EU
accession project. They have thus been credited with implementing European standards of
governance and liberal norms, including antidiscrimination laws that protect individuals,
minorities, and the environment. An important element of the conservative mobilization
is the criticism of social change that is seen as imposed from outside: Brussels is made
responsible for dictates that purportedly favor minorities and has introduced an incapac-
itating political correctness and foreign social norms – including multiculturalism and
gender fluidity. Such a foreign ‘moral order’ is explicitly framed as a demographic risk by
Catholic proponents: weakening social hierarchies would lead to fewer births and would
jeopardize the survival of Christian nations – during a time when a ‘youth bulge’ threatens
the South (Kuby, 204: 373). Hence, conservative mobilizations have a strong anti-colonial
element (Graff & Korolczuk, 2017) in which socialist (or post-communist) elites are framed
as allies of foreign, anti-national policies.
The referenda hence occurred when both the right and conservatives benefited from
them. The morality framing of the socialist or center-right as ‘liberals’ helped the oppo-
sition to develop a common denominator for broad right-wing mobilization. The whole
right has supported the campaigns and has thus legitimized the claims of a conservative
fringe. Morality mobilizations have shifted the whole right towards conservative positions.
In Poland, anti-gender campaigns have ‘enabled a political alliance between nationalism
and religious fundamentalism, contributing to the right-wing electoral victory of 2015’
(Graff & Korolczuk, 2017: 178).
By framing political adversaries, especially the left, as ‘liberals,’ the politics of moral-
ity has contributed to culturalizing political cleavages. However, a culturalist strategy has
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little traction when it does not get translated into political strategy by centrist or ruling
parties. The fate of several leaders of successful mobilizations highlights the primacy of
party politics over purely cultural dynamics. Croatian and Slovak activists tried to trans-
form their accumulated capital into electoral politics by founding political parties. So far,
all have remained unsuccessful because center-right coalitions did not integrate them.
Željka Markić moved into the field of nationalist agitation and collected numerous sig-
natures (370,000) for a change of election law that would restrict ethnic minority rights. A
moderate nationalist coalition government, however, blocked her referendum initiative on
formal grounds. The Kuffa brothers, morality agitators in Slovakia, were pushed towards
the political extreme.
4.3 Competition on the right
The politics of morality is not unaffected by party dynamics: between the right-wing par-
ties and the conservative citizen movements, the parties prevail. But party competition on
the right leads to intensified morality politics. In a situation of a generally weakened left in
CEE, political competition has largely moved to the right-wing side of the political spec-
trum. New, civic, populist, and neo-nationalist political subjects appear right-of-center and
fight for constituency and for the dominance of the right. Here, morality politics emerges
as the central issue of political competition on the right.
Examples of instrumentalized morality politics within the right wing abound, espe-
cially as regards polarizing votes, such as during presidential elections. In Poland’s 2020
presidential elections, the incumbent A. Duda attempted to push his rival Trzaskowski
into a ‘liberal’ corner by linking him with ‘LGBT ideology.’ Since they are both right-wing,
conservative candidates, the dividing line between liberal and national conservativism is
drawn over gender issues. In 2018, the candidate of the governing socialist party Smer
in Slovakia presented himself as a candidate of family and tradition, and also attempted
to push his rival, Zuzana Čaputová, into a liberal corner regarding adoption by same-sex
couples. Namely, the nominally socialist Smer adopted a populist, nationalist, and con-
servative rhetoric. M. Šefčovič, however, was not a very credible as a Catholic candidate:
He could not quote almost any of the Ten Commandments on a live show. Also, Zuzana
Čaputová managed to subtly navigate the liberal-conservative divide and eventually won
the vote. The shallow instrumentalization of moral conservativism showed that cultural
issues have for a time replaced socioeconomic ones, but also that betting on the culturalist
framing of political competition is not always an effective strategy.
Lacking the existence of other program issues, right-wing parties compete for lead-
ership of the conservative or Christian camp by doubling up on morality policies. The
respective conservative outbidding has entrenched and escalated morality politics. This
tendency is most visible in Slovakia, where several populist and nationalist projects have
built a conservative constitutional majority since the demise of the liberals at the 2020
elections. They now collectively adopt ever more conservative rhetoric.
4.4 Populism and politics of morality
Finally, a politics of morality has been a key element of the populist strategy in CEE. In a
weak conceptualization by Rogers Brubaker, populism is defined as a discursive and stylis-
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tic repertoire with an anti-elitist core (Brubaker, 2017b). For the populists, ‘the people’ is
a ‘bounded collectivity’ defined in contrast to the ‘threatening outside’ or to ‘internal out-
siders’ such as cosmopolitan elites. Further tropes involve ‘antagonistic re-politicization:
the claim to reassert democratic political control over domains of life that are seen, plausi-
bly enough, as having been depoliticized and de-democratized’; additionally, majoritarian-
ism, protectionism, and the rejection of expertise and institutional procedures (Brubaker,
2017b).
From this broad and non-ideological perspective, populism is defined as a vessel that
specific populists fill with variable content. The politics of morality has provided populists
with ready-made tropes and polarizing issues to employ. Migration and ‘gender’ were two
major populist tropes in which anti-elitism, ‘common sense,’ and nativism came together.
Morality entrepreneurs in Central Europe have indeed repoliticised marriage, feminism,
abortion, and claimed to defend common sense, native, majoritarian values against ‘for-
eign’ cultural imports and liberal, post-communist elites. Andrea Pető coined the concept
‘symbolic glue’ to describe the hostile rhetoric concerning ‘gender ideology,’ emphasizing
its ability to create broad electoral or protest platforms (Kováts & Põim, 2015: 126). The
abstract, complicated, and therefore easily manipulated concept of gender and an array of
new phenomena associated with changing gender roles (transgender rights, homosexual
marriage, #metoo, etc.) were easily used by right-wing and populist mobilizations in the
symbolic field of morality politics. Opposition to ‘gender’ has connected Catholics, LGBT
opponents, pro-life activists, ‘masculinists, and anti-feminists’ on the one hand, and the
extreme right and anti-globalists, but also some neoliberals on the other (Meyer & Sauer,
2017: 59).
The politics of morality has indeed offered a ‘new rhetoric of identity formation’ (Kováts
& Põim, 2015: 126). The dual rejection of the cultural other (migrant, Muslim) and the so-
cial other (elitist, liberal, ‘genderist’) has helped to reformulate national identity in pop-
ulist discourse as conservative, Western, and Catholic or Christian. A Christianist, nativist,
anti-colonial national self-positioning has repeatedly and successfully been used by right-
wing populists since 2013 to mobilize the public (Brubaker, 2017a). The protean nature of
‘gender’ and anti-gender politics has been extensively analyzed (Graff, 2016; Grzebalska &
Pető, 2017).
5 Conclusion
Since 2013, the politics of morality have developed in Central and Eastern Europe in ways
that have left durable traces: several countries have witnessed large conservative mobiliza-
tions; the idea of same-sex marriage and the concept of ‘gender’ have been problematized
and restrictions on abortion have been put back on the agenda. However, we need not see
in those developments proof of a generalized post-communist illiberal turn just yet.
The success of morality politics is due, in part, to a specific political dynamic. Conser-
vative mobilizations developed under the condition of a fragmented right-wing opposition
when morality issues could dynamize the opposition. Further, morality politics has become
the field in which, for a lack of other issues, right-wing parties continue to outbid them-
selves in a struggle for the leadership of the right. Third, populist parties made ample use
of this anti-colonial and anti-elite sentiment, and superimposed on it an anti-liberal one
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to dominate and mobilize majorities. On the other hand, we may cautiously conclude that
conservative mobilizations depend on the specific conditions of party dynamics. A pres-
ence of strong centrist parties, civil populism, or a substantial policy issue (such as public
health or the economy) may easily sweep the rug from under the conservative outbidding
and moralizing politics.
On the other hand, a possibly lasting effect of the new politics of morality is the cul-
turalization of political competition. The latter is in part also due to situational reasons:
the ability of conservative activist networks whose discursive strategies were not met with
serious intellectual opposition, and whose claims were promptly legitimized by media and
large parts of the political class. The conditions of this initial success may change. What
seems to be a lasting change is the discursive shift in the framing of gender and women’s
rights and human rights in general. An anti-modernist culturalist discourse has shattered
the discursive monopoly of a progressive universalism. Hence, creating a deeper under-
standing of conservative discourses and strategies remains an ongoing task.
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Embarrassing Stories: Legal Storytelling and Sociology of Law
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‘Legal storytelling’ is one of the most contested areas of the interdisciplinary research
field of ‘law and literature,’ and originally took shape in the political and legal context
of the United States. The proponents of ‘legal storytelling’ endeavor to ‘give voice’ to
groups and minorities in a disadvantageous social position by ‘telling’ – by hearing
and publicizing, in fact – their stories, unheard by law. However, many lawyers doubt
that these ordinary, often trivial stories contain any legally relevant content, while
literati question their aesthetic value. This essay argues against these doubts, leaning
on material from focus group interviews recorded in a recent piece of research about
Hungarians’ legal consciousness. It aims to expose the important role that these ev-
eryday life stories play in legal culture on the one hand, and, on the other hand, claims
that the analysis of these uncanonized, not-belletristic texts could be fruitful indeed.
For this, the first part of the essay offers a survey of how the concept of ‘legal culture’
emerged in Hungarian legal theoretical thinking, and how the sociological research
in which the presented ordinary stories were recorded is connected to the latter. Af-
ter analyzing several ‘story-bits’ taken from two focus group participants’ narrations,
the attention turns to some of the stories told by the ‘greats’ – that is, by writers –,
and here enters Franz Kafka. The last part of the essay seeks to determine what is
common to the two kinds of narratives – the ordinary and the literary –, and what
the differences are between them. In conclusion, it emphasizes that this essay can be
seen only as an intuitive theoretical experience related to the use of aesthetic notions
in analyzing empirical sociological data, rather than a methodologically well-founded
application of this approach. The basic idea of this experiment is that both law and
aesthetics are permeated by both moral and social psychological constituents.¹
Keywords: law and literature, legal storytelling, Hungarian legal culture, qualitative
empirical research methods
¹ An earlier Hungarian version of this paper was published as Szilágyi (2018a).
embaaing oie: legal oelling and ociolog of la 79
In memoriam Tamás Nagy²
1 Introduction
The headline of this study is slightly misleading perhaps, for one might associate it with
Karel Čapek’s work (Čapek, 1921; Ort, 2013),³ although we shall bring into play the aes-
thetics of one of his compatriots⁴ – highly ranked in the canon of ‘law and literature’ –
Franz Kafka, in the following analysis.
As for ‘legal storytelling,’ it is one of the most contested areas of the interdisciplinary
research field of ‘law and literature,’ and originally took shape in the political and legal
context of the United States. The proponents of ‘legal storytelling’ endeavor to ‘give voice’
to groups and minorities in a disadvantageous social position by ‘telling’ – by hearing
and publicizing, in fact – their stories, otherwise unheard by law (Delgado, 1989; Nagy,
2010). However, many lawyers doubt that these often trivial stories of everyday life have
any legally relevant content (Posner, 1997),⁵ while literati question their aesthetic value
(Posner, 1997).⁶
The present essay argues against these doubts, relying on material from focus group
interviews recorded in a recent piece of research about Hungarians’ legal consciousness.
It aims to expose the important role that these everyday life stories play in legal culture
on the one hand, and, on the other hand, claims that the analysis of these uncanonized,
non-belletristic texts could be fruitful indeed – and mainly here, in Hungary, southeast of
Kafka.
For this, the first part of the essay offers a survey of how the concept of ‘legal culture’
emerged in Hungarian legal theoretical thinking, and how the sociological research in
which the ordinary stories that were recorded and presented here is connected to that.
After analyzing several ‘story-bits’ taken from two focus group participants’ narrations,
the attention turns to stories told by the ‘greats’ – that is, by writers –, and here enters
Kafka, of course. The last part of the study seeks to determine what connects the two kinds
of narratives – the ordinary and the belletristic –, and what the differences are between
them.
² Tamás Nagy (1971–2018), a path-setter in Hungarian ‘law and literature’ studies, and a founding member
of the Hungarian Association for Law and Literature. Cf. Szilágyi (2012).
³ Čapek, who belonged to the generation of the Czech ‘national awakening,’ was seven years younger
than Kafka. He was nominated for the Nobel Prize seven times, and never won it.
⁴ If we can consider Kafka – who belonged to the Jewish community in Prague and wrote in German – as
Čapek’s ‘compatriot.’ This problem probably intrigued Kafka himself the most.
⁵ As Richard Posner observes in relation to the radical feminist Catherine MacKinnon’s anti-pornographic
writings: ‘MacKinnon is a magnet for the unhappy stories of prostitutes, rape victims, and pornographic
models and actresses. Even if all these stories are true (though how many are exaggerated? Does MacK-
innon know?), their frequency is an essential issue in deciding what if anything the law should try to do
about the sufferings that the stories narrate.’ Posner (1997: 744).
⁶ Tamás Nagy – agreeing with Posner – points out that narrated ‘legal stories’ often lack the cathartic
effect needed to overcome the prejudices of the audience (Nagy, 2010b). As Posner puts it – a bit coarsely:
‘The question is the audience for this scholarship and the sensitive issue of [the] narrative skills of the
stories’ authors. You need considerable literary skill to write a story that will effectively challenge a
reader’s preconceptions. People read junk that does not challenge their preconceptions; they do not read
junk that does challenge them.’ Posner (1997: 743).
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A few words about the authorial position. My former research fields – legal anthro-
pology (see e.g. Szilágyi, 2009; 2013), and law and literature (Szilágyi 2010; 2014) – and
the current one – the sociological study of the Hungarians’ legal consciousness and Hun-
garian legal culture⁷ – are connected in two ways. All of them require an interdisciplinary
approach, and all are theoretically linked closely to the concept of (legal) culture. The essay
inevitably mirrors these interests. This is why, on the one hand, the second section presents
an outline of legal culture: simply to mark out the author’s position in the scholarly de-
bate about the usefulness and explanatory potential of the concept in empirical studies.
Without engaging in the controversy (for a concise summary of the scholarly debate see
Nelken, 1995: 435–452; Silbey, 2001: 8624–8626) that goes back at least to the mid-1970s
when Lawrence Freedman first introduced his ideas about the concept of legal culture
(Friedman, 1975: 15–16, 193–222, 223–268), the presented analysis simply emphasizes that
the constituents of legal culture – values, norms, symbols, and patterns of social practices
– build up an intelligent and structured matrix. Narratives not only weave together these
elements into the fabric of culture, but also give shape and style to the cultural texture,
and can bridge the inconsistencies and the gaps within it.
On the other hand, the interdisciplinary approach always involves an inherent method-
ological challenge. How can we construct a discursive space in which we can combine the
different disciplines’ concepts and methods without destroying their original explanatory
forces instead of successfully locating them in synergic play? From this point of view, as
the conclusion emphasizes, the present essay can be seen only as an intuitive-theoretical
experiment involving using aesthetic notions in the analysis of empirical data rather than a
methodologically well-founded application of that. The underlying idea of this experiment
is that both law and aesthetics are permeated by moral and social psychological elements.
2 Aspects of legal culture and resear in legal consciousness
The concept of ‘legal culture’ appeared on the horizon of Hungarian theoretical legal think-
ing in the 1990s, first in legal history, then in comparative law (Szilágyi, 2018b), though
the cultural approach to law had been already present for more than a century in legal eth-
nology and anthropology on the international scholarly scene (Szilágyi, 2002). The cause
of this delay should be sought, of course, in the five-decade-long enforced dominance of
Marxism over the Hungarian social sciences. With respect to the legal consciousness re-
search that begun in the middle of the 1960s (Fekete and Szilágyi, 2017), this meant that
– fitting in the peculiar theoretical framework of ‘socialist jurisprudence’ – the notions
of ‘social-level legal consciousness’ or ‘social legal consciousness’ took the place of ‘legal
culture.’ Since the concept and theoretical perspective of ‘socialist jurisprudence’ stayed
alive more or less without any critical reflection in the last decade of the past century, so
it still has an influence on contemporary legal sociology.⁸ The critical review of this intel-
⁷ I joined the research group organized and coordinated by György Gajduschek within the frame of the
Hungarian Population’s Legal Consciousness – A eoretical and Empirical Analysis (OTKA no. 105552)
project in 2012. Fellow researchers were Balázs Fekete, Zsolt Boda, and Péter Róbert. I undertook, among
other tasks, the analysis of the above-mentioned focus group interviews.
⁸ We ought to note here that scholars belonging to the Critical Legal Studies movement – which is inspired
partly by neo-Marxian ideas, and has a great influence on contemporary socio-legal studies – also apply
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lectual heritage has begun only recently (Szabadfalvi, 2003; Szilágyi, 2011), in parallel with
the increasing interest in the cultural approach to legal phenomena.
The most trivial argument – although it has far-reaching methodological consequences
– for replacing ‘social legal consciousness’ with ‘legal culture,’ a concept more suitable for
operationalization in socio-legal studies, is that the former presuppose a kind of ‘collective
personality’ (like Marxist ‘class consciousness’), which is pointless from an empirical point
of view. For only an individual person has consciousness in proper psychological terms,
and all those socially given (and sensually ungraspable) ‘thoughts’ or ‘ideas’ appearing to
them externally in a more or less objectified form belong to the realm of culture.
For our present purposes, the concept of legal culture can be defined as a set of values,
norms, symbols, narratives, and patterns of social practices. Legal culture is related to
political culture through the concept of legitimacy, and it is organically woven into the
texture of the entire culture without sharp contours anyway.
Furthermore, we have to divide the sphere of ‘lay’ and ‘professional’ culture within
the realm of legal culture (Friedman, 1975: 223; 1977: 76; 1990: 4). The maintenance of the
latter is the function – and monopoly, in fact – of the legal profession that attends to the
normative layer of legal culture, and works out the adhering doctrinal-dogmatic layer.
The ‘professional legal culture’ is evidently of determining importance in the formation
of legal culture as a whole. Although it is also clear that the ‘lay culture’ – that is, the
vision of law in the eyes of non-lawyers – can be utterly different from the picture lawyers
would like to project inward (toward other lawyers) and outward (toward the outside social
environment).
To demonstrate the concept, let us present here a conceptual analysis of a constituent
of ‘professional legal culture’ – the attorneys’ professional self-image, as used in a recent
empirical study (Szilágyi & Jankó-Badó, 2018).
To begin with, self-image is interpreted as a cultural phenomenon. It refers to more
or less objectivized content, which regarding its ontological nature differs from individ-
ual or social psychological processes that determine its object of motifs and, therefore,
influence individual or group behavior. Consequently, the discourse about attorneys’ self-
image must be placed into the one about legal culture. In this sense, the self-image of
the attorney’s profession is viewed as one of the elements of professional legal culture, as
opposed to lay (non-lawyer) citizens’ legal culture. The self-image of the profession, how-
ever, can be interpreted as an ensemble of intellectual elements and content; a tapestry of
values, norms, prescriptive cultural patterns, narratives, and symbols, and the sociological
patterns can be read out of the conduct of the representatives of the profession.
Values characteristic of the self-image of the attorney’s profession, such as profes-
sional preparedness (a high level of legal knowledge), a sense of justice, impartiality, and
unconditional respect for the interests of the client, belong to the more general values of
the broader legal profession and are embedded in the even more comprehensive values of
political culture, such as liberty, equality, and social solidarity.
One of the layers of self-image is found closer to the level of social activities and com-
prises the rules of the profession. Parts of these rules are ‘written,’ such as the binding rules
of Act XI of 1998 on attorneys, or other rules of legal nature such as the codes of conduct
the concept of legal consciousness to ‘ideological’ phenomena of a group, class, or social level (and on
individual psychological ones, too) nowadays.
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of the Hungarian Bar Association. The profession has unwritten rules as well, including
the ‘courtesy’ rules concerning interactions with colleagues and lay citizens which also
form part the profession’s self-image.
Descriptive cultural patterns do not prescribe what ought to be done in a particular
situation, but they set out the positions and competences of participants. They also des-
ignate the place and the scope of activities that take place within society or in the legal
sphere. In this case, they can be interpreted as including the rules on pleadings and trial
organization laid down in the act on civil procedure, the recipients of which are primarily
judges. They also set forth attorneys’ positions and their options that influence the course
of an ongoing trial.
The values and the layers of prescriptive and descriptive cultural patterns analytically
separated above are in this case entwined by narratives – stories known and narrated by
attorneys. They also create the ‘normative universe,’ as coined by Robert Cover, in which
these patterns acquire their meaning (Cover, 1983). Every profession has its ‘great stories,’
such as the development of the Hungarian attorney’s profession, which is to be elaborated
and delivered in lectures at universities to future attorneys within the discipline of legal
history. These narratives are coiled around major turning points and outstanding figures
in the profession as a corporate group, and form the basis of the entire professional group.
Into these narratives are woven the fabric of local ‘urban legends’ and personal stories,
which inherently relate to other cultural fields (Szilágyi, 2015).⁹
Symbols that express self-image are not to be construed in their own physical realities
– such as luxury cars, expensive watches, powdered wigs, gowns, the latest versions of
mobile phones or state-of-the-art laptops. They are to be interpreted as signs with multi-
ple meanings. Symbols can signal the fact of belonging to the in-group and, at the same
time, are able to animate complex emotions and knowledge content in outsiders. As for
attorneys, status symbols are of major significance, and not only signal their belonging
to the middle class, but also create an impression of success with clients (such as the lux-
ury car or the expensive watch). However, other symbols (as used to be the case with the
attorney’s briefcase) distinctly signal their owner’s profession.
One must also mention the pattern layers inferred from the behavior of those prac-
ticing the profession that are grouped under tacit knowledge, and which are acquired by
professionals entering the profession through the observation of their colleagues’ not so
obvious activities. These are the ‘tricks of the trade,’ which can only be mastered in prac-
tice and which are more often than not markedly different from the idealized values and
rules of the profession’s manifest self-image.
What is important to note here is that contradictions and internal tensions generally
arise among the above-mentioned elements and layers of self-image in spite of the basic
tendency to strive for intellectual unity and internal coherence during the formation of
the professional self-image. Presumably, the more coherent and clear the self-image is,
the more it can ensure cohesion among those practicing the profession, which may hand-
somely contribute to the assertion of interests within professional circles. Conversely, the
⁹ This is how the name of the honest attorney, Petrocelli, the protagonist of an American TV show who
defends the rights of his clients to the very end, became a pun and sarcastic moniker for a Hungarian
attorney who represents Roma rights – namely, ‘Putricelli’ (the first part of the name, ‘putri,’ designates
a gypsy hut). The brave lawyer who actually got this nickname from his colleagues is the very same
Elemér Magyar to whom I later refer (below, in the fourth section of the paper).
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more contradictory, fragmented, and vague the self-image of the profession is, the less it
will be able to integrate its members and the more vulnerable it will become in the face
of adversity. The role of a solid and clear professional self-image from the point of view
of how it has evolved socially is always an empirical question: an overly strong corporate
spirit may also become a hindrance to reacting adequately to social change.
Finally, one must acknowledge the dynamic relation between the self-image of the
profession and the image created of the profession by lay citizens. The two are mutually
conversant in defining the playing field, which is indispensable for the adjustment to social
change or the actual inducement thereof.
What matters of all the above in furthering our analysis? First, it is important to see
that the structure of lay legal culture is similar to the professional one, although its nor-
mative layer is much thinner, and it is rather more fragmented and loaded with more
logical contradictions. The presence of these two characteristics – the relatively low level
of knowledge (Fekete & Gajduschek, 2015), and the existence of logical contradictions in
lay views about law (Berkics, 2015a; 2015b) – was detected by the latest legal sociological
studies of the Hungarian population, too. However, these differences are only gradual –
even if they are important –, and they do not touch the basic congeniality of these two
aspects of legal culture with regard to their constituents, structure, and fine connective
tissue (Cotterrell, 2006: 81–108). Consequently, stories about law are also important for
understanding lay legal culture. These narratives not only connect and order the elements
of legal culture – values, norms, symbols, and patterns of social practices –, but also weave
the legal culture within the texture of the whole culture. Furthermore, narratives also give
shape and style to the cultural texture, and can cover the inconsistencies and the gaps
within it, as we shall see it in the next section.
So the research program in which the following tiny stories were recorded aimed to
examine the Hungarian population’s legal consciousness.¹⁰ In the last period of the project,
in the autumn of 2016, four focus group interviews were recorded,¹¹ two in Salgótarján and
two in Budapest. The material with which we shall work is taken from one of the latter two
events. The interview in question was recorded by video camera in windowless, meeting-
room-like premises. It lasted approximately one and a half hours, with eight participants,
who sat around a long table. The moderator sat at the head of the table with her back to the
camera. The script of the interviews ran as follows: after the introduction, the moderator
asked for the participants’ opinions about fare dodgers on public transport; then about
buying goods of suspicious origin (e.g. goods ‘fallen off a truck,’ probably fake or possibly
stolen); she prompted them to recall their childhood experiences and parental models in
relation to these topics; finally, she questioned them about a failed barter deal (somebody
asked a mechanic to maintain a new motorcycle in exchange for a good bike). Our research
group had rather explicit hypotheses about the plausible outcomes of the interviews in this
phase of the project: namely, nothing good.
Inquiries led by Kálmán Kulcsár and András Sajó in the 1970s and 80s revealed a
peculiar schizophrenia in Hungarians’ legal minds. This was expressed by the following
maxim: ‘The law ought to be rigorous, and has to be enforced against everybody – except
¹⁰ The interviews were conducted within the frame of the Hungarian Population’s Legal Consciousness – A
eoretical and Empirical Analysis project (OTKA no. 105552). Cf. note 7 above.
¹¹ The interviews were recorded by Königsberg Consulting Ltd. in September 2016.
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me’ (Fekete & Szilágyi, 2017). Sajó characterized the Hungarians’ relation to law with the
‘hypocrite-parasitic’ attributive in one of his essays written after the democratic changes
(Sajó, 2008). Moreover, György Gajduschek, in another study (Gajduschek, 2008) – which
examined the public administration practice of applying sanctions – drew attention to the
fact that the message of the authorities’ observed practice was ‘Whoever abides by the law
is stupid.’ A natural accompaniment of this schizophrenia was the above-mentioned logi-
cal inconsistence of views spectacularly exposed by Mihály Berkics’s survey: 73 percent of
the representative sample simultaneously agreed with the statements ‘Rights are due only
to those who fulfil their obligations’ and ‘Certain freedom[-related] rights are equally due
to everyone’ (Berkics, 2015a). As György Gajduschek put it in an essay:
All these mirror the citizens’ ‘schizophrenic legal mind.’ They do not trust the state
and law (which they see as a product of the state), but they expect the resolution of
all their problems by the state. They demand thorough regulations and sanctioning
of even the least digressions from the rules and strict punishments, however, when
they have to face the law then they may outflank it or require bonitarian treatment.
All of this is embedded in an unusually pessimistic, cynical and anomic cultural en-
vironment. (Gajduschek, 2018, 169; see also Jakab & Gajduschek, 2019)
In fact, our expectations were proved true.
3 Niki, Gabi and the others
Now meet Gabi and Niki.
– I’m Gabi, thirty-seven years old. I have been living in Pest for twelve years, and
now I’m just serving my period of notice after quitting my job. And I do massage, go
on outings and go biking anyway. That’s all.
– I’m Niki, thirty-five. I live with my son. I have been working as a credit evaluator
for two months, but was in banking before. I love doing everything in my spare time.
The range is quite wide. I like reading, but also hiking, going to concerts, frolicking
about, theatre. I’ll try anything that’s available.
Two young ladies, in light summer clothes – we are in the first days of September –,
sitting side by side on the moderator’s left. Had we not known that they were randomly
selected into the panel, we would think that they were friends. As the conversation be-
gins to warm up after getting through the introduction and the topic of fare-dodging, the
moderator turns to the problem of the ‘goods that fell off a truck’: ‘Suppose that an ac-
quaintance of yours gets a new coat, or some perfume, a mobile phone or something else
very cheaply. So cheap that you may think that the coat or perfume fell off a truck – that
is, it was stolen. What do you think about this? Is it acceptable? This is an example.’
Whereupon childhood memories descend on Niki:
We grew up near Ferencváros transfer station. This meant that all kinds of things
quite often ‘fell off trucks’ and everybody living in the housing project worked at
MÁV [Hungarian State Railways] or had some relatives there, given that the project
was built for railway workers. Things very often ‘fell off a truck.’ And quite good
things sometimes. At that time [when everybody wanted to buy them] Hi-Fi sets,
TVs, tracksuits, specifically, everything. And MÁV workers, too, thought, of course,
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that they were working for very little money, so something fell off at every stop,
but there is no steady demand for railway transportation anymore… it’s considerably
faded away. A lot of things fell off at every stop, and then some people got in trouble
with the police. But, really, why would one pay ten, twenty, or no matter how many
thousand for something that could be bought for two. And it was [products were]
original or good quality.
One round later in the conversation, the moderator raised a question about the influ-
ence of the social environment: ‘If acquaintances or friends buy these kinds of goods, to
your mind, does it influence one’s decision in such a case?’ – the question throws Niki
back into her memories again.
It just worked that way for us then, and the products kept coming, and specifically
everybody did it that way. Thus, nobody thought of buying a Hi-fi set in the shop
when it could be delivered for half or three-quarters of the price. And this was quite
normal. You shouldn’t think of [that we lived in] extreme poverty by the way, for we
had cars and spent our holidays by the seaside. We weren’t lowlifes. But this was the
normal, the accepted [thing to do], and everybody lived this way there. That if there
was something, then it was from there [off the train]. The [having a] Hi-Fi set wasn’t
vital, of course – we simply bought it there, and that was it.
Then, at the finish of the interview, just before leaving, when the moderator asked each
of the participants what had been the most interesting thing: ‘We’ve arrived at the end of
this conversation more or less, nevertheless I would like to have another round for you to
summarize your opinion about what you found to be the most interesting.’ – Niki suddenly
‘comes out’ (as popular media call these kinds of announcements nowadays):
I’m ashamed now, because I feel a bit that everybody is trying to be very honest. […]
I don’t know, but it seems to me that way from the conversation, yet I am used to
use these opportunities, let’s call them that, even in administration for example. I’ve
got a lot of connections everywhere, so that’s my way of using them, and this is the
most natural thing for me, and I am used to fare-dodging too, when I need to do it.
Obviously, not when I’m in a new job and rolling in money, for I buy one [a ticket]
then. And I too teach my child to be honest, and he never does fare-dodging anyway,
because he’s a bit of square, so he seems to be a bit too stiff about these regulations to
me. I like that a bit in him, but I’m not so honest. And I tell you, that I feel ashamed
of myself anyway.
One question only before we turn to Gabi’s story, setting aside any kind of popular
psychology: how much might Niki really feel ashamed of hersel?
Let us hear, however, Gabi’s story now, which is a reflection of Niki’s from many points
of view. Interestingly, it begins at the end, with a memory from adolescence called forth
by the following question of the moderator: ‘Let’s move to the next topic now. Did it ever
occur in your childhood that somebody in your environment, you yourself, or anybody
else, lifted a roll, some chocolate, a bun or something else from a shop. What happened to
her? Was she caught and accounted for, or what?’
To which Gabi responds:
It happened every day that the others stole. In high school. Doesn’t matter. I said OK,
I ought to do it too. I went into the shop for a [carton o] milk, I was so much of a
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loser. And it [the compulsion to steal] didn’t come from inside, but from the need to
belong somewhere, to do the same as them, so I tried to steal one, but they caught
me, of course. I felt bloody embarrassed because I didn’t really want to do it. But it
didn’t matter – they said that I shouldn’t go there ever again behaving like this. I said
OK, and I thought through this ‘follow the others’ thing again.
Moderator: Did the shopkeeper grab you then?
Gabi: There was no visible sign of what we were talking about. She just accosted me,
I told her that it was OK, she was right, I gave it back to her and went off, she went
back in. There was no humiliation in the story.
However, after several comments, the moderator’s next question – ‘And how was it
within your family? – I asked this already, but you just haven’t answered yet’ – pushes
Gabi further, and she has a kind of attack of sincerity:
Bloody good question! I saw my parents stealing. So we went to the shop, I was only a
kid, and saw them putting something away and I felt awful. I don’t know why I have
become so different, or how it works. For I simply knew in my mind that it would
be fucking sticky if they were nabbed. They weren’t caught, of course. I just learned
from this… that I felt uneasy seeing this. That it’s no way for me.
Let us take a closer look at the two stories once again. How should we understand
that the two stories are reflections of each other? Niki’s narrative begins in the past and
ends in the present: she says that fencing is not a problem to me, since I grew up in such
circumstances in which this was common, and I make use of every sensible opportunity
even nowadays – indeed, I try to guide my son in this direction. Gabi’s story starts in the
present and moves toward the past: I am honest, because I was caught engaged in petty
mischief once in my adolescence, since I was a loser then. I saw my parents stealing in my
childhood, and a fear of being collared was already fixated in my mind.
Niki and shame: ‘I am not afraid to say that I am not honest, because honesty is not
enough for “surviving” – street smarts are what is needed. In fact, I am not ashamed of
not being honest; indeed, I wish that my son were not so honest either.’ Gabi and shame:
‘actually, I am ashamed because being honest is lame. I am honest, in fact, only because
I am scared of being caught. I became scared in my childhood, when I saw my parents
stealing at the shop.’
Niki and sincerity: ‘I’m not sincere, of course – I do not feel ashamed at all for breaching
stupid regulations when I need to. Do not think about me, however, that I do not consider
honesty to be important, while you play at being innocent.’ Gabi and sincerity: ‘I am really
afraid of breaching the rules, therefore I am really honest, although I know it is lame.’
Accepting honesty – the virtue of following the rules (be they moral or ethical) for their
own value – driven by feigned shame or fear represents subordination in both cases. In
the former case, subordination to a hypocritically ashamed (self-consciously understood,
in fact) ‘common sense,’ while in the latter, to a sincerely ashamed ‘irrational fear.’
However, emerging from the thermal bath of academic moralism – as Richard Posner
might strongly approve of¹² – and stepping onto the dry land of Hungarian socio-legal
¹² Considering the way that Posner describes academic moralism: ‘A lot of it strikes me as prissy, her-
metic, censorious, naive, sanctimonious, self-congratulatory, too far Left or too far Right, and despite its
frequent political extremism, rather insipid’ (Posner, 1998a: 1640).
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studies, we see that the researchers have picked up on another common denominator of
Gabi’s and Niki’s stories in the middle of the 1970s. Namely, the influence of social envi-
ronment (and practice); that is, the influence of ‘others.’ This effect has been named ‘nor-
malization’ – forgetting or setting aside the well-known Roman law concept of desuetudo
– when the normative effect of social practice derogates the law’s normativity. For exam-
ple, in one survey only 43 per cent of the Hungarian population were inclined to punish
minor theft at the workplace, while 11 per cent did not express any kind of disapproval at
that time (Sajó, 1986: 372).
4 Legal storytelling as literature
If we were to look for legal stories, then we would find that Hungarian jurisprudence
has not yet paid much attention to narratives told about law. The underlying cause of
this might not be the late and fragmented reception of the ‘law and literature’ formed in
Anglo-American jurisprudence – for the delay is not long, only two decades, and as for
fragmentation – and the actual lack of dealing with legal narratives –, this is rather the
result of a deeper theoretical current that defines Hungarian legal thinking: namely, the
legal positivism that took shape in the first part of the twentieth century (Szabadfalvi, 2007;
2011), which primarily sees rules as being within the phenomenon of the law – eminently,
the positive legal rules issued and enforced by the state. This peculiar narrowed perspective
has prevented, for example, Hungarian legal ethnography from studying everyday life
stories about law, although ethnographers have probably met regiments of these kinds
of stories in the field.¹³ Instead of this, they have tried to reconstruct – using the term
‘construct’ may be more adequate here – the rules of custom and folk law by leaning on
carefully prepared questionnaires (Bognár, 2016).
So we have to cast our watchful eyes on the literature! This is true even if a recent
high-impact legal story – which raised the attention of both lawyers and (film) critics –
was published by Elemér Magyar, an attorney in Eger. However, considering the fact that
Magyar, who wrote a drama on the basis of the files related to Dénes Pusoma’s criminal
case, retired to be a fulltime writer soon after the premier of the film adaptation, Magyar’s
case hardly questions the above statement (Szilágyi, 2015).
Classic Hungarian literature abounds in legal stories, of course, beginning with János
Arany’s ballads, to the novels of Dezső Kosztolányi and Géza Csáth, which have been an-
alyzed by scholars interested in ‘law and literature’ as an antidote to the dryness of the
legal curriculum. Anna Kiss’s work (2009) has been ground-breaking in this respect – the
latter the title of whose first book (also used in legal education) is quite eloquent: Literary
Heroes Who Commied Crimes. Yet even more eloquent are the legal instruments concern-
ing chrestomathy, serving as material for complex practical training in criminal law and
for preparation for the bar exam, which she edited (Kiss, 2010), thereby coordinating the
work of a populous scholarly community: Crimes from the Library-room. This latter title
especially hints at the attitude of Hungarian lawyers, expressing that they prefer to turn
to literature rather than to ordinary people when they seek legal stories.
¹³ There are always exceptions – for example, see Lanzendorfer (2017). However, on how useful it can be
to collect everyday life stories in the study of legal culture (or legal consciousness), see Ewick and Silbey
(1998).
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However, this may not necessarily be true only for Hungarian lawyers: on the one
hand, we have seen the scruples formulated in American jurisprudence against ‘legal sto-
rytelling,’ and, on the other hand, like their overseas – or over-Elbe – colleagues, the Hun-
garians too are inclined to look beyond their own national literature, and to select stories
from the inexhaustible store of world literature. At this point, we arrive at Franz Kafka’s
works, which are of key importance in our inquiries. Partly because they thematically
join together the Hungarian and the international ‘law and literature’ studies, and partly
because Kafka’s aesthetics can help us – we hope – to shed light on certain features of
Hungarian legal culture.
The most renowned ‘Kafka-logist’ in Hungarian ‘law and literature,’ Tamás Nagy, iden-
tifies three interpretations of Kafka’s works (Nagy, 2010c). Two of these are closely linked,
being embedded in the same polemics – the so-called ‘Posner debate’¹⁴ –, while the third
one is only loosely related to that context. Robin West’s keynote thesis is that the picture
drawn about the human condition by liberal economics – homo economicus – is too sim-
plistic. Thus, it too easily identifies the nature of consent based on free choice – which
morally justifies the free market and the liberal legal order – with the motive of wealth-
maximization based on rational deliberation. West uses Kafka’s novels to reveal that the
consent of a party sometimes arises from the ‘freedom of submission,’ which can be de-
structive in both a moral and a material sense, however (West, 1985).
Posner’s aim is not simply to refute West’s Kafka interpretation again, but to question
Kafka’s works’ – and thereby generally literature’s – legal relevancy. In order to do this, he
emphasizes primarily that Kafka’s ideas about human nature and his feeling about life is
nothing but a projection of his own neuroses and personal historical position, which has
nothing to do with modern American life (Posner, 1998b: 199). From this point of view, e
Trial is no more than a ‘sick Kafkaesque joke’ (Posner, 1998b: 135).
Theodor Ziolkowski, whom Posner mentions in a note, but otherwise leaves out of
consideration in fact, elaborates the third interpretation (Ziolkowski, 1967: 37–67; 1997).
This omission is no wonder, for Ziolkowski – unlike West and Posner, who rather use
Kafka’s short stories such as In the Penal Colony, e Judgement, or A Hunger Artist –
concentrates on the analysis of e Trial. According to Ziolkowski, the novel can be read
in the context of the professional discussion about the contemporary reform of Austrian
penal law in which Kafka himself was an interested participant. More precisely, the novel
can be seen as a critical reflection on the penal regime of the time that was tending towards
an absurd burlesque. This aspect of the text might be evident to Kafka’s contemporaries. As
Tamás Nagy points out, evoking a biographical anecdote ‘[…] according to which, when
Kafka first read out the first chapter of the novel in company – among many of whom were
lawyers like his friend, for example, Max Brod – he had to stop from time to time since he
could not continue the reading for the big laughter’ (Nagy, 2010c: 114).
¹⁴ The heated debate, which sometimes was not without personal insults, lasted for years and certainly
makes up an autonomous chapter in the history of ‘law and literature.’ Nearly all the leading scholars
in the field took part in it, including the challenged Posner himself. Just to mention here several names
and contributions in chronological order as illustration: West (1985), Posner (1988), Weisberg (1989), Fish
(1988), Balkin (1989), D’Amato (1989), Posner (1989), Posner (1991), Nussbaum (1993), Weisberg (1993),
Posner (1998b), Seaton (1999). A survey of the debate is presented to Hungarian readers by Tamás Nagy
(2010c).
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Each of the above-presented, partly contradictory interpretations contains elements
that are worth considering. West is probably right about that the ‘freedom of submission’
apprehended by Kafka is indeed a real psychological factor that can affect the work of law.
Ziolkowski, in turn, rightly sees that Kafka’s feeling about life is more directly related to the
reality of law’s life than abstract, psychological circumstantiality. We must not brush aside
Posner’s insight either, which may seem to be superfluous at first sight: it is possible that
the whole Kafkaesque ‘sick joke’ somehow belongs to the spirit of the place and age in fact.
Ziolkowski would keenly agree: this spirit is not American, nor modern (or ‘post-modern’
or whatever we call the contemporary Zeitgeist). However, to dig deeper, it is inevitable
that we look into the nature of the Kafkaesque ‘sick joke’; that is, into the aesthetic program
on which Kafka’s oeuvre is built, which in turn can be best grasped by the concept of the
‘absurd.’¹⁵
If we are to understand the aesthetic working of ‘absurd,’ it is enough to take Kafka’s
Metamorphosis as an example. It is evidently impossible that one awakes one morning to
find himself transformed into a bug. However, this nonsense does not seem to embarrass
anybody, including the protagonist of the story, except for the reader. Nevertheless, the
absurd does not work only with effects drawn from the tension of cognitive contradictions.
In that case, the situation would not be more exciting for the reader than a well-formulated
logical trap or paradox – for example: what happens when an irresistible force meets an
unsurmountable obstacle? Paradoxes can serve as a starting point for building up the sense
of absurdity, as in the case of Joseph Heller’s Catch 22, which, however absurd, calls forth
ambivalent emotions, too. For example, the reader of Metamorphosis may be cast adrift
between empathy, commiseration, and compassion on the one hand, and disgust, hatred,
and rejection on the other. At the center of the aesthetic impact stands the precipitation of
the feeling of incapacity in fact. The reader is unable to understand the story and identify
himself with the protagonist, yet he cannot reject him either. What the reader experiences
is nothing but this inability. Géza Páskándi accurately expresses this in one of his essays,
writing that we can glimpse in the heroes of absurd literature ‘the people who are standing
unarmed in the face of the situation, not capable to choose or make a decision’ (Páskándi,
1967: 839).
This feeling of incapacity, in turn, stands only a step away from the ‘freedom of sub-
mission’; acquiescence in moral and physical destruction. As Páskándi aptly phrases this
in another piece of writing:
Thus for the man, absurd is what carries its own ineluctability in its contingency: it is
law and necessity in its fortuitousness. It is such a ‘coincidence’ which has smuggled
itself in the Pantheon of necessities to show itself as real god. The essence of absurd
phenomenon is the chance that camouflages itself as ineluctability and law to our
mind. Therefore the prototype and the source of absurd is: death. (Páskándi, 1969:
171)
Casting a glance over the history of literature is enough to see that Posner is right in
that the ‘sick joke’ and ‘freedom of submission’ are not American inventions at all. For
the homeland and primary hotbed of the absurd lies in Middle Europe. This is why Kafka
and the outstanding writers of the following generations – Rózewicz, Mrožek, Hrabal,
¹⁵ Peter Fitzpatrick (2016) nicely brings to light the absurdity of Kafka’s vision of law in his essay, even if
he does not use the term itself in his analysis.
ineecion. ea eopean jonal of ocie and poliic, 7(1): 78–96.
90 in h. ilgi
Okudzhava – ‘flirt with absurd and make the conditions of the region look like a living
nonsense. After all, people live, are born, love, and die here too, as if this place were an
enchanted garden in which everything stands on its head, and the inhabitants hardly notice
this’ (Almási, 1992: 224, emphasis in the original).
5 Embarrassing stories and the absurdity of everyday life
Now, we have arrived at the last of our problems indicated in the introduction. What are the
similarities between Kafka’s writings and our story scraps, and what are the differences?
The essence of their similarity is easily recognizable in light of the above: it lies in their
absurdity. The more intriguing part of the question is revealing their differences. Looking
for an answer, we should consider the circumstances of the writings’ conception first –
that is, we should cast a glance at the author’s social position.
Kafka, the offspring of middle-class parents, graduated in law and worked as a lawyer
until the end of his life. He had moderately radical – anti-clerical, pacifist – political views,
and – well – some problems with the fair sex (to be fair: who has not had any problems with
some kind of sex?). After being diagnosed with tuberculosis, he took his illness seriously
and tried to spend more time in fresh air. All in all, he lived a normal ‘bourgeois’ life
– except that he obsessively wrote at night. However, the question of who was doing
what during their night-time solitude was not counted among the criteria of normality
by Kafka’s contemporaries.
Why is this interesting? Because it is evident that – notwithstanding the salient ten-
sions derived from his insecure political and sexual identity, and his spiritual sensibility –
Kafka needed a great deal of artistic creativity to write his stories. On the other hand, our
contemporary legal storytellers are the protagonists of their own stories. In other words:
what was fiction by Kafka is reality today. To put it in a lengthier way: it seems that Kafka’s
absurd nightmares have slowly become reality during the past hundred years. What does
this mean and how could it happen? Let us see a ‘literary’ example first! Read carefully
this text below dated 3 November 1959.
István Örkény has belonged to the group of right-wing writers within the Writers’
Association since 1953. He was elected as a member of the Writers’ Association’s pres-
idency, and the editorial committee of the Literary Paper in the autumn of 1956. He
agreed with the counter-revolutionary line of action of these organisations. He looked
with favour on the movement started on 23th October 1956, and, to support […] it,
he wrote and read out the ‘Obsecration for Budapest’ on the Radio, and published it
in the newspaper entitled ‘Truth’. He also wrote the infamous counter-revolutionary
calumniation entitled ‘We lied at day, we lied at night’ as the introduction to the Free
Kossuth Radio’s broadcasting. After 4 November 1956, he actively took part in the
‘Revolutionary Committee’ of Writers’ Association, and he approved its working. In
the company of Tibor Déry, Géza Képes and Áron Tamási, he took part in the in-
formative meeting with Krishna Mennon, Indian ambassador in December 1956. He
actively took part in the preparatory works of the Writers’ Association meeting on
28 December 1956, and of the resolutions issued by it. After the autonomy of Writers’
Association was suspended, he continued his inimical activity: he was among the or-
ganisers of the writers’ strike, and the boycott of the Literary Committee at the time
of its formation. Örkény’s opinion and behaviour has not changed until recently. He
has not been capable, and has not wanted to face and admit his faults; consequently,
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he has excluded himself from Hungarian literature. On the grounds of the above said,
we do not propose to issue a driving licence to István Örkény.¹⁶
If we take a ‘scientific’ approach to the problem now, via the above-presented contem-
porary socio-legal studies on the legal consciousness of Hungarian population and legal
culture, then we may again refer to György Gajduschek’s insights about the underlying
causes of Hungarian legal culture’s chaotic and confused character:
Six different political regimes have dominated in Hungary in the past century. […]
There are some similarities among most of these regimes. The most obvious, though
paradoxical, similarity is that their legitimizing ideology was always founded on the
harsh denial of the previous one. Most of these regimes, except for the 1990–2010
period, had authoritarian features or had a totalitarian nature. The legitimacy of each
regime was mostly not based on free elections, on a democratic arrangement, or on a
high level of welfare for the people. Instead, these regimes relied on actively spread
ideologies that proclaimed the superiority of the given regime in various respects and
served as major legitimizing forces. The end-result of this is that the footprints of of-
ficial ideologies have continuously been present in citizens’ minds. However, these
ideologies have been inherently contradictory. As they were inculcated in an uncon-
scious and unreflective manner, the contradictions do not cause mental problems in
everyday life (Gajduschek, 2017: 49–51).
Well, this confused mind-set may be mentally manageable at the outset, except that it
can easily make everyday life absurd and anathematize contemporary Hungarians to the
constant taste of its bitterness.
Finally, sinking again into the warm thermal bath of academic moralism, let us wave
farewell to the Dear Reader by quoting István Bibó, the greatest Hungarian political and
moral philosopher of the past century:
Evil, paltriness, and cowardice consist not in any free and dauntingly devilish choice
but in the very fact that we wretchedly, unconsciously, and without free choice do and
only do what our social, community, educational and personal characteristics, warped
and warping experiences, ingrained biases, meaningless platitudes, and comfortable
and foolish formulas dispose us to do. […] It is in this context that we have to raise the
issue of our own, our nation’s, and our society’s responsibility. If Hungarian society
is indeed a serf-minded and herd-wise one that dumps the issues of responsibility on
its masters and occupiers, there is no point in raising the question; it will reject it. But
I do not believe Hungarian society was or is so deeply lost in this herd-mindedness
and in being downtrodden (Bibó, 2015: 258–259).
He wrote this in 1948.
6 Conclusions
In the introduction to this paper, we became aware of the doubts concerning the genre
of ‘legal storytelling’ engaged in by both lawyers and literati. This essay argues against
¹⁶ Jelentés Örkény István gépkocsivezetői engedélyéről (Report on István Örkény’s driving licence) (2004).
Rubicon, 15(8–9) 76, quoted by Nagy (2010a: 183). Nagy aptly notes that had we not known that this were
a police document, we would think it one of Örkény’s own ‘one-minute’ stories.
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these scruples using the material of focus group interviews taken from recent research
into Hungarians’ legal consciousness that reveals the important role these everyday life
stories play in legal culture.
It takes the analysis of attorneys’ professional self-image as a starting point to explore
the elements, structure, and the dynamics of legal culture, emphasizing that narratives
not only connect and order the elements of legal culture – the values, norms, symbols,
and patterns of social practices –, but weave legal culture within the texture of the whole
culture. The discussion progresses from this general level to highlighting more specific
characteristics of Hungarian legal culture. The alarming symptoms of legal alienation and
norm-confusion set the background for the empirical studies that include assorted every-
day legal stories.
The stories of Gabi and Niki accurately reflected these problems. The acceptance of
honesty – the virtue of following the rules (be they moral or ethical) for their own value
– driven by feigned shame or fear, meant subordination in both cases. In the former case,
to the hypocritically ashamed (self-consciously understood, in fact) ‘common sense,’ while
in the latter to a sincerely ashamed ‘irrational fear.’
At this point, Franz Kafka’s works were introduced to enable deeper understanding of
the overall cultural context in which Hungarian legal culture is embedded. From the syn-
thesis of three different readings of Kafka – Robin West’s, Richard Posner’s, and Theodore
Ziolkowski’s – the aesthetic concept of ‘absurd’ emerged as a key notion for clipping to-
gether everyday life and literary narrations.
Seeking the differences between everyday life and literary stories led us to consider the
historical process that has turned absurd fiction into reality in Middle Europe, and more
particularly, in Hungary. An official police document and some scholarly notes were used
to shed light on the nature of this phenomenon.
In conclusion, we have to point out that this essay can be seen as an intuitive theoret-
ical experiment that uses aesthetic notions to analyze empirical sociological data, rather
than a methodologically well-founded application of that. The basic idea behind this ex-
periment is that both law and aesthetics are permeated and cross-infected by moral and
social-psychological constituents. This is why the phenomena of these two cultural fields
permanently resonate with each other. A great deal of philosophical and aesthetic research
and qualitative empirical data is needed to ground this method sufficiently.¹⁷ Nevertheless,
we hope that this attempt can stand as a demonstration of the possibility.
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Aims. There are significant differences in harm reduction services availability and
performance in various countries. The paper examines the state of one of the harm
reduction interventions – needle exchange services – through the lenses of morality
policy, attempting to establish potential relationships between policy framing and
policy outcomes. Method. The research uses an explorative design with cross-country
comparison. The unit of analysis is drug policy in a country, and the geographical
scope includes Czechia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, following the maximum vari-
ation case selection procedure. Countries’ drug strategies are analysed to identify
the policy frames, and data on needle exchange programmes are used to assess the
state of harm reduction. Results. The analysis identified health and social drug policy
framing in Czechia and Slovakia, the morality frame in Hungary, and no frame in
Poland. The availability and coverage of needle exchange programmes is the highest
in Czechia, followed by Slovakia, Hungary and Poland. Conclusions. The Hungarian
case confirms the relationship between morality framing and poor policy outcomes,
while the Czech case between health framing and effective policy. Further research is
needed to establish the function of morality framing as a necessary and/or sufficient
condition for unsatisfactory policy performance.
Keywords: morality policy, policy framing, harm reduction, East-Central Europe
(ECE), needle exchange, drug policy
1 Introduction
The harm reduction approach to drug use, although still relatively new compared to the
other three pillars of drug policy (law enforcement, treatment, and prevention; McCann,
2008), has already secured a well-established position in many developed countries, es-
pecially in Western Europe. It is understood as ‘policies, programmes and practices that
aim to minimise negative health, social and legal impacts associated with drug use, drug
policies and drug laws’ (Harm Reduction International, 2020, para. 1). Based on public
health and human rights considerations, and promoting pragmatic solutions, it aims to
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minimise the adverse health and social consequences of substance use instead of attempt-
ing to eliminate use altogether (Single, 1995). Initially controversial and contested by many
as potentially promoting drug use, the harm reduction approach has slowly made its way
into the mainstream of policy interventions.
Today, there is a plethora of evidence on the effectiveness of harm reduction services
in preventing infectious diseases (see, for example, Hurley, Jolley and Kaldor, 1997; Mac-
Donald, Law, Kaldor, Hales, and Dore, 2003; Vlahov and Junge, 1998; Wodak and Cooney,
2006). Moreover, such interventions have proved to be cost-effective as well (Andresen
and Boyd, 2010; Wilson et al., 2015). Some scholars claim that in the face of this evidence,
‘[t]he prolonged scientific debate about harm reduction is over’ (Wodak, 2007: 60).
This view seems to be shared by major international organizations. The United Nations,
in the Resolution adopted by its General Assembly in April 2016, highlights the need for
a balanced approach to drug policy and ‘[i]nvite[s] relevant national authorities to con-
sider […] effective measures aimed at minimizing the adverse public health and social
consequences of drug abuse […], as well as consider ensuring access to such interven-
tions, including in treatment and outreach services, prisons and other custodial settings
[…]’ (United Nations, 2016: 6). The European Union even goes a step further, calling in its
Action Plan on Drugs 2017–2020 for ‘[s]cal[ing] up where applicable, availability, cover-
age and access to risk and harm reduction services, e.g. needle and syringe exchange pro-
grammes, opioid substitution treatment [and] opioid overdose management programmes’
(Council of the European Union, 2017: 7).
Notwithstanding this international agreement about the role of harm reduction in drug
policies, significant differences in the availability of various interventions across coun-
tries can be observed. For example, while needle and syringe exchange programs (NSPs)
are available in 29 out of 30 countries reporting to the European Monitoring Centre for
Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), take-home naloxone programs are implemented
in only ten, drug consumption rooms in eight, and heroin-assisted treatment in five coun-
tries (EMCDDA, 2019).
There are also clear between-country differences in the level of accessibility of ser-
vices. According to civil society experts, while the accessibility of prevention and treat-
ment responses in East-Central Europe countries is similar to Western European one, the
accessibility of harm reduction programmes is significantly lower (Kender-Jeziorska and
Sarosi, 2018: 43).
One of the explanations for this phenomenon may be the role of values and social
norms – drug policy that addresses addictive-behaviour-related matters is one of the typ-
ical examples of morality policies (Euchner, 2019). It is possible that while in mainstream
Western literature and policy practice the controversy around illicit drugs has become
negligible (which seems plausible, among other factors due to the recent normalisation
of drug use – Parker et al., 2002; Ravn, 2012; Wilson et al., 2010), it is still contestable in
Central and Eastern Europe.
In order to shed some light on the potential reasons for the above-mentioned differ-
ences, this paper examines, through the lenses of the morality policy framework, the state
of harm reduction services for people who inject drugs (PWID) in the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. The chosen countries share numerous cultural, social, and
political similarities on the one hand, and face relatively similar challenges regarding drug
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use on the other (more detailed case selection logic can be found in the Methods section).
In other words, the goal is to establish whether a relationship exists between the morality
framing of drug policy and the state of harm reduction in selected countries. To that end,
the following section presents the theoretical framework. Subsequently, data and methods
are discussed, followed by empirical analysis and conclusions.
The study uses technical guidelines developed by the World Health Organization, Unit-
ed Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS
(2012) in order to help counties in implementing and monitoring HIV prevention inter-
ventions as points of reference. The analysis will focus on needle and syringe exchange
programs (NSPs) for people who inject drugs.
2 Morality policy
The theoretical framework of this inquiry derives from studies of morality policy. Since
the proliferation of research on morality policy is a relatively new phenomenon within
the area of policy studies, theories and frameworks in this area are continuously develop-
ing, resulting in various approaches to the problem. The primary definitional criterion of
morality policies that differentiates them from other kinds of policies is that they essen-
tially include conflicts of fundamental values, as opposed to instrumental conflicts about
wealth redistribution (Knill, 2013; Meier, 1999; Mooney, 2001).
There is no agreement, however, regarding the specific criteria for classifying policies
as morality ones, nor whether certain policies should be defined as morality policies a pri-
ori, or whether they become morality issues due to policy actors’ behaviour. A policy-based
analytical approach represents the former orientation. It highlights the policy content and
differentiates between four main categories of moral policies: (i) matters involving life and
death (e.g. abortion), (ii) sexual behaviour (e.g. same-sex marriage), (iii) addiction, and (iv)
restricting individual self-determination by the state (e.g. firearm control) (Heichel et al.,
2013: 320).
The latter view, on the other hand, includes two main approaches. The politics-focused
one considers morality policy to be a distinctive policy type with political ‘process patterns
that reach beyond existing policy typologies’ (Knill, 2013: 310). In other words, morality
policies can be identified based on the politics surrounding them, i.e. technical simplicity,
saliency to the general public, and high citizen participation (Mooney, 2001: 7–8).
Finally, the last approach argues that policies become morality policies due to their
being framed as such by policy actors. In other words, in cases of morality policies ‘those
who frame the issues place adherence to [sic] moral principles above alternative consid-
erations’ (Mucciaroni, 2011: 191). This paper adopts the framing approach, this being an
important and explicit element of two of the most influential approaches to analysing pol-
icy change: namely, Advocacy Coalition Framework, and Punctuated Equilibrium Theory.
While various policy actors can use different frames, and specific frames are liable to be
differently received and supported among various social groups, this paper focuses on the
government as the actor that frames policies. Adopting the framing approach, this paper
assumes that morality policies can vary in space and time.
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3 Methods and data
The above discussion implies that (i) the framing of drug (and within it, harm reduction)
issues may vary between countries, and (ii) morality policies (the framing policy field as
such) tend to have poor results. Therefore, we ask: What, if any, is the relationship between
drug policy framing and the state of harm reduction? In order to answer the above research
question, this paper adopts an exploratory study design with a cross-country comparison.
The geographical scope includes the Visegrad Group states: the Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, Poland, and Slovakia, following maximum variation sampling, and taking the expert-
assessed availability of needle exchange services as the criterion. According to this assess-
ment, the level of NSP availability in the Czech Republic is very high, in Hungary very
low, in Poland medium, and in Slovakia low.
The inquiry involves three main steps: (i) determining the dominant frame used to
describe drug policy in a country, (ii) assessing the state of harm reduction in a country,
and (iii) identifying potential relationships between the two.
The identification of the policy frames was conducted using a framework borrowed
from Euchner and colleagues (2013). An analysis of relevant and corresponding parts of
national drug strategies (Table 1) was performed.¹ Words and phrases (i) referring directly
to the types of frames (see the analytical framework) and (ii) used in the context of describ-
ing drug policy goals and functions were counted to determine the dominant policy frames.
Country Analysed document Analysed sections
Czechia National Drug Policy Strategy Preamble, General back-for the Period 2010–2018 ground, Principles, Objectives
Hungary The National Anti-Drug Introduction, Basic values,Strategy 2013–2020 Vision and objectives
Poland National Programme for Drug Entire documentPrevention 2011–2016
Slovakia National Anti-Drug Strategy of the Preamble, IntroductionSlovak Republic for the period 2013–2020
Table 1: List of documents analysed to identify the policy frame
The state of harm reduction assessed in the second step is understood as the immediate
outcome of policies. For feasibility reasons, the scope of policy outcome was narrowed
down to one type of harm reduction service: needle exchange programmes. Thus, needle
exchange services in a country serve as the unit of analysis.
The assessment of the state of harm reduction was done based on the official aggre-
gate data collected by the National Reitox Focal Points for the EMCDDA – government
agencies responsible, among other things, for data collection about the drug policy field.
The following sources were used:
For the Czech Republic, Annual Report on the State of Drugs in the Czech Republic in
2017 (Mravčík et al., 2018).
For Hungary, 2018 Annual Report (2017 data) for the EMCDDA (Balint et al., 2018b).
¹ Using the qualitative data analysis software MaxQDA. The analysis focused on identifying segments that
refer to predefined themes.
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For Poland, Report on the State of Drug Use in Poland in 2018 (Malczewski, 2018).
In the case of Slovakia, country-level reports do not include the necessary data. There-
fore, organisation-level data was collected from all three needle exchange programmes
operating in 2019 from organisations’ annual reports published online (OZ Odyseus, 2017;
OZ Prima, 2017; Združenie STORM, 2017) and through direct inquiries involving data re-
quests sent to organisations’ directors or managers.
4 Analytical framework
In the attempt to identify the framing of drug policy, this paper borrows a typology from
Euchner and colleagues, who – in their study of drug and gambling policies – identified
four policy frames, as summarised in Table 2 (Euchner et al., 2013: 378).
Frames Features Examples Policy outcomesfor harm reduction
Morality Drug use as inherently Drug use contrasts Low level of availability
bad behaviour that with a positive way and coverage of needle
(a) does not conform to of life and traditional exchange services.
societal norms and norms and values
(b) values, and threatens
the user in a fundamental
and existential way
Health Drug use as threat to a The main task of drug High level of availability
and social user’s health and social policy is to control the and coverage of needle
conditions negative consequences exchange services.
that affect the
consumer’s health
Security Drugs as threats to Trade in illegal drugs Low level of availability
and public security and order and drug-related crime and coverage of needle
public because of illegal activities are serious disturbances exchange services.
order or nuisance committed by of public order and
(a) users/addicts, security; public order
or (b) suppliers and security have
to be defended
Economic Drugs as damage (health- Drug abuse and addic- Moderate level of avail-
and care costs, missing work- tion cause significant ability and coverage
fiscal force caused by addicts) economic damage. of needle exchange




Table 2: Summary of analytical framework
Sources: Euchner et al. (2013), Meier (2014)
Further, this paper follows the conclusion of Meier, who argues that one-sided policy
issues (drug abuse among them) are often poorly designed and do not work due to the
unanimous opposition against them, resulting in both a lack of informed discussion on
the matter and the involvement of professional expertise (Meier, 1994). It would follow,
therefore, that where drug policy is framed as a moral issue, policy outcomes in the area
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of harm reduction will be poor. Similarly, security and public order framing, due to its
focus on criminal justice and law enforcement, is likely to be related to the low level of
performance of harm reduction programmes. Further, it can be assumed that health and
social framing will result in a high level of positive outcomes, as the main goal of harm
reduction is to improve or prevent the deterioration of the health status of people who in-
ject drugs. Finally, for economic and fiscal framing, it is plausible to predict a high level of
service performance, given that NSPs are ‘one of the most cost-effective public health in-
terventions ever founded’ ( Wilson et al., 2015: 6) and help save significant public resources
on HIV and Hepatitis C treatment (Kwon et al., 2012).
The choice of output² indicators for needle exchange services for PWID was informed
by theWHO, UNODC, UNAIDS Technical Guide for countries to set targets for universal access
to HIV prevention, treatment and care for injecting drug users (2012) – a document developed
in the aftermath of the adoption of the 2006 Political Declaration on HIV/AIDS by the
UN General Assembly (Political Declaration on HIV/AIDS, 2006). The guide introduces
a comprehensive package of interventions for addressing HIV among people who inject
drugs, including, among other elements, needle exchange programs, opioid substitution
treatment, HIV testing and counselling, and antiretroviral therapy. It also provides a range
of indicators to monitor the level of implementation of specific services. Following the
Guide, this study focuses on two main aspects of needle exchange service-delivery:
(i) Availability, which is understood as the geographical coverage of needle exchange
services.
(ii) Coverage, which is understood as ‘the extent to which an intervention is delivered
to the target population’ (WHO et al., 2012: 35).
An auxiliary variable – the estimated number of people who inject drugs – is used
to enable the estimation of the services’ coverage.³ Variables are measured across a range
of indicators chosen based on the availability of the data and feasibility of their study.
The table below presents the conceptualisation and operationalisation of the variables. (A
summary of specific indicators and, where applicable, benchmarks for each variable can
be found in Appendix 1.)
Variable Conceptualisation Operationalisation
Population The magnitude of the phenomenon Estimated number of people
size of injecting drug use in a country who inject drugs (PWID)
Availability The geographical coverage Number and location of sites whereof needle exchange services needles and syringes are available
Coverage
Quantity of needles–syringes
The extent to which an intervention distributed; number of PWID
is delivered to the target population reached by NPSs, NSP service
occasions (total client contacts)
Table 3: Conceptualisation and operationalisation of main variables
² The performance of services is a policy outcome. However, from the perspective of concrete services,
values for specific indicators are service outputs.
³ Slovakia is an exception, as only data on the prevalence of problematic drug use is available. The number
of people who inject drugs within this population is very likely to be lower. On the other hand, Slovakia
is characterized by the widespread injection of methamphetamine (Pervitin). Based on the available data,
it is not possible to even roughly estimate the number of people who inject drugs in Slovakia.
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5 Identification of policy frames
In the Czech national drug strategy, the health and social frame is strongly dominant. It
appears 30 times in the analysed parts of the document, in forms such as ‘well-being,’
‘loss of people’s lives,’ ‘public health,’ ‘protection from harm,’ and ‘healthy development
of […] individuals.’ The second strongest frame is a security and public order one, with 14
keywords (primarily ‘safety’ and ‘security,’ but also ‘political stability’ or ‘rule of law’).
In Hungary, the morality framework seems to appear the most – 37 times. However,
the interpretation of the language used in the Hungarian national drug strategy is not
straightforward. At first glance, it seems that references to health and social issues are
the dominant ones and – if looked at without much context – this is true. However, it
appears that in Hungary it is the health and well-being of society at large that is being
protected, while people who use drugs appear as a threat. They are a ‘burden’ who ‘by
abusing substances’ ‘can harm themselves and their environment,’ and drug use itself is
‘harming human dignity.’ As a result, since rejecting drug use ‘is a value in itself,’ ‘the
state is obliged to take action against the vulnerability of the individual’ by adopting a
‘recovery-oriented approach,’ ‘fight[ing] against drug consumption’ and promoting the
‘spread […] of lifestyles representing clear consciousness’ in order to ‘popularize drug-free
lifestyles.’ Further, while ‘those people who refuse to use drugs […] are doing it right’ and
‘represent something worth giving to other people,’ people experiencing drug dependency
should ‘hope that their recovery is possible.’ Such and similar formulations involve a rather
strong although implicit critique of drug use as not conforming to decisionmakers’ vision
of society and supported norms and values. The health and social frame is the second most
dominant one in Hungarian drug strategy, with 22 references of a neutral character.
In Poland, there is currently no drug strategy, and the area of drug policy is briefly
addressed in the National Health Program. Therefore, the last available document that
specifically addressed drugs was chosen for the analysis. The Polish National Programme
for Drug Prevention 2011-2016, however, is a purely legal and very technical document
and, as such, does not include any narrative elements describing ideas, goals, or values. In
consequence, it was not possible to identify the drug policy framing in Poland.
In the Slovak drug strategy, similar to that of the Czech Republic, the health and social
frame dominates, with 13 references to ‘welfare,’ ‘public health’ and ‘reduction of risk,’
among others. The only other frame present in the Slovak document is a security and
public order one, with two references in the text.
The table below summarises the dominant drug policy frames identified in analysed
drug strategies.
This section presents the results of the data analysis. First, within-case analysis is per-
formed for each country, focusing on the current situation. Subsequently, a comparative
perspective is adopted, briefly discussing the current (2017) situation, and focusing on the
similarities and differences in NSPs development dynamics in four countries.
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Country Analysed document Dominant frame
Czechia National Drug Policy Strategy Health and socialfor the Period 2010–2018
Hungary The National Anti-Drug Strategy 2013–2020 Morality
Poland National Programme for Drug Prevention 2011–2016 None⁴
Slovakia National Anti-Drug Strategy of the Health and socialSlovak Republic for the period 2013–2020
Table 4: Dominant drug policy frames
6 Needle exange programmes
6.1 e Cze Republic
In 2017, altogether 108 needle exchange programmes were operating in the Czech Republic
in 138 cities and villages. This accounts for one-third of all cities and towns in the country.
Needle exchange is provided in all of the biggest cities and the vast majority of smaller
cities (up to 100,000 inhabitants). In the capital, Prague, and a few other big cities, sev-
eral services operate in different areas. Services, to a more modest extent, also operate in
smaller towns and villages, which indicates the high level of the programs’ geographical
coverage.
More than 32,000 PWID used services on a country level in 2017, which accounts for
the high coverage of the PWID population (approximately 74 per cent). In 2017, clients
received services on almost 470,000 occasions. In other words, Czech NSPs provided over
a thousand services per every hundred people who use drugs, which is a very high number.
All services in the country distributed close to 6.5 million needles-syringes. This means
198 units of equipment for every NSP client, or 146 needles per person who uses drugs,
indicating medium coverage.
Overall, the current availability and coverage of NSPs in the Czech Republic is high,
with room for improvement in case of the number of needle-syringes distributed per client.
6.2 Hungary
In 2017, 40 NSP sites were operating in 20 Hungarian cities and towns (Balint et al., 2018a:
124), which accounts for one-fifth of all cities and towns in the country, including several
NSPs operating in the capital, Budapest. Overall, the geographical coverage of services
is low and somewhat uneven – i.e. needle exchange is not available in more than one
half of Hungary’s biggest cities, and completely absent in the smallest ones (up to 20,000
inhabitants).
Over two thousand PWID used NSPs, which indicates medium coverage of the target
population – approximately one-third.⁵ In 2017, clients came into contact with NSPs on
nearly 14,000 occasions. A high number of service units were provided (234 per 100 PWID).
⁴ The Polish National Programme for Drug Prevention 2011–2016 is a very technical legal document and
does not include any contextual, normative, or value statements.
⁵ The most up-to-date PWID population estimate for Hungary is from 2015 (EMCDDA, 2020).
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The number of injecting paraphernalia that were provided was 66 per service client in
2017, which translates into only 23 needles-syringes per PWID – extremely low coverage.
In sum, the geographical coverage of NSPs in Hungary is low and uneven. The cov-
erage of the target population is moderate concerning the number of PWID in contact
with services and high concerning service occasions per 100 PWID. Coverage in terms of
distributed equipment is extremely low.
6.3 Poland
In 2017, 12 needle exchange programmes were operating in 10 Polish cities, equivalent
to 7 per cent of the cities and towns in the country. NSPs are provided primarily in the
biggest cities, but even in this case, only nearly one-fifth of all cities are covered. There are
two organisations operating NSPs in the capital, Warsaw. In cities and towns smaller than
100,000 inhabitants, services are virtually absent.
Over 1700 clients used needle exchange services in 2017; i.e. approximately one-quarter
of the estimated target population.⁶
Data on client contacts are not available from official government sources. Meanwhile,
the data shared by two NSPs located in Warsaw show that in 2017 only 50 service units per
100 PWID were provided. This result should, however, be taken with a grain of salt, since
the performance of two services (out of 12) is hardly representative of the entire country.
All Polish NSPs distributed approximately 60,000 needles-syringes in 2017, which is
35 units of injecting equipment per NSP client per year. With respect to the entire PWID
population, this translates to eight needles-syringes per person annually, an extremely low
number.
Overall, the availability of NSPs in Poland is extremely low and concentrated in the
biggest cities only. Even there, however, the geographical coverage of NSPs is inadequate
and limited to only a few settlements. Polish services reach out to nearly a quarter of the
target population, client contacts are rare, and very little injecting equipment is provided.
6.4 Slovakia
Nine NSP sites operated by three harm-reduction NGOs existed in Slovakia in 2017. Two
organisations operated fixed location and outreach programmes in the capital, Bratislava,
and one organisation operated services in Nitra and outreach in several neighbouring
cities. Altogether, NSPs are available in five cities and towns, which accounts for the low
geographical coverage of 17 per cent.
According to the data obtained from all organisations operating NSPs in 2019, nearly
2200 PWID used NSP services (exactly one-quarter of the estimated PWID population⁷),
which indicates a medium level of coverage.
Clients contacted all NSPs on over 16,000 occasions, which translates to 184 contacts
⁶ The estimates of the PWID population can be found in two Polish reports to the EMCDDA. One of
them defines the mean of estimates at 7,170 (Malczewski & Misiurek, 2013: 13) and the other at 7,285
(Malczewski & Misiurek, 2014). The median value of these numbers (7,228) is used for the analysis.
⁷ The most up-to-date estimation of the population size is from 2008 at 10,500 (Reitox National Focal Point
Slovakia, 2009: 67). Importantly, this estimation does not include people who inject drugs but a broader
category of ‘problematic drug users’. The number of PWID is very likely somewhat smaller.
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per 100 PWID – a high result for this indicator of coverage. All three organisations gave
away over 400,000 needles-syringes in 2017. The number of needles-syringes distributed
per client per year was 184; however, due to generally low level of target population cov-
erage, the amount of injecting equipment distributed among PWID was small, at only
39 units per person. Given the highly imperfect and outdated data on the target popula-
tion, however, the real coverage concerning paraphernalia distributed is likely somewhat
higher.
Overall, the availability of NSPs in Slovakia seems to be low, with services in only a few
locations in the western part of the country, with central and eastern Slovakia having no
NSPs at all. Service coverage is medium with respect to the proportion of PWID reached.
While the number of distributed paraphernalia is medium-high for PWID in contact with
services, it is low if we take into consideration the entire target population.
6.5 Cross-country comparison
This section applies a comparative perspective in an attempt to identify the similarities
and differences between the state of needle exchange programmes in examined countries.
Only comparable indicators (ratios) are analysed, and benchmark levels are used next to
absolute numbers.
6.5.1 Availability of needle exchange programmes
An important comment regarding the denominator used for NSP availability levels is re-
quired. While the level thresholds are adopted directly from the WHO, UNODC, UNAIDS
Technical Guide (WHO et al., 2012), the denominator differs. Due to the lack of data on
the number of cities in which PWID are present, the availability rate was calculated using
the total number of cities of a specific population in each country.
Indicator CZ HU PL SK
Percentage of cities where
NSPs are present, including: High (100 %) Low (46 %) Low (18 %) Low (50 %)
Cities of 100,000+ inhabitants
Cities of 50,000–99,999 High (88 %) Low (40 %) Low (2 %) Low (22 %)inhabitants
Cities of 20,000–49,999 Mid (76 %) Low (20 %) Low (1 %) Low (0 %)inhabitants
Table 5: Availability of needle exchange programs
Clearly, in big and mid-sized cities the geographical coverage of needle exchange pro-
grams is by far the highest in the Czech Republic, where services exist in all five biggest
cities and the vast majority of smaller ones. In three other countries, the overall availabil-
ity of services is low. Within this group, Hungary performs best with almost half of its 13
biggest cities operating NSPs. In Slovakia, needle exchange is available in one of the two
largest settlements, and one-fifth of smaller ones. In Poland, only one-fifth of the biggest
cities have NSP, while programmes are hardly available in smaller towns.
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6.5.2 Coverage of needle exchange programmes
As shown in the table below, most needles-syringes are distributed in the Czech Republic,
where almost 150 units of equipment per PWID were provided in 2017. Further, taking
into consideration only PWID in contact with services, the result is very close to high in
terms of the effectiveness of HIV prevention. In Slovakia, paraphernalia coverage is mod-
erate but leaning towards high among service clients. It remains low for the entire target
population. The situation in the remaining two countries is significantly worse, with ex-
ceptionally low needle coverage in Poland.
Indicator CZ HU PL SK
Number of needles-syringes distribu- Mid (146) Low (21) Low (8) Low (39)ted per PWID per year
Number of needles-syringes distribu- Mid (198) Low (66) Low (35) Low (184)ted per NSP client per year
Table 6: Injecting paraphernalia distributed
In the case of reaching out to the target population, again, the Czech Republic performs
best, ensuring coverage at the level of 74 per cent (Table 7). In contrast, Slovak needle
exchange programmes are in contact with only one in five people who inject drugs. Pol-
ish services perform slightly better, covering almost one-quarter of the PWID population,
while in Hungary close to one in every third person who was injecting drugs contacted
NSPs at least once in 2017.
Indicator CZ HU PL SK
Percentage of all PWID who were reached by an NSP 74 % 31 % 24 % 21 %in the last 12 months⁸
Table 7: Outreach to population of people who use drugs
Regarding client contacts (number of service occasions), country-level data are not
available for Polish NSPs. The organisational-level data were successfully obtained only
from two organisations operating NSPs, which is not indicative of the entire country.
Therefore, the table below presents the numbers of client contacts only in three analysed
countries.
Indicator CZ HU SK
The number of NSP occasions of service in High (1055) High (234) High (184)the last 12 months per 100 PWID
The number of NSP occasions of service in 14 7 7the last 12 months per 1 NSP client
Table 8: Occasions of service
⁸ Data on NSP clients who inject drugs is available only in the case of the Czech Republic. In other coun-
tries, only the total number of clients is available. The coverage of the PWID population in Hungary,
Poland, and Slovakia therefore represents the best-case scenario. In reality, the level of coverage is likely
to be even lower, as NSP clients are usually not injecting drugs.
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The data shows that Czech NSPs provide the highest coverage of the target popula-
tion in this respect as well. In 2017, the number of contacts per 100 PWID reached 1,055.
If we take into consideration only PWID in contact with NSP, it appears that each client
visited a service once a month on average. In Hungary and Slovakia, the number is half of
this, which means that each person injecting drugs who was in contact with services vis-
ited them roughly once every two months. Concerning the occasions of service (contacts)
per 100 PWID, the numbers in Slovakia and Hungary are also relatively similar. Notwith-
standing the differences, however, in the context of the UN guidelines on HIV prevention
services, all countries perform well, achieving high scores in the category of client contact.
In sum, it is clear that in the area of harm reduction the Czech Republic is leading, and
is performing well in terms of both service availability and coverage. In Hungary, the avail-
ability of NSP is low. Although one in every three persons who was injecting drugs was in
contact with services in 2017, and the number of service occasions was high, an average
NSP client could be provided with only a minimal number of injecting paraphernalia. In
Poland and Slovakia, the availability of services is deficient. Coverage in Poland is the low-
est of all the examined countries. Meanwhile, in Slovakia, the situation is somewhat mixed
– while outreach to PWID is low, the injecting paraphernalia coverage of organisations’
clients is close to high. None of the three countries, however, would qualify as having an
effective HIV prevention system concerning needle exchange programmes.
7 Conclusions
This paper has attempted to identify the relationships between the framing of drug pol-
icy as a health, morality, security, or economic issue, and the outcomes of harm reduc-
tion policies in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. It examined relevant
parts of the countries’ national drug strategies, borrowing the typology of policy frames
from Euchner and colleagues (Euchner et al., 2013). Further, it analysed official data about
the availability and coverage of needle exchange programmes using a guide developed by
United Nations agencies as the source of the majority of indicators.
The analysis of countries’ drug strategies revealed the strong health and social orienta-
tion of Czech drug policy and a somewhat weaker such orientation in the case of Slovakia.
In Hungary, the morality frame is dominant in the country’s drug policy, while in Poland
no frame was identified due to the highly technical character of the document.
The examined policy outcomes of needle exchange programmes are definitely poor in
Hungary and Poland. In the case of Slovakia, the picture is more complex, with generally
meagre performance at the country level and in the context of the entire population of
people who use drugs. On the other hand, at the organisational level, the performance
of Slovak needle exchange programs seems to be much better, primarily in terms of the
number of distributed injecting paraphernalia per NSP client.
Going back to our research question, therefore, have we managed to identify any rela-
tionship between drug policy framing and the state of harm reduction? It seems that the
Hungarian case confirms the central hypothesis – that the morality framing of drug pol-
icy is related to weak policy outcomes. Further, it seems that the strong health orientation
of the Czech drug strategy is somehow related to the excellent (compared to the other
countries’) performance of needle exchange services.
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On the other hand, in Slovakia, there is a health-focused drug strategy and noticeably
inferior harm reduction outcomes. The complex picture of the situation in this country
(see above), however, triggers some questions. Is it plausible that Slovakia’s harm reduction
policy could have performed much better had there been more organisations providing the
services in question? Recently, several NSPs in Slovakia ceased to exist (supposedly, due
to a lack of funding), leaving one part of the country abandoned. Is the reason for rather
insufficient country-level NSP outcomes indeed the lack of funding, or does the analysed
document by itself not capture the actual framing of drug policy? Indeed, Slovak drug
strategy is significantly less well elaborated than the Czech or Hungarian one – perhaps
there is a need to include more sources to increase the validity of this finding.
Finally, there is Poland, with very low availability and coverage of needle exchange
services and unknown framing. Is it justified to presume that Polish drug policy is framed
as morality policy? Or are other policy frames related to its severe underperformance as
well?
This paper, with its empirical scope and theoretical orientation regarding topics which
are highly understudied in the region, contributes to the understanding of morality poli-
cies and drug-related policies. Two statements can be made. First, the case of Hungary
confirms that morality framing is related to poor policy outcomes. Second, the case of the
Czech Republic confirms that a strong health-social orientation is related to excellent pol-
icy outcomes in the area of harm reduction policy. Even more importantly, however, it
opens interesting avenues for further research, perhaps most interestingly regarding the
status of morality framing as a necessary and/or sufficient condition for ineffective poli-
cies.
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Appendix
Appendix 1: Variable indicators and benmarks
Variable Indicators Benmarks
Population Estimated number of people –size who inject drugs (PWID)
Availability
Number of NSP sites –
Number of cities where NSPs are present –
Percentage of cities where NSPs Low ← 60% ← Mid → 80% → Highare present⁹
Coverage
Total number of needles-syringes –distributed by NSPs in the last 12 months
Number of needles-syringes distributed Low ← 100 ← Mid → 200 → Highper PWID accessing services per year
Number of PWID who accessed –an NSP over the last 12 months
Percentage of all PWID who were
Low ← 20% ← Mid → 60% → Highreached by an NSP over the last
12 months
Number of NSP occasions of service –(total contacts) in the last 12 months
The ratio of the number of NSP occasions
Low ← 30 ← Mid → 70 → Highof service in the last 12 months per
100 PWID
⁹ The original indicator refers to the ‘percentage of cities/ states/ provinces/oblasts where PWID are lo-
cated, and NPSs are present’. In this study, the percentage of all cities are calculated (for all country
cases) due to the lack of data on the presence of PWID.
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Appendix 2: Outputs of needle exange programmes in the Cze Republic
Availability
Indicator Value Level
Number of NSP sites 108 X
Number of cities where NSPs are present 138 X
Percentage of cities where NSPs are present, including: 65% Mid
Cities of 100,000+ inhabitants (N=5) 100% High
Cities of 50,000–99,999 inhabitants (N=17) 88% High
Cities of 20,000–49,999 inhabitants (N=46) 76% Mid
Cities of 10,000–19,999 inhabitants (N=78) 37% Low
Cities of 5,000–9,999 inhabitants (N=133) 23% Low
Coverage
Indicator Value Level
Total number of needles-syringes distributed by NSPs in 2017 6 401 662 X
Number of needles-syringes distributed per PWID per year 146 Mid
Number of needles-syringes distributed per NSP client per year 198 Mid
Number of PWID who accessed an NSP in 2017 32 300 X
Percentage of all PWID who were reached by an NSP in 2017 74 % High
Number of NSP occasions of service (total contacts) in 2017 460 900 X
The ratio of the number of NSP occasions of service in 2017 per 100 PWID 1 055 High
Appendix 3: Outputs of needle exange programmes in Hungary
Availability
Indicator Value Level
Number of NSP sites 40 X
Number of cities where NSPs are present 20 X
Percentage of cities where NSPs are present, including: 21% Low
Cities of 100,000+ inhabitants (N=13) 46% Low
Cities of 50,000–99,999 inhabitants (N=15) 40% Low
Cities of 20,000–49,999 inhabitants (N=41) 20% Low
Cities of 10,000–19,999 inhabitants (N=82) 0% None
Cities of 5,000–9,999 inhabitants (N=130) 0% None
Coverage
Indicator Value Level
Total number of needles-syringes distributed by NSPs in 2017 137 580 X
Number of needles-syringes distributed per PWID per year 11 Low
Number of needles-syringes distributed per NSP client per year 66 Low
Number of PWID who accessed an NSP in 2017 2 093 X
Percentage of all PWID who were reached by an NSP in 2017 31 % Low
Number of NSP occasions of service (total contacts) in 2017 13 883 X
The ratio of the number of NSP occasions of service in 2017 per 100 PWID 207 High
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Appendix 4: Outputs of needle exange programmes in Poland
Availability
Indicator Value Level
Number of NSP sites 12 X
Number of cities where NSPs are present 10 X
Percentage of cities where NSPs are present, including: 7% Low
Cities of 100,000+ inhabitants (N=39) 18% Low
Cities of 50,000–99,999 inhabitants (N=48) 2% Low
Cities of 20,000–49,999 inhabitants (N=136) 1% Low
Cities of 10,000–19,999 inhabitants (N=160) 0% None
Cities of 5,000–9,999 inhabitants (N=N/A) None None
Coverage
Indicator Value Level
Total number of needles-syringes distributed by NSPs in 2017 60 000 X
Number of needles-syringes distributed per PWID per year 8 Low
Number of needles-syringes distributed per NSP client per year 35 Low
Number of PWID who accessed an NSP in 2017 1 726 X
Percentage of all PWID who were reached by an NSP in 2017 24 % Mid
Number of NSP occasions of service (total contacts) in 2017 3 646¹⁰ X
The ratio of the number of NSP occasions of service in 2017 per 100 PWID 50 Mid
Appendix 5: Outputs of needle exange programmes in Slovakia
Availability
Indicator Value Level
Number of NSP sites 9 X
Number of cities where NSPs are present 5 X
Percentage of cities where NSPs are present, including: 17% Low
Cities of 100,000+ inhabitants (N=2) 50% Low
Cities of 50,000–99,999 inhabitants (N=9) 22% Low
Cities of 20,000–49,999 inhabitants (N=28) 0% None
Cities of 10,000–19,999 inhabitants (N=31) 6% Low
Cities of 5,000–9,999 inhabitants (N=40) 0% None
Coverage
Indicator Value Level
Total number of needles-syringes distributed by NSPs in 2017 404 886 X
Number of needles-syringes distributed per PWID per year 39 Low
Number of needles-syringes distributed per NSP client per year 184 Mid
Number of PWID who accessed an NSP in 2017 2 199 X
Percentage of all PWID who were reached by an NSP in 2017 21 % Mid
Number of NSP occasions of service (total contacts) in 2017 16 271 X
The ratio of the number of NSP occasions of service in 2017 per 100 PWID 155 High
¹⁰ The number of contacts is based on data acquired directly from (only) two organizations since official,
country-level data is not available.
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There are two channels for achieving the representation of national minorities in rep-
resentative bodies. One of them is the inclusion of minority representatives on main-
stream party lists, while the other is their self-organization via ethnic parties. The
arrangements pertinent to the organization of European Parliament elections hypo-
thetically provide citizens with equal opportunities to be elected, regardless of their
belonging to national minorities. However, some EU Member States are characterized
by a relatively ethnically homogeneous population combined with a small number of
allocated MEP mandates. Based on the empirical evidence from Lithuania, this article
assesses the feasibility of the use of the two channels by politicians with a minority
background in relation to their being elected MEPs, and shows that the latter meth-
ods represent two different types of representation according to Pitkin’s concept. The
article concludes that being elected via the mainstream party lists requires a politi-
cian to have a high profile in the public life of Lithuania, whereas the success of use
of the monopolized ethnic channel is contingent on the general electoral condition of
the ethnic party and its capacity to sustain its constituency among the country’s na-
tional minorities. The text’s findings provide a country-specific illustration that may
also be applicable in the wider context of East Central Europe in relation to studies
focused on the electoral performances of ethnic parties and the inclusion of minority
representatives in the activities of mainstream parties.
Keywords: Lithuania, elections, European Parliament, national minorities, minority
representation, Poles in Lithuania
1 Introduction
The European Parliament (EP) is a representative body of the European Union. This im-
plies that citizens of each EU Member State can seek representation in it based on domestic
arrangements that regulate European Parliament elections. In each Member State, repre-
sentation in the European Parliament is hypothetically equally open to persons belonging
to the ethnic majority and national minorities, provided they meet all the requirements
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and receive sufficient electoral support. There are two channels available for national mi-
norities to achieve representation in the European Parliament. The first is the inclusion
of persons with an ethnic minority background on the electoral lists of the mainstream
parties. The second one is the election of minority representatives on ethnic party lists.
This configuration, however, raises the problem of the practical feasibility of each of these
two channels in terms of national minorities from smaller EU Member States gaining rep-
resentation in the European Parliament, taking into account the relatively small number
of the MEP seats allocated to these countries.
This analysis of the cases of MEPs elected from Lithuania provides substantial empir-
ical evidence about the feasibility of the use of these two channels, which may be appli-
cable in a broader European perspective. In Lithuania, ethnic Lithuanians constitute 84.2
per cent of the country’s population, followed by Poles (6.6 per cent), Russians (5.8 per
cent), and Belarusians (1.2 per cent).¹ In contrast to the other Baltic States, Lithuania has
applied the principle of inclusivity by granting citizenship to all of its residents who wish
it (Barrington, 2000: 262; Popovski, 2000: 14). This implicitly suggests that the outcomes of
EP elections embody the will of all segments of Lithuania’s society. Additionally, the coun-
try’s national minorities are numerical enough to effectively seek MEP representation on
ethnic party lists.
The feasibility of these two channels in relation to national minorities being repre-
sented in the European Parliament must also be distinguished from effective representa-
tion, which starts when the elected MEPs commence their duties. This article focuses only
on the perspective of politicians with a minority background from Lithuania, regarding
their becoming elected as MEPs via either of the two designated channels. Accordingly,
the following sections of this paper examine these options, taking into account the coun-
try’s political system and electoral rules. The article addresses empirical evidence based on
the profiles of the MEPs with a minority background that have been elected via both chan-
nels. Due to the monopolization of the ethnic party channel by one political group, the text
also focuses on the general electoral situation of the latter to reveal the relevant constraints
to maintaining its constituency and obtaining representation at the EP level. The article
concludes that both channels are viable ways for politicians with a minority background to
become elected as MEPs from Lithuania. While being elected through mainstream party
lists requires a high profile in Lithuanian politics and support from an overwhelmingly
majoritarian electorate, the monopolization of the ethnic channel by one political group
makes election contingent on the latter entity’s general electoral condition, and its ability
to sustain its constituency among Lithuania’s national minorities.
2 Conceptual framework and its application to the empirical evidence from
Lithuania
The need for the interpretation of the empirical evidence about European Parliament elec-
tions in Lithuania raises several questions about the key concepts which should be applied
in this case study. This evidence suggests that the analysis should accommodate the fact
that ‘how a community chooses its representatives may be just as important as who the
¹ Ethnicity, mother tongue and religion (2013). Statistics Lithuania, March 15.
https://osp.stat.gov.lt/en/web/guest/informaciniai-pranesimai?articleId=223122
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representatives are’ (Bowler et al., 2003: 6). This presupposes the specification of the con-
cepts of ‘political representation’ and ‘minority background.’
A classical approach to political representation provided by Hanna Pitkin (1972) en-
dorses the notion of ‘descriptive representation,’ which concerns the fit between the ethnic
composition of the population of a certain territory with its proportion of elected repre-
sentatives. An analysis of contemporary European minority-related legal frameworks and
supervisory practices reveals that the concept of descriptive representation is offered as
the primary tool for ensuring the representation of national minorities in various decision-
making bodies (Henrard, 2008: 128). While construing Pitkin’s model, Iris Young (2002: 129)
maintains that political representation is a dynamic phenomenon which ‘moves between
moments of authorization and accountability.’ Young also notes (2002: 126) that a diversity
of interests, backgrounds, experiences, and beliefs within an ethnic group might signifi-
cantly affect the ability of its members to vocalize their shared will, although an ethnic
group might demonstrate greater coherence than a group whose members share other
distinctive characteristics. For candidates with a minority background that are elected
through one of two designated channels, this implies different outcomes.
An ethnic party can be defined as
[…] an organization authorized to compete in elections, the majority of whose leaders
and members identify themselves as belonging to a nondominant ethnic group, and
whose electoral platform includes among its central demands programs of an ethnic
or cultural nature. (Van Cott, 2005: 3)
Thus, a classic ethnic party typically does not strive to appeal to the voters outside the
ethnic group it represents (Gunther & Diamond, 2003; Horowitz, 1985). However, an ethnic
party can claim representation of more than one ethnic category provided it is capable of
designating who the common significant other is (Chandra, 2005). In proportional electoral
systems, ethnic mobilization is the key concept that explains the ability of ethnic parties
and their representatives to obtain electoral success. In other words, an ethnic party ‘relies
primarily upon coethnic voters for electoral victory’ (Moser, 2008: 276). Logically, the scope
of successful ethnic mobilization at any election largely depends on the number of persons
belonging to a minority community. Within the context of the approach offered by Young,
MEPs elected on ethnic party lists are per se self-declared representatives of the specific
ethnic group authorized predominantly by their co-ethnics and possibly other affiliated
ethnic groups. This situation fits the concept of descriptive representation, but poses the
further question of how deep the grassroots support of the elected MEP is in the relevant
community(-ies) – which is addressed in the following parts of this paper.
For MEPs elected on mainstream party lists, it is important not to ignore the fact that ‘a
person’s participation in large-scale politics can somehow be individualized’ (Young, 2002:
143). This individualization of politicians might also imply that the level of articulation of
their ethnic affiliation may vary depending on various objective and subjective factors,
including their family background, personal values, institutional frameworks, or political
practicability. These observations apply to the ethnic majority and national minorities, and
emphasize both the diversity within different ethnic groups and the frequently blurred
boundaries between them.
Young’s conceptualization raises three issues. The first one is the status of potential
MEPs within their political group and the latter’s impact on their political ‘individualiza-
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tion.’ The second is the apparent contribution of the respective minority in the election
of these politicians. However, the most important factor is the third one, which addresses
the issue of the individual’s ethnic identification, which could also be multiple or inexplic-
itly articulated. The last factor raises the logical question whether those potential MEPs
who do not always identify themselves with a specific minority group may be regarded as
examples of minority representation.
To answer this question, it is equally important to define who those persons are with a
minority background within the mainstream political landscape of Lithuania. Lithuania’s
Constitution guarantees individual equality before the law, and ensures citizens’ right
to freely form political parties and associations provided that their activities and goals
are consistent with the country’s legislation.² This suggests that Lithuania’s citizens can
equally take part in political processes in the country irrespective of their ethnicity, and
that persons belonging to national minorities are active both within mainstream and ethnic
parties. Lithuanian legislation lacks an established definition of a ‘national minority.’ Thus,
the common understanding is that national minorities are numerically inferior groups of
citizens whose ethnic affiliation is other than Lithuanian.³ As the Constitutional Court of
Lithuania underlines, the issue of belonging to a specific ethnic group is a private matter
for each individual.⁴ However, the information about the ethnicity of each politician may
become public. At various elections in Lithuania, the country’s Central Electoral Commis-
sion provides standardized candidate profiles with basic information about them. Item 11
of these profiles indicates the candidate’s ethnicity (Lithuanian: tautybė).⁵ Although this
item is not subject to compulsory completion, candidates can self-identify themselves as
representatives of a specific ethnic group. The empirical evidence from Lithuania suggests
that this formalized approach is not sufficient for grasping the complexity of the issue of
the ethnic belonging of potential MEPs elected via the mainstream channel. If candidates
decide to self-identify themselves, they are not able to specify more than one ethnic af-
filiation. Thus, candidates with multiple or complex ethnic identities have two options:
they can either declare their belonging to just one ethnic group, or not indicate any be-
longing. Their identification with another ethnic group or refraining from indicating any
such group on their candidate profiles does not preclude these politicians from being ac-
tively engaged in the community life of their respective national minorities – thus being
a part thereof. Since Lithuania has adopted a proportional electoral system and its entire
territory forms a single electoral district at European elections, MEPs from Lithuania are
not attached to any specific region of the country, including those with a significant pres-
ence of national minorities. Due to the above-described qualitative characteristics of the
representatives and those they represent, they cannot be formally considered examples of
² An English translation of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania is available at
http://www3.lrs.lt/home/Konstitucija/Constitution.htm.
³ National Minorities (2018) Department of National Minorities under the Government of the Republic of
Lithuania, February 20. https://tmde.lrv.lt/en/national-minorities
⁴ Case No. 14/98: On the spelling of names and family names in the passports of citizens of
the Republic of Lithuania (21 October 1999). Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania,
https://www.lrkt.lt/en/court-acts/search/170/ta1147/content
⁵ See, for instance, Valdemar Tomaševski’s candidate profile at the 2019 European Parliament elec-
tion, available at the website of the Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Lithua-
nia: https://www.vrk.lt/2019-europos-parlamento/rezultatai?srcUrl=/rinkimai/904/rnk1186/kandidatai/
epKandidatasAnketa_rkndId-2415249.html
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descriptive minority representation, although their roles are consistent with the notion of
minority representation as such. In line with Pitkin’s concept, the latter could be attributed
to the substantive type of representation which implies that ‘[…] representatives have to
be responsive to the represented and not the contrary’ (Garboni, 2015: 86). As a result,
the presence of politicians with a minority background among the MEPs from Lithuania
elected via the mainstream channel neither provides a guarantee of minority interest rep-
resentation, nor implies a full mirror resemblance between them and their minority elec-
torates which could address the needs of the later (ibid.: 87). Still, the presence of MEPs
with a minority background is per se a phenomenon that contributes to the accomplish-
ment of substantive minority representation. The empirical evidence from Lithuania also
suggests that MEPs with a minority background elected via the mainstream channel fail to
claim their connection with their relevant communities to the extent they symbolize these
minority constituencies, and thus comply with Pitkin’s concept of symbolic representa-
tion (Stokke & Selboe, 2009: 59). As voting outcomes reveal, the election of MEPs from
Lithuania via the mainstream channel is characterized by two features. On the one hand,
the respective minority electorates are aware of candidates’ belonging to these groups,
although on their official candidate profiles candidates may refrain from self-identifying
themselves as persons belonging to a specific community. On the other hand, the former
demonstrate the relative ‘irrelevance of the ethnic dimension in Lithuanian politics’ (Lau-
ristin et al., 2011: 135) to the mainstream parties’ majoritarian voters, who are also aware
of the minority background of these MEPs.
Therefore, the identification of persons with a minority background among the MEPs
elected from Lithuania is not limited to a simple check of their EP election candidate pro-
files on the Lithuanian Central Electoral Commission website. When applicable, it also in-
volves an examination of their profiles in other elections in Lithuania, as well as publicly
available information about their memberships in and collaborations with organizations
of national minorities. Public information about the selected MEPs’ command of minority
languages is, however, disregarded. According to 2011 national census data, 63 per cent of
Lithuania’s population speak Russian and 8.5 per cent Polish.⁶ This implies that the mother
tongues of the two largest Lithuania’s national minorities are distributed beyond these eth-
nic groups, signifying no direct linkage between the command of a minority language by
the MEPs elected from Lithuania and their attachment to a specific national minority.
Based on the above, the related research model is designed as follows. The identified
profiles of the MEPs with a minority background are allocated among the two designated
channels. For those elected via mainstream party lists, the analysis involves an exami-
nation of the MEPs’ electoral candidate profiles for EP elections in Lithuania, their self-
identification, their roles in the relevant parties, the electoral performances of the latter
political groups, and an analysis of their electorates and other information about their po-
tential support among the co-ethnics of MEPs identified as having a minority background.
The same framework applies to the MEPs elected from ethnic parties. However, in addi-
tion, the general electoral situation of this representation channel will be assessed, since
⁶ Gyventojai pagal išsilavinimą ir kalbų mokėjimą: Lietuvos Respublikos 2011 metų visuo-
tinio gyventojų ir būstų surašymo rezultatai (Population by education and language knowl-
edge: Results of the 2011 population and housing census of the Republic of Lithuania) (2013).
Lithuanian Department of Statistics, March 29. https://osp.stat.gov.lt/documents/10180/217110/
Gyv+pagal+i%C5%A1silavinima_ir_kalbu_mokejima.pdf
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the ethnic party niche in Lithuania is monopolized by single forms of political collabora-
tion. The research model also requires making reference to public statements of the selected
politicians and the retrieval of data on the electoral performances of the relevant politi-
cal groups and relevant candidate profiles for the municipal and parliamentary elections in
Lithuania. The lack of focus on the specific activities of the selected mainstream politicians
as MEPs in this analysis is explained by the nature of substantive minority representation
discussed above, and based on the premise that the main criterion for the assessment of
politicians is their ability to get re-elected.
3 e Lithuanian political system and prospects for minority candidates at
EP elections
There is a consensus in the academic literature that European Parliament elections should
be designated second-order ones because they do not result in the filling of the major
political offices of the entire political system at the national level (Reif & Schmitt, 1980; Reif,
1985; Norris & Reif, 1997; Willermain, 2014). Nevertheless, the European elections cannot
be viewed separately from the political systems of specific EU Member States because
the outcomes of each election are significantly affected by the political situation in the
countries in question at the moment of the electoral campaign (Reif, 1985). The results
of each European election are substantially predetermined by domestic political agendas
and discourses in Member States. Specifically, electoral campaigns could be focused on
the issues which are neglected or ignored by governments, which makes the European
Parliament elections essentially not only about Europe (Hix & Marsh, 2011). Lithuania is
not an exception to this rule since domestic political processes in Lithuania significantly
affected the results of the 2004 and 2009 European Parliament elections (Matonytė, 2016:
547). This observation can also be extended to the 2014 and 2019 EP elections.
Lithuania’s legislation treats all political groups equally. The MEP mandates assigned
to Lithuania are divided among the political groups that reach a five per cent electoral
threshold and no concessions are made for ethnic parties or coalitions.⁷ Voters of each po-
litical group are also entitled to rank candidates on the relevant list, thereby determining
the distribution of the allocated mandates. Lithuania’s political party system is character-
ized by its extreme plurality (Cabada et al., 2014: 81). Since 2008, at all Seimas and European
Parliament elections the winning political party was capable of attracting around 20 per
cent of all votes, and the 26.16 per cent received by the Homeland Union – Lithuanian
Christian Democrats (Lithuanian: Tėvynės sąjunga – Lietuvos krikščionys demokratai) at
the 2009 European Parliament election is rather an exceptional result.⁸ The total number
of MEP seats allocated to Lithuania dropped from 13 in 2004 to 11 in 2019. As a result, due
to the strong competition, it is typical for a Lithuanian political party to be able to claim
just one or two MEP mandates.⁹
⁷ Law on Elections to the European Parliament, 20 November 2003, No. IX-183, as amended. https://e-
seimas.lrs.lt/portal/legalAct/lt/TAD/TAIS.226195
⁸ 2009 m. birželio 7 d. rinkimai į Europos Parlamentą. Balsavimo rezultatai Lietuvoje (European Par-
liament election of 7 June 2009. Voting results in Lithuania) (2009). Central Electoral Commission
of the Republic of Lithuania, June 14. https://www.vrk.lt/statiniai/puslapiai/2009_ep_rinkimai/output_
lt/rezultatai_daugiamand_apygardose/rezultatai_daugiamand_apygardose1turas.html
⁹ Only in four cases were political parties able to secure more than two MEP seats: the Labour Party
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This configuration has two implications for the candidates with a minority background,
depending on the channel. If an MEP is elected to the mainstream party list, it implies that
this politician should enjoy sufficient backing by the party to be ranked somewhere among
the top of the party list, and supported by the party’s electorate at election time. This situ-
ation might create a serious constraint for a candidate with a minority background, since
their place on the electoral list may not be high enough to ensure their success among the
elected candidates (Janušauskienė, 2016: 582) and the preferential voting system does not
always contribute to this either. Breaking with this trend requires the ‘individualization’
of candidates, who should thus possess the characteristic of being high-profile individuals
in Lithuania’s political or public life.
The empirical evidence from Lithuania suggests that the notion ‘ethnic party’ within
the context of this article can be equated with the Electoral Action of Poles in Lithua-
nia – Christian Families Alliance (Polish: Akcja Wyborcza Polaków na Litwie – Związek
Chrześcijańskich Rodzin, Lithuanian: Lietuvos lenkų rinkimų akcija – Krikščioniškų šeimų
sąjunga, EAPL-CFA), since the latter was the only political group of this kind at the EP
elections in Lithuania.¹⁰ Its electoral lists are always dominated by the representatives of
the Polish and other national minorities. The presence of an EAPL-CFA representative in
the European Parliament has two effects. The first one is truly symbolic and qualitative.
The ethnic Polish party from Lithuania has a representative in the European Parliament
and this very fact distinguishes it from many other minorities throughout the European
Union. The second one implies the fully fledged engagement of the EAPL-CFA in the do-
mestic policy-making processes, which involves participation in government coalitions
and goes beyond minority issues (Bobryk, 2013: 357–358).
The election of an MEP with a minority background to the ethnic party list seems to
involve a combination of opportunities and constraints. At the four EP elections in Lithua-
nia, the EAPL-CFA managed to reach the votes-to-seats ratio only once, in 2009, when the
high mobilization of the EAPL-CFA electorate coincided with weak national polling.¹¹ As a
result, ethnic political groups have never been able to claim more than one MEP mandate,
even when the votes-to-seats ratio was achieved. This can be perceived as an opportu-
nity, because the election results thus prove this channel to be feasible. Some Lithuanian
scholars define the EAPL-CFA as ‘an ethnic-based “niche” political party’ (Janušauskienė,
2016: 582), which refers to its limited electoral capacities. One of the biggest challenges for
the EAPL-CFA under the existing electoral rules is demography, as the Polish minority in
Lithuania constitutes only 6.6 per cent of the country’s population.
The party consistently lacks the ethnic Polish votes it would need to comfortably reach
the five per cent electoral threshold, which has created the precondition of a Polish-Russian
minority political alliance (Csergő & Regelmann, 2017: 305; Kazėnas, 2014: 283). At every
(Lithuanian:Darbo Partija) received five MEP mandates in 2004, the Homeland Union – Lithuanian Chris-
tian Democrats got four MEP mandates in 2009 and three in 2019, and the Social Democratic Party of
Lithuania (Lithuanian: Lietuvos socialdemokratų partija) obtained three MEP mandates in 2009.
¹⁰ The regionalist Samogitian Party (Lithuanian: Žemaičių partija) which advocates the promotion of
Samogitian identity and culture (Matonytė, 2016: 537) participated in the 2009 EP election. However,
its marginal result (1.23 per cent) only confirms that it never had any significant impact on Lithuania’s
politics.
¹¹ Turnout in areas with a Polish majority was highest in the country: 41.41 per cent of voters cast their
ballots in the Šalčininkai district, and 34.81 per cent in the Vilnius district, while in no other region of
Lithuania did turnout reach even 30 per cent.
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European election, the EAPL-CFA has formed a coalition with ethnic Russian parties. This
strategy proved to be effective in the 2009, 2014, and 2019 elections, when the Polish-
Russian electoral collaboration between the EAPL-CFA and the Russian Alliance (Lithua-
nian: Rusų aljansas) resulted in one MEP seat.¹² This suggests that the EAPL-CFA and its
allies have to collect a sufficient number of votes that will qualify them to take part in
the distribution of MEP seats. In other words, the main issue at stake for them is getting
into the European Parliament. Another problem with their qualification comes from the
composite character of this electoral collaboration. Being the major collaboration partner,
the EAPL-CFA needs to fill the gap in ethnic Polish votes with the votes of Lithuania’s
Russians, and, as far as possible, members of other smaller minorities. Hence, members of
these groups should authorize the ethnic Polish party to represent their interests, taking
into account that the highest level achievement of the Polish-Russian electoral collabora-
tion is a single MEP seat.
4 What does a politician with a minority baground need to become an
MEP from Lithuania?
The results of the European elections in Lithuania prove the feasibility of both these chan-
nels for politicians with a minority background in terms of being elected an MEP. The
scheme with the mainstream party list was viable in the case of two MEPs – Viktor Us-
paskich from the Labour Party in 2009, 2014 and 2019, and the late Leonidas Donskis, rep-
resenting the Liberals Movement of Lithuania (Lithuanian: Lietuvos Respublikos Liberalų
Sąjūdis) in 2009. However, neither of the two declared their belonging to any national mi-
nority in their EP candidate profiles. The ethnic party channel worked for one politician –
Valdemar Tomaševski (Polish: Waldemar Tomaszewski) from the EAPL-CFA who received
an MEP mandate in 2009, 2014, and 2019. An ethnic Pole, Tomaševski, remains the only
MEP from Lithuania who clearly self-identified as a member of a national minority in his
candidate profile at the EP elections.
4.1 Representation through mainstream parties
The late Leonidas Donskis was one of the most prominent intellectuals in contemporary
Lithuania never to hide his Jewish roots (Matonytė, 2016: 540), and who served as deputy
chairman of the Lithuanian Jewish community.¹³ However, in his candidate profile for the
2009 European election, Donskis declared his Lithuanian ethnicity.¹⁴ However, during the
electoral campaign Donskis explicitly addressed the multiplicity of his self-identification.
He stressed that his Jewishness had a moral dimension. Renouncing his Jewish identity
would mean dishonoring the memory of his father, who was a Holocaust survivor. Donskis
¹² In 2004, EAPL and the Lithuanian Russian Union formed a coalition called ‘Together we are strong!’ This
was supported by 68,937 voters (5.71 per cent) but failed to obtain any MEP seats due to the electoral
formula which required a political group to obtain approximately seven per cent of the votes to take part
in the distribution of the MEP mandates (Bobryk, 2013: 343).
¹³ Leonidas Donskis Dead at Age 54 (2016), Jewish Community of Lithuania September 27.
https://www.lzb.lt/en/2016/09/27/leonidas-donskis-dead-at-age-54
¹⁴ 2009 m. birželio 7 d. rinkimai į Europos Parlamentą. Leonidas Donskis (European Parliament election of
7 June 2009. Leonidas Donskis). Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Lithuania. https://www.
vrk.lt/statiniai/puslapiai/rinkimai/404_lt/Kandidatai/Kandidatas25250/Kandidato25250Anketa.html
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also expressed sorrow for those who believe that a person cannot be a Lithuanian and a
Jew at the same time.¹⁵ Considering Donskis’ embeddedness in Lithuania’s intellectual life,
as well as his professional background¹⁶ and political views, this choice of ethnicity in his
candidate profile could probably be best explained by a quotation of his in which called
himself ‘a citizen [and] a person who has chosen Lithuania for his entire life as his primary
and essential political and moral space’ (Donskis, 2010).
Donskis appeared on the electoral list of the Liberals Movement of Lithuania without
being a party’s member. He was invited to join the Liberals’ electoral campaign by the
party leadership¹⁷ and his first place on the electoral list was decided by a secret ballot at
the meeting of the party’s council.¹⁸ In other words, Donskis’s first place on the electoral
list was duly authorized by a democratic procedure within the party. His position vis-à-
vis the party was characterized by both trust and considerable autonomy. The former was
implied by his nomination procedure, while the latter derived from his non-partisan status.
At the 2009 election, the Liberals Movement was supported by 7.17 per cent of vot-
ers (40,502 persons)¹⁹ and its only MEP seat was claimed by Donskis. He received 20.89
per cent of the ranking points after preferential voting, substantially more than the 13.72
per cent collected by the runner-up candidate on the electoral list.²⁰ One can suppose that
Donskis’s personality might have led to an increase in support for the Liberals Movement
among the Lithuanian Jewish community at this election. However, the 2001 population
census established that self-declared Jews comprised only 0.12 per cent of Lithuania’s pop-
ulation (4,007 persons).²¹ This implies that even the very large-scale support of Donskis by
Lithuania’s Jewish community would not have been the decisive factor in the successful
electoral performance of the Liberals Movement and Donskis’s first place on the list after
preferential voting.
At the electoral campaign, Donskis called the Liberals Movement a ‘niche party’ which
did not enjoy the greatest popularity in Lithuania and which should compete for voters’
attention.²² Based on the above, it is possible to conclude that Donskis’s MEP seat was
supported by the majoritarian electorate which shared the party’s liberal views and val-
ues. Donskis’s minority background was not an obstacle to his election. On the contrary,
¹⁵ Donskis: svarbu būti skaidriam prieš rinkėjus (Donskis: it is important to be transparent to the
voters) (2009). Alfa.lt, June 5. https://www.alfa.lt/straipsnis/10275870/?Alfa.lt.vaizdo.konferencijoje..
Donskis=2009-06-05_16-13
¹⁶ About L. Donskis. Leonidas Donskis Foundation. http://www.donskis.lt/en/2/169/leonido-donskio-
biografija
¹⁷ Samoškaitė. E. (2009). Su Liberalų sąjūdžiu į EP rinkimus eis L.Donskis (L. Donskis will go to the EP
election with the Liberals Movement). Delfi.lt, February 23. https://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/su-
liberalu-sajudziu-i-ep-rinkimus-eis-ldonskis.d?id=20705589
¹⁸ Pirmasis Liberalų sąjūdžio sąraše - Leonidas Donskis (The first on the list of the Liberals Movement is
Leonidas Donskis). (2009) TV3.lt, April 18. https://www.tv3.lt/naujiena/lietuva/248509/pirmasis-liberalu-
sajudzio-sarase-leonidas-donskis
¹⁹ 2009 m. birželio 7 d. rinkimai į Europos Parlamentą. Balsavimo rezultatai Lietuvoje (n. 8).
²⁰ 2009 m. birželio 7 d. rinkimai į Europos Parlamentą. Lietuvos Respublikos liberalų sąjūdis (Eu-
ropean Parliament election of 7 June 2009. Liberals Movement of Lithuania). Ibid. June 14.
https://www.vrk.lt/statiniai/puslapiai/2009_ep_rinkimai/output_lt/rezultatai_daugiamand_apygardose/
partijos_pirmumo_balsai3572.html
²¹ Population by Sex, Age, Nationality and Religion. (2002). Statistics Lithuania. https://osp.stat.gov.lt/
services-portlet/pub-edition-file?id=3037.
²² Donskis: svarbu būti skaidriam prieš rinkėjus (n. 15).
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it was the strategy of the Liberals Movement to rely on his reputation and publicity to
successfully perform at the election.
Donskis decided not to participate at the 2014 EP election and withdrew from active
politics. However, two mandates obtained by the Liberals Movement at this election may
have implicitly signified the positive assessment of his activities as an MEP by the party’s
electorate.
The case of Viktor Uspaskich is even more remarkable since he was elected as an MEP
on three occasions – in 2009, 2014, and 2019. This Russian-born Lithuanian politician never
indicated his ethnic belonging in his candidate profile at the European elections.²³ Further
analysis of his electoral profile at the parliamentary elections reveals that he self-identified
as ethnic Russian on one occasion in 2004,²⁴ while he did not specify his ethnicity in 2000,²⁵
2008,²⁶ and 2012.²⁷ Despite this, Uspaskich actively contributed to the organization of Rus-
sian cultural events in Lithuania.²⁸
All three successful EP elections brought quite similar results for Uspaskich and the
Labour Party. On each occasion, he was number one on the electoral list, retained this
position after preferential voting, and subsequently received the only mandate obtained
by his party. In 2009, he received 22.09 per cent of all ranking-related points cast by Labour
Party voters, while 21.07 per cent in 2014, and 21.36 per cent in 2019.²⁹ On every occasion,
these figures were substantially higher than those of the runners-up.
²³ 2009 m. birželio 7 d. rinkimai į Europos Parlamentą. Viktor Uspaskich (European Parliament election of
7 June 2009. Viktor Uspaskich). Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Lithuania. https://www.
vrk.lt/statiniai/puslapiai/rinkimai/404_lt/Kandidatai/Kandidatas25574/Kandidato25574Anketa.html;
2014 m. gegužės 25 d. rinkimai į Europos Parlamentą. Viktor Uspaskich (European Parliament election of
25 May 2014. Viktor Uspaskich). Ibid. https://www.vrk.lt/statiniai/puslapiai/rinkimai/426_lt/Kandidatai/
Kandidatas70828/Kandidato70828Anketa.html; Rinkimai į Europos Parlamentą 2019 m. gegužės
26 d. Viktor Uspaskich (European Parliament election of 26 May 2019. Viktor Uspaskich). Ibid.
https://www.vrk.lt/2019-europos-parlamento/rezultatai?srcUrl=/rinkimai/904/rnk1186/kandidatai/
epKandidatasAnketa_rkndId-2415195.html
²⁴ 2004 m. Lietuvos Respublikos Seimo rinkimai. Viktor Uspaskich (2004 Lithuanian Seimas elec-
tion. Viktor Uspaskich) (2004). Ibid., November 8. https://www.vrk.lt/statiniai/puslapiai/rinkimai/2004/
seimas/kandidatai/kand_anketa_l_294844.htm
²⁵ 2000 m. spalio 8 d. Lietuvos Respublikos Seimo rinkimai Viktor Uspaskich (Lithuanian Seimas
election of 8 October 2000. Viktor Uspaskich). Ibid. https://www.vrk.lt/statiniai/puslapiai/n/
rinkimai/20001008/kandvl.htm-133960.htm
²⁶ Lietuvos Respublikos Seimo rinkimai Viktor Uspaskich (Lithuanian Seimas election. Viktor Uspaskich).
Ibid. https://www.vrk.lt/statiniai/puslapiai/rinkimai/400_lt/Kandidatai/Kandidatas21259/Kandidato2125
9Anketa.html
²⁷ 2012 m. spalio 14 d. Lietuvos Respublikos Seimo rinkimai. Viktor Uspaskich (Lithuanian Seimas
election of 14 October 2012. Viktor Uspaskich). Ibid. https://www.vrk.lt/statiniai/puslapiai/rinkimai/
416_lt/Kandidatai/Kandidatas67880/Kandidato67880Anketa.html
²⁸ Gaučaitė. M. (2018). Rusų šventė Vilniuje sutraukė didžiulę minią: „Neturime gėdytis savo kultūros“
(Russian festival in Vilnius gathered a big crowd: ‘We must not be ashamed of our culture’). Lietu-
vos Rytas, June 9. https://www.lrytas.lt/lietuvosdiena/aktualijos/2018/06/09/news/rusu-svente-vilniuje-
sutrauke-didziule-minia-neturime-gedytis-savo-kulturos–6576802/
²⁹ 2009 m. birželio 7 d. rinkimai į Europos Parlamentą. Darbo partija (European Parliament election of
7 June 2009. Labour Party) (2009). Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Lithuania, June 14.
https://www.vrk.lt/statiniai/puslapiai/2009_ep_rinkimai/output_lt/rezultatai_daugiamand_apygardose/
partijos_pirmumo_balsai3566.html; 2014 m. gegužės 25 d. rinkimai į Europos Parlamentą. Darbo
Partija. (European Parliament election of 25 May 2014. Labour Party) (2014). Ibid., June 1.
https://www.vrk.lt/statiniai/puslapiai/2014_ep_rinkimai/output_lt/rezultatai_daugiamand_apygardose/
partijos_pirmumo_balsai4947.html; Rinkimai į Europos Parlamentą 2019 m. gegužės 26 d. Darbo
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Founder of the Labour Party, Uspaskich, at each election acted in the capacity of its
chairman or honorary chairman. The role of the party’s leader suggests that Uspaskich
was authorized by this political group to have a direct impact on and be responsible for
defining its strategies. Within Lithuania’s political landscape, the Labour Party is seen
as ‘a model example of left-wing […] populism’ (Aleknonis & Matkevičienė, 2016: 37).
The party’s typical voter’s profile can be described as ‘younger, less educated, blue-collar
or unemployed [persons] living predominantly in provincial towns and the countryside’
(Jurkynas 2014: 336). The electoral successes of this political group have been driven by
the personal charisma and popularity of Uspaskich (Kavaliauskaitė, 2014: 126). At the 2019
EP election, the party’s electoral slogan ‘I take responsibility for my words!’ (Lithuanian:
Atsakau už savo žodžius!)³⁰ was directly related to the personality of Uspaskich. It was
the only personified electoral slogan employed at this election, during which the leader
addressed his electoral message to potential voters on behalf of the entire party and thereby
took responsibility for its electoral performance.
The Labour Party has a stable connection with Lithuania’s Russian minority. It is one
of the most popular political parties among the members of this ethnic group, as a consid-
erable part thereof tends to vote for leftist mainstream parties (Csergő & Regelmann, 2017:
304–305; Duvold & Jurkynas, 2013: 148–149; Lauristin et al., 2011: 135; Ramonaitė, 2018:
84). At the 2012 and 2016 parliamentary elections, the Labour Party electoral list incorpo-
rated candidates from the Lithuanian Russian Union (Lithuanian: Lietuvos Rusų Sąjunga),³¹
an ethnic party claiming to represent Lithuania’s Russian minority. At the 2019 EP elec-
tion, the Labour Party presented its electoral list as multi-ethnic.³² For example, it included
a former member of the Lithuanian Russian Union, Larisa Dmitrijeva, who was initially
placed in sixth position.³³
Back in 2011, Uspaskich clearly indicated that he was a leader of a mainstream Lithua-
nian party and not of a party of a national minority.³⁴ Although the Labour Party enjoys the
substantial support of Lithuania’s Russians, their votes are important but not decisive in
Partija (European Parliament election of 26 May 2019. Labour Party). (2019). Ibid., June 3.
https://www.vrk.lt/2019-europos-parlamento/rezultatai?srcUrl=/rinkimai/904/2/1548/rezultatai/lt/
rezultataiEpDaugmPartPirmVrt_rorgId-28032.html
³⁰ Rinkimai į Europos Parlamentą 2019 m. gegužės 26 d. (European Parliament election of 26 May 2019).
(2019) Ibid. https://www.vrk.lt/documents/10180/676652/EP+bendras+leidinys++A5+2019.pdf/
³¹ 2012 m. spalio 14 d. Lietuvos Respublikos Seimo rinkimai. Darbo partija (Lithuanian Seimas elec-
tion of 14 October 2012. Labour Party). Ibid. https://www.vrk.lt/statiniai/puslapiai/rinkimai/416_lt/
KandidatuSarasai/RinkimuOrganizacija4132_1.html; Kandidatų sąrašas. Darbo partija (Candidates list.
Labour Party). Ibid. https://www.vrk.lt/2016-seimo/kandidatai?srcUrl=/rinkimai/102/rnk426/kandidatai/
lrsKandidataiVienasSarasas_rorgId-26092.html
³² Darbo partiją Europos Parlamento rinkimuose ves V. Uspaskich, sąraše pusė vietų teko moterims (V.
Uspaskich will lead the Labour Party at the European election, half of the list is represented by women).
(2019) Labour Party, March 12. https://www.darbopartija.lt/naujienos/partijos-naujienos/darbo-partija-
europos-parlamento-rinkimuose-ves-v.-uspaskich-sarase-puse-vietu-20921/
³³ Rinkimai į Europos Parlamentą 2019 m. gegužės 26 d. Larisa Dmitrijeva (European Parliament elec-
tion of 26 May 2019. Larisa Dmitrijeva). Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Lithua-
nia. https://www.vrk.lt/2019-europos-parlamento/rezultatai?srcUrl=/rinkimai/904/rnk1186/kandidatai/
epKandidatasAnketa_rkndId-2415208.html
³⁴ Davydova, L. (2011). Viktor Uspasskikh: v Litve - diktatura vlastnogo bolshinstva (Viktor Us-
paskich: there is a dictatorship of the ruling majority in Lithuania. Ekspress nedelia, De-
cember 28. https://www.nedelia.lt/news-lt/aktual/20523-viktor-uspasskih-v-litve-diktatura-vlastnogo-
bolshinstva.html
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relation to the party’s ability to reach the electoral threshold. In other words, Uspaskich’s
electoral successes at three EP elections were predetermined and authorized by the ma-
joritarian electorate, with a substantial number of minority votes coming from Lithuania’s
Russians and other smaller minorities.
The cases of Donskis and Uspaskich are examples of substantive representation. They
demonstrate the relative irrelevance of the ethnic factor for the mainstream type of mi-
nority representation. However, the success of these politicians has been predetermined
by their high profiles in Lithuania’s domestic politics or public life, since the mainstream
parties’ electorates are predominantly or overwhelmingly majoritarian. This also confirms
the importance of the placement of these candidates in top position(s) due to the tough
competition among political groups at the EP elections and the small number of allocated
mandates.
4.2 Representation through ethnic parties
Valdemar Tomaševski has led the EAPL-CFA since June 1999. The EAPL-CFA was created
in 1994 to comply with a novel element of Lithuanian legislation which differentiated the
activities of civil and political organizations (Kazėnas, 2014: 270). Hence, the EAPL-CFA is
an entity which took up the political functions of the Union of Poles in Lithuania, one of
the main tasks of which is to maintain the active civic engagement of the members of the
Polish minority and to mobilize it in support of the political activities of the EAPL-CFA
(Bobryk, 2013: 109, 121).
Tomaševski is the most domestically and internationally recognizable politician in
Lithuania’s Polish-Russian minority electoral alliance (Bobryk, 2013: 357; Csergő & Regel-
mann, 2017: 304). As mentioned above, he was elected as an MEP at the 2009, 2014, and
2019 EP elections. On each occasion, Tomaševski was placed first on the electoral list of
the Polish-Russian electoral collaboration and retained this position after preferential vot-
ing, which enabled him to claim an MEP mandate. Specifically, in 2009 the ethnic Polish-
Russian alliance received 46,293 votes (8.20 per cent),³⁵ in 2014 it attracted 92,108 votes
(7.60 per cent),³⁶ while in 2019 it narrowly crossed the electoral threshold with 69,347 votes
(5.21 per cent).³⁷ In 2009, Tomaševski received 20.99 per cent of the ranking points after
preferential voting;³⁸ while in 2014 this figure was 20.68 per cent³⁹ and in 2019 20.10 per
³⁵ 2009 m. birželio 7 d. rinkimai į Europos Parlamentą. Balsavimo rezultatai Lietuvoje (n. 8).
³⁶ 2014 m. gegužės 25 d. rinkimai į Europos Parlamentą. Balsavimo rezultatai Lietuvoje (European Par-
liament election of 25 May 2014. Voting results in Lithuania) (2014) Central Electoral Commission
of the Republic of Lithuania, June 1. https://www.vrk.lt/statiniai/puslapiai/2014_ep_rinkimai/output
_lt/rezultatai_daugiamand_apygardose/rezultatai_daugiamand_apygardose1turas.html
³⁷ Rinkimai į Europos Parlamentą 2019 m. gegužės 26 d. Balsavimo rezultatai Lietuvoje (European Parlia-
ment election of 26 May 2019. Voting results in Lithuania). (2019) Ibid., June 3. https://www.vrk.lt/2019-
europos-parlamento/rezultatai?srcUrl=/rinkimai/904/2/1548/rezultatai/lt/rezultataiEpDaugmVrt.html
³⁸ 2009 m. birželio 7 d. rinkimai į Europos Parlamentą. Lietuvos lenkų rinkimų akcija (European
Parliament election of 7 June 2009. Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania). (2009) Ibid., June 14.
https://www.vrk.lt/statiniai/puslapiai/2009_ep_rinkimai/output_lt/rezultatai_daugiamand_apygardose/
partijos_pirmumo_balsai3585.html
³⁹ 2014 m. gegužės 25 d. rinkimai į Europos Parlamentą. Lenkų rinkimų akcijos ir Rusų aljanso
koalicija „Valdemaro Tomaševskio blokas“ (European Parliament election of 25 May 2014. Coali-
tion of the Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania and the Russian Alliance ‘Block of Valde-
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cent.⁴⁰ In each instance, these figures were approximately twice as high as those achieved
by the runners-up. This implies Tomaševski’s unquestionable authority among the party’s
electorate and the lack of equably influential politicians both within the EAPL-CFA and
its collaboration partner party that represent the Russian minority.
After the successful electoral performance in 2009 as the EAPL, with representatives
of the Russian Alliance on the list, the ethnic Polish-Russian collaboration shifted towards
the personalization of Tomaševski’s role as its leader. In 2014, it was called the ‘Coalition
of the Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania and the Russian Alliance “Block of Valde-
mar Tomaševski”’ (Lithuanian: Lenkų rinkimų akcijos ir Rusų aljanso koalicija „Valdemaro
Tomaševskio blokas“ ). In 2019, its full name was ‘“Block of Valdemar Tomaševski” – Coali-
tion of the Christian Families Alliance and the Russian Alliance’ (Lithuanian: „Valdemaro
Tomaševskio blokas“ – Krikščioniškų šeimų sąjungos ir Rusų aljanso koalicija). Since Polish-
Russian electoral collaboration is not capable of claiming more than one MEP seat, the
electoral list called ‘Block of Valdemar Tomaševski’ transmits a clear message to its po-
tential voters. They are implicitly prompted with the name of the future MEP from the
Polish-Russian minority electoral alliance. To put it succinctly, the voter is indirectly in-
vited to vote for Tomaševski. Hence, European Parliament elections can rather be seen as a
vote of confidence in the EAPL-CFA chairman and a means of authorizing him to become
an MEP. The other members of the coalition’s electoral list merely perform the role of the
crowd.
In practical terms, this also proves that the EAPL-CFA has always been the leading
partner in the minority coalition. This is confirmed by the statistics related to preferential
voting. At all three elections, the total number of ranking points cast for the Russian Al-
liance candidates on the minority collaboration’s list ranged between 17 and 18 per cent.
Likewise, the ethnic Russian candidates on its electoral lists dropped down the list after
preferential voting. These figures most notably signify the inability of Russian Alliance
politicians to challenge the primacy of the EAPL-CFA within the collaboration. Addition-
ally, the Russian Alliance is not capable of attracting the majority of ethnic Russian votes in
Lithuania. According to the available data, less than 20 per cent of the members of Lithua-
nia’s Russian minority voted for the ethnic collaboration lead by the EAPL-CFA at the 2016
parliamentary election (Ramonaitė, 2018: 84), when this political group claimed 5.48 per
cent. Calculations based on the 2011 census results suggest that 20 per cent of all ethnic
Russians with the right to vote comprise approximately 1.3 per cent of the total electorate.
This suggests that ethnic Russians currently constitute approximately 20 per cent of the
voters in the Polish-Russian electoral collaboration.
The composite character of the Polish-Russian electoral collaboration and the consis-
tent lack of ethnic Polish votes made the electoral success of Tomaševski dependent on
obtaining sufficient electoral authorization beyond Lithuania’s Polish minority. In other
words, inter-ethnic coalition between Lithuania’s Poles and Russians is a prerequisite for
mar Tomaševski’). (2014). Ibid., June 1. https://www.vrk.lt/statiniai/puslapiai/2014_ep_rinkimai/output
_lt/rezultatai_daugiamand_apygardose/partijos_pirmumo_balsai5087.html
⁴⁰ Rinkimai į Europos Parlamentą 2019 m. gegužės 26 d. „Valdemaro Tomaševskio blokas“ – Krikščion-
iškų šeimų sąjungos ir Rusų aljanso koalicija (European Parliament election of 26 May 2019.
‘Block of Valdemar Tomaševski’ – Coalition of the Christian Families Alliance and the Russian Al-
liance). (2019) Ibid., June 3. https://www.vrk.lt/2019-europos-parlamento/rezultatai?srcUrl=/rinkimai/
904/2/1548/rezultatai/lt/rezultataiEpDaugmPartPirmVrt_rorgId-30084.html
ineecion. ea eopean jonal of ocie and poliic, 7(1): 116–135.
129 epeenaion of lihania’ naional minoiie in he ep
their electoral collaboration and sustaining their constituency. The systemic constraints
on an MEP from Lithuania in relation to their being elected to the ethnic party list can
be illustrated by the retrieval of data about EAPL electoral performances at the recent
municipal and parliamentary elections.
The 2019 EP election in Lithuania was held on 26 May, soon after the municipal elec-
tion that took place throughout Lithuania on 3 March 2019. At this municipal election, the
EAPL-CFA formed an electoral coalition with the Russian Alliance in six municipalities,
including the city of Vilnius.⁴¹ In four other municipalities, the EAPL-CFA had its electoral
lists, whereas in the country’s third-largest city of Klaipėda the Russian Alliance competed
independently.⁴² The EAPL-CFA and the Russian Alliance collected 61,657 votes, including
58,981 as a coalition.⁴³ This number was less than at the 2014 European Parliament elec-
tion (92,108 votes), the 2015 municipal election (87,152 votes, both independently and in
the coalition with the Russian Alliance),⁴⁴ the 2016 parliamentary election (69,810 votes re-
ceived at the national multi-member constituency),⁴⁵ and at the subsequent 2019 European
Parliament election (69,347 votes).
A more detailed analysis of these data reveals the direct relationship between the elec-
toral success of the Polish-Russian minority coalition and its support by the minority urban
electorate in the cities of Vilnius and Klaipėda. The 2014 municipal election in the city of
Vilnius was successful for the minority coalition. Its list collected 38,138 votes and was
ranked second.⁴⁶ In 2019, the Polish-Russian coalition managed to attract 19,907 votes and
finished fourth.⁴⁷ In Klaipėda, the Polish-Russian minority coalition came third in 2014
with 5,905 votes.⁴⁸ In 2019, the Russian Alliance finished seventh with only 1,941 votes
⁴¹ Partijų koalicijų kandidatų sąrašai (Lists of candidates from party coalitions). Ibid. https://www.vrk.
lt/2019-savivaldybiu-tarybu-kandidatai?srcUrl=/rinkimai/864/rnk1144/kandidatai/savKandidataiKoalici
jos.html
⁴² Partijų kandidatų sąrašai (Lists of candidates from parties). Ibid. https://www.vrk.lt/2019-savivaldybiu-
tarybu-kandidatai?srcUrl=/rinkimai/864/rnk1144/kandidatai/savKandidataiPartijos.html
⁴³ 2019 m. kovo 3 d. savivaldybių tarybų rinkimai (I turas). Partijų, komitetų gautų balsų ir mandatų skaičius
Lietuvoje. (Municipal councils’ election of 3 March 2019 (Round I). Number of votes and mandates re-
ceived by parties, committees in Lithuania) (2019). Ibid., April 24. https://www.vrk.lt/2019-savivaldybiu-
tarybu/rezultatai?srcUrl=/rinkimai/864/1/1506/rezultatai/lt/rezultataiSavPartKoalBalsuIrMandSk.html
⁴⁴ 2015 m. Lietuvos Respublikos savivaldybių tarybų rinkimai. Partijų, komitetų gautų balsų ir man-
datų skaičius Lietuvoje (2015 municipal councils’ election in the Republic of Lithuania. Number of
votes and mandates received by parties, committees in Lithuania) (2015). Ibid., April 15. https://
www.vrk.lt/statiniai/puslapiai/2015_savivaldybiu_tarybu_rinkimai/output_lt/rinkimu_diena/stat1.html
⁴⁵ 2016 m. spalio 9 d. Lietuvos Respublikos Seimo rinkimai. Balsavimo rezultatai daugiamandatėje apygar-
doje (Lithuanian Seimas election of 9 October. Voting results in a multi-member constituency). (2016).
Ibid., October 31. https://www.vrk.lt/2016-seimo/rezultatai?srcUrl=/rinkimai/102/1/1304/rezultatai/
lt/rezultataiDaugmVrt.html
⁴⁶ 2015 m. Lietuvos Respublikos savivaldybių tarybų rinkimai. Vilniaus miesto (Nr.57) savivaldybė
(2015 municipal councils’ election in the Republic of Lithuania. Vilnius city (No. 57) municipality)
(2015). Ibid., June 4. https://www.vrk.lt/statiniai/puslapiai/2015_savivaldybiu_tarybu_rinkimai/output
_lt/rezultatai_daugiamand_apygardose/apygardos_rezultatai7817.html
⁴⁷ 2019 m. kovo 3 d. savivaldybių tarybų rinkimai (I turas). Vilniaus miesto (Nr.57) savivaldybė.
(Municipal councils’ election of 3 March 2019 (Round I). Vilnius city (No. 57) municipality)
(2019). Ibid., March 26. https://www.vrk.lt/2019-savivaldybiu-tarybu/rezultatai?srcUrl=/rinkimai/864/
1/1506/rezultatai/lt/rezultataiTarNariaiMeraiSavivaldybeje_rpgId-19966.html
⁴⁸ 2015 m. Lietuvos Respublikos savivaldybių tarybų rinkimai. Klaipėdos miesto (Nr.20) savivaldybė
(2015 municipal councils’ election in the Republic of Lithuania. Klaipėda city (No. 20) municipality)
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and did not reach the electoral threshold.⁴⁹ The lists of parties, coalitions, and committees
in the municipal elections in Lithuania can significantly differ from those at the Seimas
or the European Parliament elections. However, the discrepancy in the results achieved
by the EAPL-CFA and the Russian Alliance at the 2014 and 2019 municipal elections in
Vilnius and Klaipėda demonstrates that the stable core electorate of the minority coalition
lives in the small towns and rural areas. At the same time, the political competition in big
cities is much higher and the votes of the urban Poles, Russians, and representatives of
other national minorities are more likely to be attracted by other political groups. Without
the substantial number of votes provided by the minority electorate in the cities of Vilnius
and Klaipėda, the Polish-Russian electoral collaboration led by the EAPL-CFA fails to meet
the five per cent electoral threshold.
This observation is also confirmed by the results of the 2019 election to the European
Parliament. In-depth analysis of the latter focused on regional statistics and comparison
with the 2019 municipal election reveals two important features.⁵⁰ First, the result of the
Polish-Russian minority coalition at the 2019 European election was just 2,746 votes above
the electoral threshold. Thus, the number of ethnic Polish votes was insufficient to reach
the threshold. This conclusion can be backed by the fact that the coalition was supported
by 4,942 voters in the city of Klaipėda, with its sizeable Russian minority.⁵¹ Second, in
the city of Vilnius, the minority coalition led by Tomaševski received 23,972 votes⁵² – i.e.
about 4,000 votes more than at the municipal election in March 2019. Thus, the narrow
success of the Polish-Russian coalition led by the EAPL-CFA at the 2019 European elec-
tion and Tomaševski’s re-election as an MEP was predetermined by the votes of urban
Poles, Russians, and representatives of other minority communities. A substantial drop
in the EAPL-CFA’s electoral support from 92,108 votes (47.35 per cent of voter turnout)
in 2014 to 69,347 votes (53.48 per cent of voter turnout) in 2019 indicates other barriers
to sustaining the constituency of this political group for representation in the European
Parliament. These challenges are predominantly personality driven and attributed to the
self-organization of Lithuania’s Polish minority.
(2015). Ibid., June 4. https://www.vrk.lt/statiniai/puslapiai/2015_savivaldybiu_tarybu_rinkimai/output
_lt/rezultatai_daugiamand_apygardose/apygardos_rezultatai7780.html
⁴⁹ 2019 m. kovo 3 d. savivaldybių tarybų rinkimai (I turas). Klaipėdos miesto (Nr.20) savivaldybė
((Municipal councils’ election of 3 March 2019 (Round I). Klaipėda city (No. 20) municipal-
ity) (2015). Ibid., March 26. https://www.vrk.lt/2019-savivaldybiu-tarybu/rezultatai?srcUrl=/rinkimai/
864/1/1506/rezultatai/lt/rezultataiTarNariaiMeraiSavivaldybeje_rpgId-19974.html
⁵⁰ Voter turnout at both the elections was quite commensurable. The 2019 EP election attracted 53.48 per
cent of voters, while at the 2019 municipal election the proportion was 47.90 per cent.
⁵¹ 2019 m. gegužės 26 d. rinkimai į Europos Parlamentą. „Valdemaro Tomaševskio blokas“ – Krikščioniškų
šeimų sąjungos ir Rusų aljanso koalicija (European Parliament election of 26 May 2019. ‘Block of
Valdemar Tomaševski’ – Coalition of the Christian Families Alliance and the Russian Alliance). (2019)
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An in-depth analysis of the personalities on the candidate lists of the Polish-Russian
minority coalition at the 2009,⁵³ 2014,⁵⁴ and 2019⁵⁵ European Parliament election shows
that six of them participated in all three electoral campaigns and nine candidates were
involved in two elections. On the one hand, this implies that the EAPL-CFA and the Russian
Alliance have a rather stable pool of experienced politicians. On the other hand, the top
five of the ‘Block of Valdemar Tomaševski’ after preferential voting at the 2019 European
election included four personalities who ran for election for the third time since 2009, when
the current minority electoral alliance was formed. This raises the question of leadership
within the Polish minority in Lithuania.
As mentioned above, the EAPL-CFA is closely affiliated with the Union of Poles in
Lithuania. Since May 2002, this umbrella organization of the Polish minority has been
chaired by Michal Mackevič (Polish: Michał Mackiewicz), an MP representing the EAPL-
CFA. In other words, the leaders of the main political and civil organizations of the Polish
minority in Lithuania have kept their positions for nearly two decades. In addition to the
long periods in office of the two leading personalities of the Polish community, a series of
internal conflicts within Lithuania’s Polish minority in 2018 signified a crisis in its leader-
ship (Knutowicz, 2018). In early 2018, Mackevič was at the center of accusations concerning
the use of financial assistance from Poland that evolved through a conflict with Urszula
Doroszewska, Poland’s ambassador to Lithuania. In May 2018, Mackevič was re-elected as
the chairman of the Union of Poles in Lithuania, actively backed by Tomaševski.⁵⁶ Sub-
sequent developments in the situation resulted, inter alia, in a ‘double’ celebration of the
centenary of the re-establishment of Poland’s independence in Vilnius at the Rasos (Polish:
Rossa) cemetery in Vilnius on 11 November 2018, as the leadership of the Union of Poles
in Lithuania preferred not to engage in the activities organized by the Embassy of Poland
(ibid.).
The public debate about these series of conflicts ranges from accusations of alleged at-
tempts to split the unity of Lithuania’s Polish community to the chance for a ‘revolution of
dignity’ that could significantly change the situation within the community (Radczenko,
2018). In any case, it signifies that the current leadership of the political and civil orga-
nizations of Lithuania’s Polish minority lack a clear public mandate as representatives of
the entire community. This situation resulted in partial fragmentation of the ethnic Polish
electorate of the EAPL-CFA in both municipal and EP elections in 2019, and proved the
public demand for change (Radczenko, 2019).
The ethnic channel for the election of MEPs with a minority background from Lithua-
nia is an example of descriptive representation. It has proved its feasibility on three oc-
casions. Based on the self-organization of ethnic political groups, this channel is monop-
olized by the electoral Polish-Russian collaboration led by the EAPL-CFA. It is also cur-
rently personalized by Valdemar Tomaševski, who has unquestionable authority among
the electorate that tends to vote ‘ethnically.’ This channel provides Lithuania’s national
⁵³ 2009 m. birželio 7 d. rinkimai į Europos Parlamentą. Lietuvos lenkų rinkimų akcija (n. 37).
⁵⁴ 2014 m. gegužės 25 d. rinkimai į Europos Parlamentą. Lenkų rinkimų akcijos ir Rusų aljanso koalicija
„Valdemaro Tomaševskio blokas“ (n. 38).
⁵⁵ Rinkimai į Europos Parlamentą 2019 m. gegužės 26 d. „Valdemaro Tomaševskio blokas“ – Krikščioniškų
šeimų sąjungos ir Rusų aljanso koalicija (n. 39).
⁵⁶ Rok afery Mackiewicza (Year since Mackiewicz’s fraud). (2019). ZW.lt, May 24. https://zw.lt/wilno-
wilenszczyzna/rok-afery-mackiewicza/
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minorities with a chance to elect one MEP who is authorized by minority voters who has
a slim-to-none chance of attracting a majoritarian electorate (Ramonaitė, 2018: 84). Poten-
tial constraints associated with this channel include the general electoral situation of the
EAPL-CFA and composite character of its electoral collaboration with the Russian Alliance.
To a large extent, the former are personality driven and linked to the self-organization of
Lithuania’s Polish minority. The later constraints suggest that any potential MEP elected
from this collaboration-based list will always be an ethnic Pole, taking into account the
coalition’s capacity to receive no more than one MEP seat. Therefore, Lithuania’s Russian
and other smaller minorities can be represented in the European Parliament only by an
ethnic Polish MEP if they choose to become a part of the multi-ethnic electoral minority
coalition led by the EAPL-CFA.
5 Conclusion
Based on the empirical evidence from the European Parliament elections in Lithuania,
the article revealed the feasibility of politicians with a minority background being elected
MEPs both through mainstream party lists and as representatives of ethnic parties. In any
case, all electoral lists for the European Parliament elections in Lithuania involve a high
level of competition due to the extreme plurality of the country’s party system, meaning
that each political group typically secures just one or two MEP mandates. Similarly, this
candidate requires top placement on the electoral list of the party.
The findings showed that MEPs elected via the ethnic channel are examples of the
process of descriptive representation, whereas electing MEPs via the mainstream channel
signifies substantive representation. This configuration results in an essential contrast be-
tween the context of the election of MEPs through mainstream channels and ethnic party
lists. The paper has revealed that MEPs with a minority background that are elected on
mainstream party lists should have a high profile in Lithuanian public life and politics,
which makes the ethnic factor significantly irrelevant. It also implies the ‘authorization’
of such politicians by the respective political group in terms of the former’s scope to define
the strategies of the latter entity or to act on behalf of it. Moreover, the electoral success
of these politicians is predetermined by the predominant or overwhelming support of the
majoritarian electorate, which might also involve the substantial support of the party and
its top candidate by the electorate from a relevant minority. In nominal terms, the num-
ber of MEPs of a minority background elected through this channel could potentially be
limited only by the total number of MEPs allocated for the country, the electoral capac-
ity of the relevant political group, and the high profile of candidates. Empirical evidence
from Lithuania suggests that this number ranged from zero MEPs in 2004 through one
representative in 2014 and 2019 to two elected candidates in 2009.
The case of Valdemar Tomaševski exemplifies the ethnic channel of minority repre-
sentation. Sensu stricto, Tomaševski remains the only self-identified minority MEP from
Lithuania. His three consecutive MEP mandates can be seen as the electoral success of
the Polish-Russian minority coalition led by the EAPL-CFA. Due to objective socio-demo-
graphic reasons, this channel is limited to one prospective MEP seat. It also requires elec-
toral cooperation between the Polish and Russian ethnic parties, as neither have the sup-
port of a sufficient number of ethnic electorate to comfortably reach the electoral threshold,
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set at five per cent. The evidence also demonstrates that this channel is monopolized by
the Polish-Russian collaboration led by the EAPL-CFA, and personalized by Tomaševski.
The leading role of the EAPL-CFA implies that any MEP elected through this channel
will always be an ethnic Pole. Due to this monopolization, the constraints of this channel
are directly linked to the general electoral situation of the Polish-Russian collaboration
and personality-driven factors related to the self-organization of the Polish minority in
Lithuania. This situation signifies a situation of crisis and apparent demand for change
within Lithuania’s Polish community. It also provides Lithuanian mainstream parties with
an additional opportunity to gain the support of a new electorate among the country’s mi-
norities, particularly among urban Poles, Russians, and representatives of other commu-
nities. For the EAPL-CFA, this scenario could lead to its prospective relegation to a purely
regional political party with no representation in the European Parliament and with few
mandates in the Seimas, obtained only in the single-mandate districts with a Polish ethnic
majority. The findings presented in this text are based on the case of Lithuania. However,
they are more broadly applicable in a wider East Central European context, and are not
limited by the context of the European Parliament elections. These findings will obviously
be of service in comparative studies that focus on ethnic parties’ electoral performances
and the inclusion of the representatives of national minorities in the electoral strategies of
mainstream parties. They can also encourage further case-based and comparative research
that focuses on the subjective and objective constraints to ethnic parties which might sub-
stantially affect their electoral performance.
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The Identitarian movement, a radical-right movement active in a number of European
countries, desires to unite European nationalists in international action. Nevertheless,
the theory claims that the latter ideology is based on nativism. This might create
internal ideological conflict between nativism versus transnationalism. The article
offers a qualitative analysis of how the movement solves the issue of identity framing
on the transnational level. This is a question of how the ethno-nationalist message
is transformed to the transnational level, and how national needs are translated into
transnational ones. The findings show that the Identitarian movement constructs a
two-fold identity – a national one and a European one; and operates with three types
of identity framing, thereby building a complex picture of a common past, present,
and future. All three frames always act to maintain a balance between both identities,
and always work with the language of civilization. Such framing, then, might lead to
the successful mobilization of international resources and turn ideas into action.
Keywords:Transnationalization, Identitarian movement, radical right, ethno-national-
ism, identity politics
1 Introduction
Increasing internationalization raises attention to the transnational mobilization of the Eu-
ropean radical right. We can see how radical-right political parties initiate international
forms of cooperation in the European Parliament in the form of political factions (Identity,
Tradition, Sovereignty in 2007; Europe of Nations and Freedom in the period 2015–2019;
Identity and Democracy since 2019) and European political parties (European Alliance
for Freedom, Identity and Democracy Party, and the Alliance for Peace and Freedom).
Outside the institutional arena as well, the radical right is intensifying its connections
and forms of cooperation. In recent decades, transnational radical-right networks have
emerged. Political parties have organized themselves into coalitions such as the World
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National-Conservative Movement and cooperative networks such as the Anti-Islam Con-
gress (between 2008 and 2011). Political movements are not lagging behind, and also use
international processes to intensify their reach and impact. Since 1987, the international
neo-Nazi organization Blood and Honour, has expanded to many countries around the
world. With the advent of the internet, the internationalization of radical right concepts
has even intensified. The concept of autonomous nationalism has gained popularity all
over Europe – even in Australia and New Zealand in the first decade of the new millen-
nium. Later, this was followed by the emergence of the new concept of the Identitarian
movement, with a return to the thinking of the French Nouvelle Droite. With intensified
terrorist attacks in Europe and the European migration crisis of 2015, Europe witnessed
attempts to transpose radical-right projects from one country to another, and to wake up
radical-right powers already in place. The German Pegida movement was disseminated
and branches were soon founded in Great Britain, Netherlands, Austria, Bulgaria, Sweden,
and Canada. Vigilante movements such as the Soldiers of Odin inspired and were copy-
pasted in a few European countries; the same goes for the neo-Nazi organization Nordic
Resistance Movement, with local branches founded in all the Scandinavian countries.
The current research on the transnationalization of the radical right pays attention
to aspects of the latter’s online presence and questions how the internet contributes to
transnationalization (Caiani et al., 2012; Caiani & Kröll, 2014); also, how social media em-
power the radical right and affect interactions inside the radical right online and offline
(Froio & Ganesh, 2018); and how social media contributes to the formation of a shared iden-
tity and is turned into a weapon of the radical right (Guenther et al., 2020; Maly, 2019). In
the offline context, research addresses the transnationalization of the radical right during
electoral campaigns (Mudde, 2007), institutional cooperation (Vejvodová, 2012), and there
is some focus on collective action (Mareš, 2012; Virchow, 2013; Vejvodová, 2014). Less at-
tention is paid to the ideological level of radical-right transnationalization (Grumke, 2009;
Caiani et al., 2012; Macklin, 2013). Nevertheless, the ideological level represents an interest-
ing aspect of transnationalization and a challenge for the radical right because the radical
right faces the conflict of nativism versus transnationalism. Even the radical right itself
has discussed this issue theoretically, such as in the theoretical approaches of the French
Nouvelle Droite, which currently serves as an ideological source of the Identitarian move-
ment. Here arises the question how does the radical right solve the issue of identity on the
transnational level practically? This involves how the ethno-nationalist message is trans-
formed into the transnational, and how national needs are translated into transnational
ones with the usage of global structures and opportunities.
The article responds to these questions by applying a qualitative single-case analy-
sis of the Identitarian movement, which is active in a number of European countries and
represents an attempt by the radical-right movement to join European nationalists in in-
ternational action when mobilizing international resources. The Identitarian movement
represents the transnational radical right; Maly (2019) talks about trans-local actors in the
context of the Belgian Identitarians. Using the theory of social movement mobilization,
the article analyzes identity framing (the interpretative frame), protest repertoire, and, in
relation to those collective actions, framing.
The Identitarian movement was established in 2003 in France on the basis of the Nou-
velle Droite. Since 2012, it has gradually spread across Europe. Nowadays, the movement
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operates in Germany, Austria, Spain, Netherlands, Belgium, the Scandinavian countries,
the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic, and even overseas in the US. In different coun-
tries they use (slightly) different names, but it is still the same entity, promoting the same
politics and principles, and referring back to the same brand.
2 Radical-right identity and the allenge of transnational mobilization
Transnationalization is understood as interaction between national and foreign actors that
is aimed at engaging in protest, making demands, and communicating a message. Thereby,
a network of cross-border actors with common objectives of both an international and
a national character comes into being. Such actors share an outlook on the world. Their
common interests are visible both in word and action. Engaging in transnational collective
activity signals the will of actors to establish links with like-minded formations across bor-
ders based on a common discourse built on shared interpretative frames (Froio & Ganesh,
2018). Thus, transnationalization means sharing and disseminating ideology, ideological
elements, and behavioral patterns (Tarrow, 1998; Virchow, 2013). Frames capture the sym-
bolic construction of external reality; they represent the worldview which impacts or gov-
erns the behavior of a social movement. Frames provide a definite identity, and help make
sense of things and actions. Such common identity is closely tied to the framing of col-
lective action. We can label such transnational frames master frames. Such master frames
allow a common identity to be created throughout the movement. The latter define a com-
mon language and common ground, and even create space for keeping some regional or
local specificities, but always in harmony with the wider frame. National and regional
movements might derive their own identity from the master frame, or shape their identity
to fit the transnational one (Vejvodová, 2014). The master frame connects disparate actors
who are remote, and it mobilizes them by defining the key problem and its solution, iden-
tifying enemies and allies, and presenting shared values and symbols (Della Porta et al.,
2006).
Even though the radical right is discussed in terms of transnationalization, as stated
in the introduction, the transfer of radical-right identity to the transnational level is not
easy due to the fact that the radical right’s Identitarian politics stands on nativism and is
closely connected to ethnicity. It is no surprise that the history of international cooperation
within the radical right is full of failures and break ups caused by an inability to harmonize
nationalistic demands.
As Betz states (2009: 195), ‘the radical right has adopted a new form of cultural nativism,
which, rather than promoting traditional right-wing notions of ethnic and ethnocultural
superiority, aims at the protection of […] indigenous culture, customs and way of life [and]
has increasingly shifted its focus to questions of national and cultural identity, and as a
result their politics has become identity politics.’ The ideology of the radical right is no
longer based on biological racism or white superiority, and it does not seek to install a non-
democratic regime. Minkenberg (2000) talks about the concept of ethnopluralism, which
is accompanied by authoritarian and populist notions. Rather than superiority, it is an in-
compatibility of cultures, ethnicities, and religions which is believed in; all as a reaction to
a changing world, which is perceived by the radical right as endangering and destroying
identity (Betz, 1990). The radical right believes in putting people into ethnonational cate-
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gories along national, religious, cultural, and ethnic lines (Wodak & KhosraviNik, 2013).
Even the silent counter-revolution conceptualized by Pierro Ignazi as a return to materi-
alist values also refers to the need for the protection of traditional values and national and
ethnic identity (Ignazi, 1992), which have been challenged by immigration, and has made
demands on conservative parties to provide more social stability and security.
Authoritarianism and populism, the defining features of the contemporary radical right,
are influenced and shaped by such identity politics as well. Authoritarianism involves the
desire to set up a strictly ordered society, the latter which is currently seen as weakened by
different ethnic and religious minorities, boosted by processes of change related to glob-
alization and European integration. In the case of populism, we see the strict rejection
of the elites allegedly responsible for mass migration, globalization, and multiculturalist
approaches that ‘destroy identities.’ All in all, identity politics links all of the elements of
radical-right ideology (based on Mudde’s definition, 2007): nativism depicts non-natives as
a cultural, security, and economic threat; authoritarianism stresses the decline of moral-
ity and of law and order; and populism identifies who should be blamed for changes that
threaten national identity.
The radical right claims that globalization, immigration, and multiculturalism repre-
sent a threat to national identities. Based on this, the radical right is motivated to protect
such identities. It is often cultural changes that are recognized, and thus criticized, by the
radical right. There is no doubt about the effect of the negative evaluation of immigration
among supporters of the radical right (Coffé et al., 2007; Bowyer, 2008; van der Brug, 2003;
Stockemer, 2015; Sørensen, 2016). The idea of ethnopluralism has intensified since 2015
with the start of the European migration crisis. This situation created fertile ground for
radical politics that call for the preservation of national uniqueness. By using ethnoplural-
ism, the radical right stresses the right to protect one’s own nation and national identity.
The radical right promotes a retreat from globalization and propagates policies and narra-
tives against migration and cultural diversification (Handler, 2019).
Based on the theoretical part of the article, the following sections will analyze the radi-
cal right transnational Identitarian movement as a case of an attempt to translate and trans-
fer ethno-nationalist messages and demands into transnational messages and demands.
Using the theory of social movement mobilization, the analysis looks at identity framing
(the interpretative frame), protest repertoire, and, in relation to these collective actions,
framing. In the cases of protest repertoire and framing, the analysis works with interna-
tional activity only. It is there that there is the greatest potential to capture and describe
attempts to mobilize international resources and use international opportunities. Overall,
the levels of ideology and action are analyzed.
3 Two-fold identity
The Identitarian movement (IM) promotes several types of identity – national, regional,
and European. All identities are closely interconnected. One influences the other, and vice
versa. Without one identity, the others would not make any sense, thus it is necessary to
protect and work on all of them at the same time. According to the logic of the IM, not
protecting one element would lead to destruction of the others. National and European
identities are dominant.
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On the national level, the IM represents the concept of ethnopluralism. The IM pro-
claims that it recognizes the freedom of every nation and the opportunity for the self-
realization of every nation and culture, but never at the expense of another nation. It de-
mands the differentiation of individual nations and hence rejects immigration. For the
IM, ethnopluralism respects diversity and serves as an alternative to multiculturalism and
globalization. Identitarians talk about the right to preserve the culture, customs, and tra-
ditions of every ethnic group (Identitäre Bewegung Deutschland, n.d. a). Identitarians use
the following slogan: ‘0% racism 100% identity’ as an expression to support their claim
that their ideology is not racist. However, some scholars conclude that this appears to be
true only at a cursory glance, and that the IM stands for a form of differentialist or cul-
tural racism that leaves behind the superior attitude of classic racism, but nevertheless
involves constructing collectives defined by specific characteristics that cannot be verified
(Virchow, 2015). In harmony with the ideology of National Socialism, the nation is seen as
an organic pre-modern community and homogeneity is defended by promoting difference
and exclusivity. Cultures (representing nations) are understood to be exclusive and static
groups of people in a specific place. Any mixing destroys their supposed purity and leads
to degradation. (Garner, 2017). Identitarians perceive their roots in the context of country
(soil), blood, and identity.
The IM defines national identity as characterized by direct ties to a people or a state,
representing a comprehensive identification framework characterized by social, linguistic,
and cultural rules. In such a context, regional identity is understood as a sub-level of na-
tional identity (direct attachment to one’s own city, village, and region) shaped by dialect,
customs, and regional history. The national and regional levels complement each other.
Such aspects of identity, taken together, create a common framework which elements mu-
tually build upon and complement one another (Identitäre Bewegung Deutschland, n.d.
b; Generation Identity UK, 2018b). The regional identity also might be of greater impor-
tance when it is politically relevant – such as with the Flemish branch of the movement
in Belgium.
The ideology of ethnopluralism stands on the belief that equality does not exist, or
make any sense. The idea of egalitarianism is rejected. Universal human rights and free-
doms and the universal values derived from them are simply abstract terms that are empty
of content (Revolta.info, 2013a). Such an ideological position has its source in the French
Nouvelle Droite (ref. Alain de Benoist or Guillaume Faye) and promotes the idea that a hu-
man being does not exist as a universal and abstract entity, and it is not possible to separate
the existence of a human being from society and the social groups to which they belong.
Instead of universalism, it is the laws of nature and the imperative of social organization
which should be applied (Milza, 2002).
However, the idea of ethnopluralism preceded the Nouvelle Droite. For example, Carl
Schmitt already promoted ethnopluralism as a part of the so-called identitarian democ-
racy (identitäre Demokratie). Schmitt was opposed to a pluralism of interests and pluralis-
tic democracy. Instead, he promoted democracy based on identity. Schmitt defined himself
as an opponent of universal human rights, replacing this with ethnopluralism (Gessenhar-
ter, 2004). He saw homogeneity as a necessary element for promoting the interests of the
state and nation, and saw homogeneity (internal homogeneity) as an element of democ-
racy. Pluralism meant danger for the state and its sovereignty. From this comes the idea of
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distinguishing between democracy and parliamentarianism: it is claimed that the former
can exist without the latter (Pfahl-Traughber, 2004).
Finally, there is civilizational identity, which for the IM is constituted in European
identity. Through origin, history, and culture all Europeans share both a common heritage
and a common destiny. The European identity serves to mobilize international structures
and resources. At this level we can identify three frames that are being used by the IM to
define identity.
The first frame refers to the past. It works with the symbolism of historical events,
according to which the IM can depict Europe as homogenous civilization, while also dif-
ferent from others. It works with a story about a European civilization that has always had
to defend itself against non-Europeans who wanted to conquer the continent. The IM calls
for action that resembles the example of ancestors who fought for European civilization
and protected European culture and identity. The historical heritage of Europeans is used
to justify the exclusion of outsider groups (Fligstein et al., 2012). A demonstration that
took place in Poitiers, France in 2012 was historically contextualized by the IM by making
reference to Charles Martell who, in 732,¹ halted the expansion of Muslims into Europe
at the battle of Poitiers (CBN, 2012). In a public space in Karlsruhe, the German IM dis-
played figures representing hoplites (soldiers of the ancient Greek infantry) labelled with
the dates and names of battles of the Reconquista and the Ottoman Wars. This was done to
commemorate the fact that more than once Europe succeeded in defending itself from in-
vaders (Zúquete, 2018). The term Reconquista has become part of the Identitarian everyday
vocabulary, and helps draw a parallel between the medieval period when Christians recap-
tured territory from the Muslims (who had occupied most of the Iberian Peninsula), and the
current fight of the IM against Muslims: namely, the ‘demand for a Reconquista of Europe,
the fight against our ethno-cultural downfall and against mass immigration’ (Identitäre
Bewegung Deutschland, 2017). The same symbolic role is played by the Ottoman Wars
dating from the late Middle Ages through to the early twentieth century. In 2017, the IM
from Austria even created an award for outstanding achievements in Identitarian activism
after Prince Eugene of Savoy – the Prince Eugene Prize. This personality was chosen due
to his fame associated with military feats against the Ottoman Turks (Zúquete, 2018). Even
the basic symbol of the IM has a connection with past. The Greek Lambda letter depicted
in black and yellow is a symbolic reference to the Spartan warriors who fought against the
Persians at Thermopylae. Their battle against the barbarians made them heroes, because
they protected European civilization, as the IM does today. The Persians are considered a
metaphor for present-day non-European immigrants.
The second frame of the transnational identity involves the current situation, and is
built on a definition of common enemies endangering Europe as a civilization, thereby
endangering national identities and order on the national level. This frame interacts with
the first one (in evoking historical parallels). The IM believes that all these identified en-
emies are creating a situation in which European nations and Europe itself are gradually
losing their identities, and Europeans are not far from losing theirs altogether. This situa-
tion is defined by Markus Willinger in his manifesto ‘Generation Identity: A Declaration
of War Against the “68ers”.’ Willinger explains that Europe is dying out and the current
¹ The number 732 became the symbol for the movement, and is used by the French chapter on promotional
materials.
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generation is the most important one because only it can save Europe from suicide. He
points his finger at the 1968 generation as the one which gave rise to all of our current
problems, because this generation rebelled against the order of the time. It stood against
everything that created identity. According to Willinger, the 1968 generation adopted a
mission of preventing future wars and eliminating inequality among people – i.e., elimi-
nating differences. Multiculturalism was an experiment in how to achieve this. Thus the
former took away everything that could give identity to the current generation. Willinger
does not consider the Identitarian movement to be a movement, but claims it is the entire
(current) generation. He states that a multicultural society does not function. As a result
of multiculturalism, the current generation is lacking a European identity, and this must
be revived. Multiculturalism leads to the destruction of European countries, and multicul-
tural society is perceived as harsh, unstable, and lacking solidarity. The discrepancy that is
articulated between the older generations and the present generation in terms of fighting
for values represents an interesting element. Willinger claims that whether Europe will
survive is a decision for the current young generation (Identitäre Bewegung Österreich,
n.d. a; Revolta.info, 2013; Willinger, 2013).
After the demonstration at Poitiers in 2012, there was a public declaration of war
against multiculturalism (Brücken, 2013). A video of the declaration was recorded and up-
loaded to the internet and quickly spread to other European countries, thus significantly
contributing to the dissemination of the concept across Europe. The video addresses the
total deterioration of European culture and all that has ever been identified with it. It
indicates there is one last chance to save the continent, thus war is openly declared on
multiculturalism and a wish is expressed to revive traditions and return to national histor-
ical models and principles. Cohabitation between European and non-European nations is
perceived as utterly impossible.
Another type of common enemy is more specific and more tangible – Islam and Mus-
lims. The IM articulates the alleged threat of the Islamization of Europe. Identitarians work
with the concept of the ‘Great Replacement’ of ‘indigenous Europeans’ by non-European
migrants and stress that it is necessary to stop this and revive the old values. One of the
biggest concerns is of becoming a minority in one’s own country; therefore, the IM calls
for a ‘rebooting of European ethnocultural tradition’ (Handler, 2019) without any further
specification. The IM talks about Europe facing a demographic crisis. Declining birth rates,
mass immigration, and the increase in parallel Islamic societies endanger European soci-
eties and will lead to their complete destruction within a matter of decades if no counter-
measures are taken (Generation Identity UK, 2018b; Identitäre Bewegung Österreich, n.d.
b). Following the migration crisis of 2015, the perception of such trends and visions of the
future intensified. The migration crisis fueled the IM’s fear of the replacement of European
people in European countries. The Identitarians see Europe being conquered by Islam, and
share a sense of the threat to their identity.
In this context it is interesting to mention that the IM developed a targeted campaign
focusing specifically on women. The movement framed the threat with a very sensitive
and emotional appeal in a campaign called ‘120 Decibels.’ German and Austrian women
spoke up against abuse and violence perpetrated against European women by migrants
and encouraged other women to share their experiences. The campaign was named after
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the 120-decibel self-defense pocket alarms that some women carry (Identitäre Bewegung
Deutschland, 2018).
The fear of being replaced is connected with criticisms of the European Union and glob-
alization – two factors seen not only as engines of migration, but also as responsible for
the eradication and loss of identity. The IM rejects both the European Union’s bureaucracy
and ideological setting, which promotes liberalism, capitalism, globalization, and univer-
salism. The movement opposes the European Union as a source and active supporter of
globalization, which is understood as the driver of multiculturalism and immigration. Due
to this, the European Union is seen as a cause of the dissolution of nations and national
identities. The European Union, by definition, is ruining the mission of nationalists, whose
priority is to protect the nation against foreign influence. Hence, nationalist policies are
against immigration, labor mobility, and cultural mobility (Halikiopoulou et al., 2012).
From the perspective of the IM, European civilization is currently being destroyed from
inside by the multicultural model and from the outside by foreign (non-European) people,
with a special focus on Muslims. The Identitarians disseminate an apocalyptic vision of
ethnic and cultural deterioration in Europe. Willinger explains the alleged identity crisis
as more serious than the partition of Europe by the Iron Curtain, or the devastation of
Europe by the World Wars. According to him, the crisis originates at the spiritual level,
because the European continent has lost its will to live. The problem is spelled out in bio-
political terms (Virchow, 2015) when Willinger mentions that ‘the greatest threat to Europe
results from a demographic catastrophe that is already underway’ (Willinger, 2013). The
IM talks about Europe endangering itself with self-destruction through a multicultural
‘zeitgeist’ (Generation Identity UK, 2018b). The IM expects ethnic, cultural, and religious
conflict unless there is a change in political thinking that leads to the protection of the
ethno-cultural traditions of the ancestors of the former (Generation Identity UK, 2018a).
Finally, the third frame used by the IM is the frame of the future. The IM talks about a
unified Europe, but not a standardized Europe, as associated with the European Union. It
calls for an alternative Europe composed of free European nations. The Identitarians call
themselves ‘Alter-Europeans’ (Délský Potápěč, 2013). The preferred vision of the world
is one composed of ethnically homogenous communities and pan-European nationalism
(Handler, 2019). The IM stresses the ethno-pluralistic vision of a unified Europe, and says
that any unification of different cultures means destruction. Alan de Benoist draws a
parallel between ‘genocide’ caused by racists and ‘ethnocide’ caused by so-called anti-
racists (Weber, 2004). Not surprisingly, the argument of difference/incompatibility implic-
itly places Christian, white Europe on one side, and everything else, but Islam specifically,
on the other (Garner, 2017). The old theme of civilizations and races failing due to mixing
and the endangerment of purity, as known from de Gobineau’s work, returns.
This vision of the future fits perfectly with the visions of the European radical-right
scene that calls for a unified Europe on the basis of defending European civilization, Euro-
pean values, and European space, while internally respecting the diversity of nations and
national states. This is basically the concept of ‘fortress Europe’ built on the fear of Euro-
pean nations dying out due to low birth rates, along with the presence of a very strong
cultural dimension. Here, European culture is perceived as being incompatible with non-
European cultures, and the idea that non-Europeans should stay out of Europe, or assim-
ilate if they do come. The different habits, traditions, and religious acts of non-Europeans
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conflict with the Christian roots of European civilization and degrade European civiliza-
tion. The theme is one of civilizations failing due to mixing and a loss of purity.
4 e ‘Defend Europe’ campaign
That the IM has the capacity to mobilize international capital and resources and turn them
into real action was proven in 2017, when the IM of Austria launched the ‘Defend Europe’
campaign, strongly mobilizing identity organizations across Europe, and at the same time
intensifying the internationalization efforts of the movement. The aim of the campaign
was to motivate sympathizers to act, to warn against threats related to the migration crisis,
and to stimulate the defense of European nations and European civilization. The campaign
was a logical consequence of all previous initiatives, such as ‘The Threat of Islam’ and
‘Great Replacement,’ the shared leitmotif of which was the defense of European nations
and European identity.
With the help of a crowdfunding platform, Austrian Identitarians were able to col-
lect sufficient funds for the Defend Europe project. These finances were used to buy a
ship and to secure a crew that would sail the Mediterranean Sea and sink ships bring-
ing migrants to the European coast. Identitarians promised to send migrants back to the
Libyan Coast Guard, not to bring them to Europe. The campaign attracted support across
the radical-right spectrum and beyond. Within a month, the Defend Europe campaign re-
ceived more than $178,000. Originally, the goal was to raise at least $58,000. In the summer
of 2017, the Austrian movement announced the purchase of a C-Star ship and the hiring of
a 25-member crew. Oddly, the entire project was then abruptly called off (Bulman, 2017;
Holthouse, 2017; Identitäre Bewegung Österreich, n.d. c).
In April 2018, the IM garnered attention again when it paid for a helicopter that landed
on the French-Italian border in the Alps. About 100 activists from across Europe unfurled a
banner at the border to tell migrants to go back to their countries of origin. In a statement,
activists said they were blocking the path of illegal migrants and that teams of people
were guarding the area to prevent attempts to cross the border illegally (Vávra, 2018). This
action, entitled ‘Alpine Mission,’ cost about 60,000 euros.
5 Conclusion
The case of the Identitarian movement represents an example of how the radical right is
able to overcome the conflict between ethno-nationalist identities and is making efforts to
establish a transnational movement. Today’s European radical right is highly motivated
to cooperate internationally and use international resources and opportunities like any
other political actor. However, the great challenge for the radical right is its own ideology,
based on ethnic principles and nativism, which are obstacles to long-term and stable co-
operation. The Identitarian movement tests the strategy of defining two identities that are
closely connected and influence each other –national identity and European identity. The
movement uses the argument of the necessity of the cooperation of European nations to
protect European civilization (i.e. a European identity) against non-European influences,
thereby protecting national identity. On the one side, there is an intense appeal for uni-
fication, but on the other, the movement mitigates worries about losing autonomy and
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reiterates the principle of respect for the diversity of European nations. The movement
uses a strong narrative of endangered Europe as a shared issue that unites all European
nations with a common goal, while allowing enough space for individual national identi-
ties. It also depicts a type of enemy that cannot be defeated individually (European Union,
multiculturalism, Islam, Muslims) – therefore it is necessary to unite. In this way, the Iden-
titarians are active in the transnationalization of nationalist ideas that are framed and (at
the same time) triggered by experiences with globalization and migration. Steiger (2014)
calls this ‘open-source’ ideology. The framing of the main ideas and goals is so universal
that it can be used in any context in any European country.
We can detect three frames. One shows the future of a unified Europe of ethnically
and culturally homogenous entities, protected against non-European influences. The sec-
ond frame is built on the definition of common enemies and an apocalyptic vision if na-
tionalists do not join together and fight. The third one works by referring to a common
history and historical events that are employed to define Europe as a homogenous civiliza-
tion. Notions of European civilization/identity are used to mobilize international structures
and resources. This claim is in line with the findings of Brubaker (2017), who talks about
civilizationism in the context of national populism. He points out that by labelling Islam
a civilizational threat, civilizationism can be understood as a new articulation of nation-
alism. The IM uses civilizationism as an extension of nationalism, defining self and others
in civilizational terms.
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Book Review:
Plebiscitary Leader Democracy in the Making. London/New York: Routledge. 202 pages.
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Since 2010, Viktor Orbán has opened up a new era of Hungarian politics, which is – re-
garding the degree, scope, and speed of change – almost unique among the old and new
democracies after 1989. During the last decade, we have experienced a significant rise in
the scholarly and political interest in Hungarian politics, and the need to develop appro-
priate approaches and theoretical frameworks to grasp these robust changes and describe
the characteristics of the new political system. As a result, an important debate about the
regime has emerged among Hungarian researchers in the last few years. Some scholars
perceive the new political regime as still being a (non-liberal) democracy (Csizmadia, 2017;
2019) or leader democracy (Körösényi, 2015; 2017), while labels and terms like ‘simulated
democracy’ (Lengyel & Ilonszki, 2012), ‘hybridisation’ (Gyulai, 2017), ‘hybrid regime’ and
‘competitive authoritarianism’ (Bozóki & Hegedűs, 2018; Böcskei & Hajdú, 2019; Csillag
& Szelényi, 2015; Filippov, 2018; Scheiring, 2019; Szűcs, 2018) have also been used. Other
authors describe the Hungarian system straightforwardly as an (electoral) autocracy (Ágh,
2015; Antal, 2019; Kis, 2019; Kornai, 2015; Unger, 2018; Szilágyi, 2014).
However, the motivation of András Körösényi, Gábor Illés, and Attila Gyulai was not
only to respond with well-founded answers to the question of the nature of the regime, or
to provide the first comprehensive and theoretically substantiated political science account
of the Orbán regime in English. In the seminal book e Orbán Regime: Plebiscitary Leader
Democracy in the Making, the authors argue that contemporary political trends not only
change democracy, but add up to a different type of political authority that calls for new
concepts, just like their proposed concept of Weberian plebiscitary leader democracy (PLD).
Hence, ‘describing the Orbán regime as an empirical example of PLD may have wider
significance [for] understanding some contemporary trends, both in the Eastern-Central-
European region and in Western democracies as well’ (p. 14).
Indeed, the authors use a refurbished conceptual frame of PLD that is inspired by
political changes in liberal democracies from the 1980s to the present day (Green, 2010;
Körösényi, 2005a; Pakulski & Körösényi, 2012). These ‘Millennial trends’ include processes
like de-alignment, growing electoral volatility, citizen disengagement, a decline in party
membership and alignment, the waning of party government, the growing legitimacy-
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related problems of representative democracies, the spread of non-majoritarian institu-
tions, the mediatization of politics, growing personalization and populist rhetoric, and rad-
ical or unconventional policy changes. These phenomena, according to the authors, have
changed the nature of modern representative democracies and ‘undermined the structural
base of party democracy that characterized the twentieth century’ (p. 8). In other words, we
are witnessing an epochal shift in the logic and functioning of contemporary democracies
(and politics in general), captured in phrases such as the ‘hollowing’ of Western democracy
(Mair, 2013) and the labels ‘audience democracy’ (Manin, 1997), ‘post-democracy’ (Crouch,
2004), ‘leader democracy’ (Körösényi, 2005a), and ‘ocular democracy’ (Green, 2010). The
authors claim that the concept of PLD could provide an ‘adequate analytical framework
for an account of this new era and its emerging regime’ (p. 19).
However, one thing must be made clear at the outset: Körösényi, Illés, and Gyulai
revolt against the mainstream approaches that claim to provide a radical change of per-
spective. Namely, PLD offers an alternative to the widely used discourses of populism and
hybridization to explain the Hungarian case and other recent processes in democracies
and autocracies. However, the two rival concepts are not treated in the same way. Pop-
ulism, given that it provides only partial answers to questions about regime-level change
– in the form of demagogy (Weber, 1978), rhetoric, discourse, and a populist style (Moffitt,
2016) of politics and leader-citizen communication – is incorporated into the theory of
PLD as one of its six main features. By contrast, there is no mercy for the hybrid regime
concept, which is, in the eyes of the authors, derived from the mainstream approach about
(idealized) liberal democracies and is therefore a (new) manifestation of classical liberal
democratic theory that faces the same challenges as its antecedent. As a result, it could be
said that the approach of Körösényi and his fellow authors poses a serious challenge to the
whole liberal democratic paradigm, thus the importance of this book is further enhanced
by its revolutionary perspective. Consequently, according to their implicit arguments, the
liberal democratic paradigm (and its newer manifestation, hybrid regime discourse, with
the regime classification paradigm) is unsuitable for framing new global trends in politics
and describing puzzling regimes such as those of Orbán’s Hungary. Hence, the authors
argue, it has lost its explanatory power and relevance, ultimately questioning its right to
exist; on the other hand, this justifies a paradigmatic shift and opens the door to new con-
cepts and approaches such as PLD.
According to the authors, problems with hybrid regime literature and the underlying
conceptual framework of the liberal democratic paradigm have various dimensions. First,
there is the issue of the normative bias and unreflective praise for the one-dimensional and
teleological view of liberal democracy, which neglects the fact that the democratic and lib-
eral pillars of liberal democracy cannot be combined without tension. Moreover, focusing
on liberal democratic ideals, the hybrid regime literature examines the ‘lack and violations
of certain features’ instead of ‘concrete existing characteristics’ (p. 5). Second, thanks to
the universal need for classification, the mainstream paradigm cannot explain endogenous
factors such as autocratic tendencies in the internal logic of democracy. In addition, the
authors argue, there are other problems with the hybrid (and liberal democratic) paradigm,
such as the fact that it has become more method oriented than problem oriented – or too
static, by focusing on structures instead of actors (i.e. on agency and on political leaders),
and inherently features an imperfect explanation of legitimacy.
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However, it should be noted here that the authors’ description of the liberal demo-
cratic approach is slightly simplified, since nowadays almost no one claims that liberal
democracy works without internal tensions or certain trade-offs, especially in the light
of an emerging populism. Instead, even liberal democracy apologists speak about the dis-
tinction between electoral and liberal democracy; namely, the relative lack or presence of
liberal components and majoritarian-democratic aspects (thinking here of the democracy
indices of Freedom House, or V-Dem), or talk about the spread of ‘illiberal democracies’
(Zakaria, 1997), or of the ‘growing tensions between democracy and liberalism’ and the
rise of populism as ‘an outcome not of the failures but of the successes of post-communist
liberalism’ (Krastev, 2007: 58). In fact, liberal democracy is mostly understood as a fragile
equilibrium involving the co-existence of liberal and democratic logics (Abts & Rummens,
2007), with an inherent duality and paradoxical tension (Canovan, 1999; 2002; Mény &
Surel, 2002; Mouffe 2000). It is able to disrupt the fragile balance both in the direction
of the radicalization of liberal-constitutional and democratic-populist logics (Lefort, 1986;
1988). In the same way, the mainstream literature on populism talks explicitly about ‘struc-
tural tensions within liberal democracy upon which populists can feed’ (Mudde, 2004:
563), defining populism as ‘democratic illiberalism’ (Pappas, 2016), which is an ‘illiberal
democratic response to undemocratic liberalism’ (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017: 116).
Finally, and perhaps surprisingly, similarly to the heavily criticized (for its normative di-
mension) liberal democratic approach, the authors also seek to demonstrate some (albeit
modest) normative potential of PLD, which will be discussed in detail later.
To sum up, Körösényi and his co-authors’ main critique addresses the idealization of
liberal democracy, which conceals its internal contradictions. This means that they go be-
yond the paradigm of liberal democracy, using the concept of democracy in a minimal
and formal sense, understood as the passive approval of charismatic leaders instead of
the active self-government of the people (with accountable leaders). With the conceptual
framework of PLD (Körösényi, 2019), the authors seek to offer a more sophisticated, re-
alistic, and empirically useful analysis of the legitimacy of regimes than the mainstream
approach. Hence, they intend not only to ‘unfold how the PLD regime came into existence
in the specific Hungarian context,’ but to ‘demonstrate that the role of agency can be more
crucial than political scientists usually assume,’ and especially to ‘present the Hungarian
case as a paradigmatic case of a new regime type’ (p. 14), thereby opening the door to the
international horizon of empirical research. However, this book addresses the case of the
last decade of Hungarian politics through the lens of the conceptual framework of plebisc-
itary leader democracy. Its approach is thus a qualitative case study that has the aim of
facilitating an analysis of the complex phenomena of regime-building in its specific con-
text, by way of ‘agency-centred constructivism’ or interpretivism. The Hungarian case is
seen as an important variant of PLD, because of its empirical clarity, and it could be not
just the first case but a pioneer in turning into PLD among the countries of the EU. There-
fore, the authors regard Hungary as a ‘natural laboratory for PLD,’ and consider it essential
to obtain ‘important insights into tendencies in contemporary democracies in Europe and
elsewhere’ (e.g. Turkey, Venezuela, the Philippines, USA, UK, France, and Italy) (p. 13).
The structure of the book fits these ambitious aims well, as it is divided into six chapters
that build upon each other in terms of the division of politics, polity, and policy aspects.
First, the authors present a detailed outline of their theory – namely, a reconstruction of
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the Weberian PLD concept as an authority and regime type. This reconstruction is the
fruit of long years of intensive theoretical work by all three authors, especially András
Körösényi, who has been dealing with the issues of the applicability and refurbishing of
Weber’s classical framework in today’s political reality for almost two decades (Körösényi,
2003; 2005a; 2005b; 2009a; 2009b; 2017; 2019; Pakulski & Körösényi, 2012). In this respect,
the early outlines of PLD had already been prepared when Viktor Orbán came to power in
2010, so one might even say – if the approach of PLD is accepted – that Körösényi some-
how foresaw the forthcoming radical changes even before 2010. However, over the years,
the theory of PLD has been expanded and corrected, thanks to the systematic empirical
analysis of contemporary circumstances. For example, Körösényi and his co-authors do
not follow precisely the earlier approach of Pakulski and Körösényi (2012) because of its
over-optimistic assumptions regarding the normative potential (accountability) of leader
democracy.
Following Weber’s concept of Führerdemokratie (Weber, 1978: 266–268), the authors
define PLD as a mixed type of authority that is democratic in form, but authoritarian in
substance, which means it consists of a combination of charismatic and legal-rational au-
thority, in which charisma is routinized through regular elections. In contrast to genuine
charismatic authority, in the case of PLD, ‘charismatic legitimacy is approved “in advance”;
it is not [the] prior deeds or performance of the leader that manifest his charisma, but the
trust of the people expressed at elections’ (p. 22). The latter institution is interpreted by the
authors as a source of democratic legitimacy, regardless of the possibly unfair nature of
these elections and political competition in general. Therefore, the concept of democracy
of the authors fits with Schumpeterian minimalist traditions, since ‘PLD cannot be under-
stood as self-rule or self-government of the people,’ but instead as formal ‘approval or re-
jection of the incumbent or other candidates’ (p. 23), thus only as giving consent to be ruled
through elections. In this approach, ‘the function of elections is limited to authoriz[ing]
rulers and legitimiz[ing] their rule and the political regime; therefore, the responsiveness
and accountability of leaders are rather limited, if they exist at all’ (p. 24).
There are six major traits of the PLD regime as an ideal-type that contrast with ‘leader-
less’ (liberal) democracy. Charismatic leadership, which includes heroism, vision, and per-
sonal responsibility. Demagogy and populism, understood as rhetoric and political com-
munication, which is ‘less sophisticated, more emotional, more aesthetic, and often ac-
companied by polarising rhetoric, enemy-construction, “bad manners” (Moffitt, 2016), and
identity politics’ (p. 33), in contrast to open (liberal democratic) political discourse. The
plebiscitary and top-down nature of representation and democracy is another factor, which
diminishes the role of the representative and other intermediate institutions, and replaces
the imperative mandate by a more or less free mandate (blank-check authorization). A
state of permanent crisis and crisis narrative becomes the normal state of politics and legit-
imizes revolutionary or radical politics and public policy. Radical or revolutionary public
policy and politics means that in PLD politics enjoys primacy over legal rule, bureaucratic
regulations, and social norms, while rulership becomes arbitrary. Patrimonial or preben-
dal wield[ing] of power is another factor, which includes particularistic decisions based
on personal connections and the ruler’s discretion. After this chapter, the authors unfold
their case study on the Orbán regime, systematically examining its dimensions of politics,
polity, and policy.
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Körösényi, Illés and Gyulai think the Schmittian concept of political (Schmitt, 2007)
with its antagonistic conflicts and the view of the primacy of politics, understood as a
sharply conflictual and barely limitable activity, are able to ‘grasp the very logic of the
Orbán regime’ (p. 67). They argue that primacy of politics mean ‘ruling the moment’ and
following the political interests of the day. Orbán as a leader shapes individual preferences
and the whole political space through constructing identities, setting the political agenda,
and manipulating the dimension of citizens’ judgements with the means and techniques
of discourse, heresthetics, and the media. In the eyes of the authors, the role of leader-
ship is similar to that adopted by the figure of the Schmittian sovereign ‘who does not
conform to frameworks already given to him, but, based [on] political decisions, invents
them’ (p. 68). Therefore, the concept of populism is incorporated into PLD as a performa-
tive power that instead of expressing social identities aims at constituting them. Moffitt’s
(2016) view of populism as political style ‘bad manners’ can serve as a manifestation of
charisma in PLD, and can play a crucial role in maintaining the charismatic bond between
the leader and their followers. This requires the ability of a leader to construct and tell
stories to their followers that are linked together in an overarching narrative or populist
myth about the struggle between the heroic leader and the villains, that ‘hovers over the
political agenda as an umbrella concept, absorbing and […] neutralising most individual
issues’ (p. 55). However, these wars must end with victory to make the charismatic leader
fit for the next conflict, which is never the last, hence ‘victory and redemption are al-
ways partial – a final one, breaking the cycle, would mean that the charismatic saviour
is no longer needed’ (p. 69).
In the next two chapters, the formal and informal sides of the polity dimensions of
the Orbán regime are explored – these remain in a position subordinate to the logic of
politics. The authors first focus on constitutional and other institutional changes, and then
on the elite-creation and power-wielding of the Orbán regime. Using a modified concept
of Skowronek’s (1997), the reconstruction of the polity is described as ‘order-shattering’
(destruction of previously established arrangements), ‘order-affirming’ (endorsing some
common values and constitutional traditions), and ‘order-creating’ (the process of putting
into place the new settlement). The authors conclude that Orbán’s reconstruction of the
polity ‘has been voluntarist, and this voluntarism has consisted of the will to maintain the
capacity to act’ (p. 88), and the desire to establish a stable polity, even if there were to be
a change of government.
These formal aspects of reconstruction of polity have been supplemented by a series of
informal changes since 2010. In order to analyze this side of the reconstruction of polity,
the authors supplement their approach with Schabert’s (1989) concept of ‘monocracy’ or
‘princely rule,’ and Mazzuca’s (2010) differentiation between the access to and the exer-
cise of power dimensions. On the micro-level, there is a personal, one-man-rule logic that
transforms the formal frameworks of the polity into informal ones on the basis of personal
loyalty. This is supplemented with macro-level of reconstructions in various dimensions of
state-society relationship – namely, the tools of clientelism and prebendalism, and the mas-
sive elite change in the spheres of economy, media, and culture, where ‘positions, property,
and the resulting authority and influence are only derived from those of Orbán’ (p. 110).
In contrast to the developmentalist approach and concepts like the ‘post-socialist accu-
mulative state’ (Scheiring, 2019) or ‘embedded neoliberalism’ (Bohle & Greskovits, 2018),
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as in the case of polity, the authors emphasize the subordinated nature of policy-making
(examined in fields of economic, social, and educational policies) to certain political logics.
Their concept of bricolage refers to the lack of a coherent policy program or paradigm of the
Orbán regime, which is instead a ‘blend of pragmatism and innovation, and an alternative
to paradigmatic thinking in policy-making’ (p. 134), driven by an electoral, international
institutional, and clientelist logic. This is supplemented by the quasi-ideology of realism,
with its core concepts of survival, stability, sovereignty, strength, and national interest.
This can host diverse ideological content, from full-fledged ideologies, and flexibly adapt
to changing circumstances.
The wide-ranging applicability of this important book’s theoretical panopticon de-
pends largely on the distinction between antagonistic and agonistic conflicts (Mouffe, 2000;
2005). PLD is a combination of rational-legal and charismatic authority, in which conflict-
ual politics ‘might be different from Mouffean agonism and closer to Schmittian antago-
nism or enmity’ (p. 51). Therefore, the authors argue, just as Schmittian antagonism could
be tamed into agonism by which politics becomes limited (due to traditions and consti-
tutional and institutional constraints), PLD may vary between ‘moderate’ and ‘extreme’
versions. The leaders of such hard and soft cases, and the depth and intensity of the pres-
ence of PLD’s traits, can create an international empirical perspective on regimes ranging
from Putin’s Russia to Macron’s France, Trump’s USA, or Kurz’s Austria. However, this
perspective may have unintended consequences for the authors’ conception. Namely, ex-
actly because PLD is an ideal-type, its diminished form (‘moderate PLD’) could have a
reduced level of explanatory power, opening the door to other, more relevant theories.
Therefore, using the whole framework of PLD in consolidated liberal democracies could
inflate the original concept. After all, Donald Trump, Emmanuel Macron, and Sebastian
Kurz do not own or control the USA, France, and Austria as political regimes like Putin,
Erdogan and Orbán do their countries. The question for PLD’s framework is, if agonistic
(and not antagonistic) political conflicts are dominant – more so than would be compatible
with liberal democracy –, may a country in any way be considered a PLD, or, in contrast,
would it remain a liberal democratic regime with a potentially populist or autocratic (in the
terms of the authors: charismatic) politician? In other words, there is considerable doubt
regarding how to identify where PLD as a regime exactly begins and ends, and how to
respond to this question of borders.
Another interesting question is the normative merits of PLD and its authorization-
based view of representation, which has already been widely debated in Hungarian polit-
ical science (G. Fodor, 2006; Körösényi, 2005b; 2007; 2008; 2017; Meszerics, 2008; Szilágyi,
2015; Unger, 2018). The authors reject normative (unrealistic) assumptions of the theories
of liberal democracy, and – following, inter alia, Machiavelli, Weber, and Schmitt – advo-
cate a pessimistic or realistic view of politics. Despite this, Körösényi and his co-authors
do not give up on demonstrating some normative qualities of PLD, and hence classify it
as a democratic system. First, according to the authors, PLD provides a peaceful method
for leadership selection and authorization, and solving the associated conflicts, which is
compatible with the minimalist concept of democracy provided by Schumpeter and Prze-
worski. Second, PLD generates a kind of legitimization of rule and the political regime; and,
third, it endows the people with a veto power to ‘reject […] rulers and/or their particular
public policy measure[s]’ (p. 180).
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However, serious questions and dilemmas arise here. First, the peaceful selection and
authorization of the rulers of a regime does not qualify a system as a democracy, since this
situation may be identified in many cases and periods of hereditary or elective monarchies
and in other autocracies like the Holy Roman Empire or the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and
the late Kádár era in Hungary. Moreover, all regimes have their own mechanisms of le-
gitimizing their rule and political regime, including even with certain forms of elections
(we think here of imperial prince-electors, or the institution of parliament). Additionally,
violent incidents and serious irregularities may occur in a PLD, proving that the peaceful
resolution of conflicts is not always a feature of one, like in the case of Erdogan’s Turkey
or Putin’s Russia, and occasionally even Orbán’s Hungary. Moreover, there is the issue
of elections as a means of selection, which could be seen as the Achilles’ heel of the nor-
mative merit of PLD. In the eyes of the authors, elections in a PLD are only ‘plebiscitary
acts of acclamation,’ contributing to ‘establishing relations between voters and leaders
and creat[ing] the authorisation to lead,’ and citizens have only ‘a negative power, namely
the power of approval or rejection of rulers, which they can apply through elections and
referendums’ (pp. 142, 152). This equivalence of acclamation (as manipulated authoriza-
tion, or passive consent) and democratic elections is not obvious, not to mention the fact
that this view is fairly blind, deaf, and mute to the unfair nature of political competition
which, for example, can empower a leader to constitute ‘proper’ social identities and help
win important elections. Consequently, there is potential to classify (electoral) autocra-
cies as (leader) democracies, which exercise their power behind institutions of formally
multi-party elections and a democratic façade, and create, systematically, an uneven play-
ing field for political contestation. Therefore, as in the cases of similar autocratic regimes,
the very existence of the de facto citizen (veto) power regarding the rejection of rulers is
questionable in PLD.
In addition, the claim that PLD regimes (or those of electoral autocracies) provide a
peaceful process of selection and change of rulers in which people have at least a real
negative veto power is theoretically unfalsifiable and very subjective. The limited extent
of political competition exists for the autocratic reason of monopolizing and preserving
political power – and a regime with these goals generates uncertainty in terms of the con-
sequences of elections and the possibility of leader or political change. In contrast to the
situation in democratic regimes, this uncertainty is vital in autocratic regimes, thus elec-
tions cannot be seen as an indicator of the latter’s democratic normative values. In these
regimes, sometimes people have real veto power and sometimes they do not, so regime
change is sometimes an option via peaceful elections, and at other times it is not. And,
most importantly, the truth of this is revealed only retrospectively, hence we cannot use
the formal existence of elections as present evidence of democratic control, even in cases
when the opposition can achieve sometimes only partial (typically local and municipal)
electoral victories. Therefore, elections and other ‘formal representative institutions make
for lovely decorations in the shop windows of authoritarian regimes’ (Schedler, 2013: 69),
which could be true in the case of PLD as well. Consequently, given that the real political
control of citizens and the accountability of leaders and other normative merits are highly
questionable in the case of PLD as a model of democracy, we must face the fundamental
question why should we regard PLD as a genuine form of modern democracy at all? And,
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similarly, could such a model exist without indisputable normative power and values as
part of democratic theory?
The above-mentioned are only a few examples of the similar dilemmas, thought-pro-
voking statements, and approaches of the book. Besides providing an overarching and
systematically developed view of contemporary politics, and giving a detailed description
of the Orbán regime’s modus operandi, the greatest virtue of the book is its provocative
nature – in a good sense. The authors’ revolt against mainstream approaches and theories
could encourage a form of self-reflection and renewal that is able to launch exciting dis-
cussions about not only the political system of Hungary, but about many important trends
in our political world.
In Benedek
(Centre for Social Sciences; ELTE ÁJK PDI)
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Gábor Scheiring has written an extremely thoughtful and provocative book on the death
of Hungarian democracy, introducing many new aspects. Rarely do we find such a well-
thought-out, scrupulous, and well-structured work about Hungarian politics, in which the
theoretical and empirical parts build on each other in supporting the key statements of the
book. In line with the dominant position of political science in Hungary and internation-
ally, the author considers the Orbán regime to be a competitive or elective dictatorship,
and consequently places it among hybrid regimes (cf. Levitsky & Way, 2010; Schedler, 2005;
2015). This book, however, is not so much about the nature of the already fully fledged Or-
bán regime (see, for example, Scheiring & Szombati, 2020) than about the reasons behind
its emergence.
The author claims that the primary reason for the historic failure of the fragile Hun-
garian democracy, emerging in the wake of the change of the regime, is market fundamen-
talism, which came to dominate Eastern Europe after 1989 (cf. Soros, 1998). Its principles
and key concepts, including privatization, deregulation, shock therapy, financial and trade
liberalization, macroeconomic stabilization and market society were accepted by the Hun-
garian parties. Thus, the electorate belonging to social groups below the middle-class were
unable to find a political alternative in the 1990s, which would have credibly represented
the principle of equality in addition to freedom. Eventually, these voters, having lost their
patience, lined up alongside the right-wing and far-right forces operating on the exclu-
sionary notion of ‘nation’. Scheiring points out that for significant groups of voters, the
shift essentially implied the replacement of the concept of ‘class’ with the concept of ‘na-
tion’, without a change in the substance of their basic attitudes initially. Workers, who in
the early 2000s were not yet receptive to ethnicist ideology (cf. Szalai, 2004), had mostly
espoused it by the end of the decade. The 2010 political turn put an end to the era of liberal
democracy and voters gave a green light to the rise of an illiberal, competitive dictatorship
(initially labelled as a majoritarian democracy).
Because Scheiring sometimes calls the period of 1990–2010 a democracy and other
times he dubs it as a ‘simulated democracy’, it is not always clear exactly what he means. In
my opinion, the author describes an elite-driven, institution-centred democracy, which re-
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mained one-sided over the years because active social participation could not gain strength.
Consequently, many identified the concept of democracy with the multi-party system only.
In contrast with such democratic deficit, however, the concept of simulation presupposes
intentionality on the part of political actors, and it would be an exaggeration to extend it to
the entirety of the above-mentioned twenty years. My impression is that it is more likely
that that the co-emergence of capitalism and democracy was a process laden with serious
contradictions. The fact that democracies survived in capitalist systems only does not im-
ply that a newly established capitalism automatically leads to democracy. Nor is it certain
that the nascent market economy will automatically consolidate a semi-peripheral democ-
racy which had no historical antecedents, and which emerged as result of an international
domino effect.
The term ‘simulated democracy’ is more fitting for the period starting from 2010, when
the regime – in a manner that Prime Minister Orbán himself called a ‘peacock dance’ –
elevated the double speech to the rank of official politics (on the Orbán regime see Ma-
gyar & Vásárhelyi, 2017; Kovács & Trencsényi, 2020). The defining moments of the period
included the unilateral constitutional process (2011), the fourth amendment of the Fun-
damental Law, which shattered the rule of law (2013), free but unclean elections, and the
proclamation of ‘illiberal democracy’ (2014). The exaggeration and propagandistic reinter-
pretation of the dangers posed by the wave of refugees (2015) and a referendum serving
the interests of the ruling party (2016) fit into this list as well. As illiberal democracy, de-
spite its misleading name, is not a democracy but a hybrid regime (cf. Bozóki & Hegedűs,
2018a), by adopting it the Hungarian Prime Minister declared his break with the Western-
style democratic system that has existed in Hungary since the change of regime. A typical
communication strategy of a hybrid regime is double talk, which has appeared in both the
domestic and international politics of political leaders in power. After Fidesz’s victory in
the 2018 ‘semi-free’ elections, peacock dancing was less and less needed, although electoral
autocracy persisted until the adoption of the 2020 emergency law (Scheppele, 2020).
According to Scheiring, the key social factor behind the emergence of the Orbán regime
was the parallel revolt of the working class and the national bourgeoisie against growing
inequality and insecurity engendered by the neoliberal competition state. I believe the
author is right in that for a considerable part of the working class it was indeed a revolt:
the fact that beside Fidesz, the far-right Jobbik also became visibly stronger, attests to that.
What began was not some ‘rubbing shoulders with’ the future authority, but a search for
new, radical political agents who defined themselves in opposition to the policies of the
left-liberal coalition government.
In the case of national capitalists, however, this opposition was by no means so sharp,
nor was changing sides. In their case, it was not so much a rebellion or ideological identifi-
cation, but rather a flexible adaptation to the new political environment created by Fidesz,
which by 2010 had risen to power. Those Hungarian capitalists who were unable to com-
pete with multinational companies that paid higher wages, created better working con-
ditions, and even tolerated the operation of trade unions sought and found favour in the
protectionist nation-state in exchange for their political loyalty. This is evidenced by the
fact that ‘right-wing capitalists’, as Scheiring calls them, almost unanimously opted for
Fidesz, rather than Jobbik, from the two right-wing parties available to them. Of the rising
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right-wing forces, they turned towards the only party that had a chance to come to power
(and which did come to power eventually) because that is what promised them regulatory
benefits and state benefits.
Although e Retreat of Liberal Democracy is first and foremost a critical political eco-
nomic analysis, Gábor Scheiring successfully proves that he is also well-versed in the in-
ternational literature of political sociology and political science understood in a narrow
sense. He analyses dominant explanations about the decline of liberal democracy, high-
lighting interpretations related to the violation of liberal norms by political elites, cultural
determinism, the failure of modernization and those referring to the impacts of the world
system. Elitist explanations focusing on political voluntarism can be rightfully criticized
both by proponents of both modernization theory and world-systems theory. Institutional
theory or elite theory, however, which examine the role of political agents, provide bet-
ter answers to country-specific questions requiring a case study than the overly general
world-systems theory.
e concept of class
Key concepts in the book include class, the state and dependency. One of the innovations
of Gábor Scheiring’s book is that it boldly rehabilitates class analysis and emphasizes that
the concept of class has kept its raison d’être even in the bubble societies of the 21st century,
amid the unstable political environment and individualized mass society. Scheiring insists
that the concept introduced by Marx, which was laid to rest several times in the second
half of the 20th century, remains timely, even if not in the same way as Marx had envisaged
it. According to the author’s definition, all those individuals who sell their knowledge or
labour belong to the working class, but he also stresses that societies today cannot be
divided into two classes, workers and capitalists only.
Scheiring differentiates between skilled and unskilled workers when it comes to the
working class, and between transnational and national capitalists when writing about the
capitalist class. By the term ‘working class’ in the ‘narrower sense’, he implies those who
are forced to sell their own labour in order to make a living and do not have a significant
amount of economic, relationship or cultural capital. However, the author does not provide
a definition for the working class in the broader sense. For a moment it seems that he
includes technocracy here as well, but he later claims that he regards managers and the
credentialled as a new, cosmopolitan, technocratic class separate from labour, which is
ultimately closer to capitalists than to the working class. Then, the author also accepts the
thesis of the relative autonomy of the state, based on which he concludes that the operators
of state power constitute the political class as an independent actor. According to Gábor
Scheiring, there are thus four classes in contemporary global capitalism: the working class,
the capitalist class, the technocratic class and the political class.
In addition to the ownership of labour and profit, convertible knowledge and state
power also become class-forming factors. The class theory followed by the author thus
does not necessarily assume given social classes; symbols of the cultural field and political
institutions play a role in the lived class positions just as much as the economic division of
labour and production method existing in the given historical and geographical context.
Moreover, classes do not necessarily have to manifest themselves in everyday life, it is
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enough if they come to the surface at certain crisis situations that represent certain critical
junctures.
What follows from this is that the author uses a rather loose concept of class, in which
economic structures represent only one variable in class formation. Classes appear primar-
ily as ‘classes in themselves’ (Marx), or as ‘status groups’ (Weber), which become dynamic
only at times of intense social conflicts and organize into ‘classes for themselves’ or into
‘social classes’ (Weber). The author further expands the scope of class theory, a step that
Marx himself would disagree with, but Bakunin, Dilas, Szelényi and Gouldner would not.
The author thus accepts the theory of the ‘new class’ by interpreting the new, transna-
tional, cosmopolitan, credentialled groups as a class in addition to the traditional antago-
nistic classes. Finally, in addition to technocracy, Scheiring also introduces the concept of
political class in the analysis, thus expanding his own class analysis with theoretical ap-
proaches that reflect not only the Marxist tradition represented by Gramsci and Poulantzas,
but also the influence of Foucault and Bourdieu.
The author thus seeks to remain true to the research agenda of rehabilitating class
analysis by interpreting the concept of class extremely broadly, while also staying open
to post-structuralist approaches. He analyses the impact of structure and acting agents
together, and attributes class-forming power to structural factors, such as political institu-
tions and the cultural field. The author, however, reaches a slippery ground here because
the concepts of ‘field’ and ‘habitus’ were developed by Bourdieu precisely as an alternative
to class analysis divided into structures and actors.
Scheiring’s class analysis stays within the framework of immanent system criticism:
his critical stance is not formulated as anti-capitalist, but as a left-wing position within the
system. Marx remains an important source for him, but not so much in connection with
content as with methodology. He rejects the ideological interpretation of the proletariat
as a revolutionary agent and focuses on a sociological approach towards workers. For
example, when he discusses the compatibility of capitalism and democracy, he further
elaborates the works of Adam Przeworski, written in the 1980s. According to Przeworski’s
thesis, antagonistic opposition between capitalists and workers is not always present, on
the contrary, they are able to make lasting compromises with each other despite their
conflicting interests. What unfolds before our eyes through the concepts of capitalist rule,
the rule of law, the embedded party system and the protection of collective interests is a
social democratic strategy.
In his research on the history of social democracy, Przeworski concluded that demo-
cratic welfare capitalism was a more attractive option for workers than a socialist revolu-
tion with uncertain outcomes (Przeworski, 1985; Przeworski & Sprague, 1986). As long as
the capitalist state can guarantee them the possibility of material prosperity and democ-
racy, workers will choose capitalism over revolution. Democracy is the result of a class
compromise concluded by representatives of economically and politically well-organized
classes. The social democratic, Christian democratic, and social-liberal systems after World
War II were built on the model of democratic capitalism maintained by welfare states. This
was perhaps because the Soviet-type regime, referencing Marx, existed until 1989–91 as
an alternative to Western capitalist democracies. Although this system was neither cultur-
ally attractive nor economically successful, in a military sense it posed a serious threat to
humanity for a long time.
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What also becomes clear from Gábor Scheiring’s book is that classical social democ-
racy, which builds on class compromise, was not an available alternative for the Central
and Eastern European countries that were exposed to the shock of post-communist trans-
formation. The new democratic, post-communist elite that came to power in the 1990s
believed in the primacy of market coordination; some of this elite even absolutized the
societal role of market logic. The author calls them market fundamentalists.
In these countries, the existing left pursued a policy of liberalization, marketisation,
and cultural cosmopolitanism within the framework of the modernization paradigm, while
the existing right promoted the control of social subsystems by the nation state. The left
was both economically and culturally liberal, while the right was anti-liberal in both re-
spects. All this preceded the emergence of social polarization beyond democratic fault
lines. Scheiring’s analysis convincingly points to the deepening material and cultural gap
between Hungarian workers and the economic elite.
The Eastern European societies undergoing transformation were not completely alone
in this regard, because by the time of the 2008 financial crisis, the class compromise, which
had maintained democracy for a long time, had begun to disintegrate in Western coun-
tries as well. Moreover, capitalism, which was left without competition, also underwent
a paradigm shift in the decades following the Cold War. Class analysis was made more
difficult by the fact that in global capitalism, which has replaced local welfare capitalist
systems, the welfare state was replaced by ‘market society’, while democracy was replaced
by ‘post-democracy’ and an organized working class was replaced by a fragmented and
unstable precariat (Crouch, 2004). The livelihood gap between the global elite and workers
expanded spectacularly and the culture of inequality was normalized.
Scheiring thinks it is important to bring class analysis back into the Hungarian social
science discourse, despite – or perhaps precisely because of – experiences related to East-
ern European ‘wild capitalism’ following the collapse of state socialist class politics. His
inspiration to do so may have been the constructivist approach suggesting the existence of
all social phenomena which concepts are created for. The author also refers to a working
class and a capitalist class in ‘peacetime’ as well, when organization into a class is politi-
cally invisible. It would have been worthwhile to discuss the role of the other two classes
he refers to, the technocratic and the political class, in maintaining the regime. If we ac-
cept the plausible statement that every democracy is the result of a class compromise, in
future research it will be worth examining whether such a compromise is made by class-
conscious actors or by actors in a similar class position who randomly drift near power.
It can be hypothesized that the parties reach a class compromise at critical historical mo-
ments, typically in crisis situations, i.e. when the class consciousness of actors belonging
to a similar class position is temporarily dynamized by the crisis.
e concept of state
Another notable innovation of the book is the description of the state’s transformation.
Comparing the periods during and after the change of the regime, the author differenti-
ates between three stages, assigning a different type of state to each of them. The first is
the vestigial welfare state, a legacy of state socialism; the second is the competition state
that emerged during the 20-year democratic period; the third is the accumulative state that
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gained ground in the post-democratic Orbán era. According to Scheiring, what emerged
during the era of state socialism was not a ‘premature welfare state’, as described by János
Kornai (Kornai, 1989; 1993), but a ‘vestigial welfare state’ which he considers in more posi-
tive terms. Thus, the problem with the welfare services provided by the state in the socialist
era was not that they came too early, but that they covered only a few areas. Here it would
have been an attractive intellectual challenge for Scheiring to critically analyse Kornai’s
concept in more detail, but he did not take this opportunity – presumably because the
primary subject of his book was not an analysis of the pre-1989 socialist state.
In the period following the change of the regime, the vestigial welfare state was gradu-
ally replaced by a pro-market (and in some cases neoliberal) ‘competition state’. The com-
petition state (for its definition, see Drahokoupil, 2008) considered as its main task to en-
sure marketisation and macroeconomic stabilization, to create an attractive investment
environment, i.e. the successful adaptation of capitalism, while it sought to pacify those
who dropped out of the competition through early retirement and unemployment benefits.
The latter led to a significant decline in the share of the employed within the population,
so the competition state, paradoxically, carried an increasing proportion of dependents on
its back. This contradiction allows us to conclude that the competition state was not really
neoliberal, as it continued to offer certain achievements of state socialism in order to main-
tain social peace for the losers in the competition. Here, perhaps it would have made sense
to place more emphasis on the responsibility of the economic and political elite in the years
immediately following the change of the regime for ‘managing’ privatisation, not only in
an anti-social but also in a criminal respect. The competition state was dominant, but not
exclusive, because some structures of the vestigial welfare state persisted throughout the
entire era, which reduced social tensions pertinent to the transition to capitalism. For ex-
ample, the Medgyessy government sought to build on these structures and expectations
when it announced its social democratic programme of ‘welfare regime change’ in 2002.
However, by the end of the second decade after the regime change, it became clear that
the competition state was no longer able to enhance the country’s competitiveness. What
was still successful in the decade between 1995 to 2005 gradually failed in the years that
followed. The global economic crisis of 2008 exposed the need for a change in economic
policy. However, the elite of the competition state reacted to the crisis in the old way: it
continued to think in terms of financial and economic austerity. All this led to a rapid loss
of political credit and a radical change in political demand.
Scheiring calls the state that emerged after 2010 an ‘accumulative state’ (see Wolfe,
1977), a notion that is not frequently used in Hungary but is well-known in international
scholarship. In this paradigm, the function of the state is to boost economic development
through massively and excessively rewarding certain national capitalist groups, relying
on domestic resources. The question, however, is to what extent is the concept of the ac-
cumulative state applicable to a context where political entrepreneurs occupying the state
from within redistribute public funds to their henchmen and to capitalists connected to
them on the basis of political loyalty, while undermining the rule of law? Such a state in-
dulges some but plunders many others: it systematically rewards a relatively narrow circle
– provided the state has any ‘relative autonomy’ and is separable from this circle at all –,
while it applies a social Darwinist workfare policy with regard to those lagging behind.
Its survival was made possible not only by the world economic conjuncture of the 2010s,
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but also by the state control of the public media, the polarization of society, its xenopho-
bic and ethnicist politics, a permanent war rhetoric, the personal charisma of the head of
government and the faltering – structurally restrictive, but also occasionally supportive –
policy of the European Union (Bozóki & Hegedűs, 2018b; Tamás, 2020).
Scheiring’s conduct is fair when he mentions approaches that contradict his own posi-
tion – in addition to János Kornai’s theory, he cites, for instance, Bálint Magyar’s concept
of the ‘mafia state’ (Magyar, 2015; 2018) – but he does not challenge them substantially.
He calls the latter a neo-utilitarian approach. At one point, he misunderstands the thesis
of the mafia state, discussing it under ‘crony capitalism’. In crony capitalism, the ‘cronies’
taking part in mutual sharing are more or less equal. The essence of the mafia state, how-
ever, is centralized, vertical, personalised power. Its practitioners cannot be characterized
by reciprocity or horizontal relations but rather by the system of relations of the ‘adopted
political family’, governed by a single person, the ‘head of the family’, who – as a political
boss – grants economic and political power, influence and prestige from above, who is un-
critically accepted by his followers. In contrast to crony capitalism, every person holding
a position in the mafia state is an actor who has been bribed by the ‘head of the family’.
The post-communist mafia state is a personalized system; it is not based on existing
formal institutions but on the informal power of the leader and the resulting arbitrary de-
cisions. As a consequence, it is irrelevant whether the head of the state, the chief prosecu-
tor, the commissioner of fundamental rights, the constitutional court or the media council
are ‘independent’ actors on paper, because in practice they are governed by the regime’s
namesake. In this structure, central decisions may also be aimed at rearranging ownership
relations, for instance, according to the method of transit nationalization. The ‘predatory’
nature of the state is based on the chie’s efforts to meet the needs of his clientele because
the system cannot be sustained without their support. Nevertheless, the thesis of the mafia
state is a partial theory because it focuses on the functioning of the state and does not in
itself provide an answer to the relationship between the state and society, nor does it anal-
yse the system’s legitimacy or society’s innermost shifts. The latter are better addressed by
theories drawing on path-dependency, i.e. research on re-feudalisation, culture and value
systems.
Both nationalization and re-privatization can be observed in the Orbán regime but
ultimately it is not important because boundaries are blurred between private and pub-
lic property, as well as between the state, the party and the leader’s clique. The common
set of the latter is what could be called a ‘political family’. The concept of the accumula-
tive state may be problematic because the head of government treats the country’s assets
essentially as his own, which makes the system sultanistic (or in other approaches: neopat-
rimonial, neoprebendal) (Csillag & Szelényi, 2015). Public accumulation is exploitative in
that it channels resources away from the low-wage earners and also sets public targets
based on whether these resources can be reallocated to the accumulating clique.
The author distinguishes between two phases of the accumulative state. The first phase
took place in the end of the 18th century, the beginning of the 19th century, when the old
order was able to retain its influence as a result of a compromise between the nobility and
the bourgeoisie; in return, the state that was under its control ensured the capital accu-
mulation of the bourgeoisie. This ‘pre-democratic’ state was not open to integrating the
working class into the system — in fact, it was specifically seeking to exclude it — be-
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cause its primary goal was to gain domestic and international markets for the bourgeoisie
through state intervention. At this point, Scheiring mentions the American railroad con-
struction companies in the Wild West (Central Pacific Railroad, Union Pacific Railroad)
and the East India Company affiliated with the British Parliament, citing them as classic
American and English examples of the accumulative state’s beneficiaries. According to the
author, at least in the English case, there were two independent actors: the rising bour-
geoisie and the old, aristocratic order, which compromised with each other and embarked
on great, collaborative projects.
Another phase (and also type) of the accumulative state, the author claims, can be ob-
served in the semi-peripheral Hungarian economy, where the post-communist accumula-
tive state not only mediates between national and international capital, but also serves the
interests of both. Scheiring holds that the competition state focused only on introducing
and operating capitalism, and thereby came under the influence of transnational capital.
By contrast, the accumulative state, by marginalizing the working class, found an ally in
national capital vis-à-vis transnational capital and tried to represent the interests of the
former to counterweight the latter. This is possible because the state, as a political class,
simultaneously represents its own class interests and seeks to exclude both the political
opposition and the subaltern. Thus, while the competition state was able to prevail within
the framework of democracy, the accumulative state is forced to break with democracy,
because otherwise it would not be able to survive.
Thus, the accumulative state is not compatible with democracy. However, while the
early accumulative state of the core countries was based on a compromise of two classes,
the Hungarian accumulative state of the semi-peripheral post-communist region is de-
scribed as a threefold alliance (political class, transnational capital, national capital). This
is, however, more similar to the model described by the new, South American dependency
theories than to the old development strategies in England or North America. In today’s
semi-peripheral authoritarian system, the political class favours national capitalists, while
subordinating them and expecting unconditional political loyalty from them. The author
claims that the power bloc is engaging in an authoritarian exercise of power that combines
institutional authoritarianism and authoritarian populism to stabilize the new accumula-
tion regime. Companies and their leaders may be catapulted to the top in no time and then
go down the drain at the will of the state just as quickly. In the Orbán regime, we can-
not talk of a compromise concluded between the national capitalist class and the political
class as independent actors, only about the political submission of the capitalist class. It
is a capitalism in which the fate of capitalists is in systemic dependence on their political
loyalty.
Therefore, finding analogies between these two, temporally distant ‘accumulative states’
seems to be too adventurous an enterprise. The existence of relevant examples from recent
centuries about the accumulative state facilitating the prosperity of some capitalist com-
panies does not mean that state intervention in the given countries was systemic. It takes
a great amount of imagination to consider the East India Society, founded by James Lan-
caster and supported by political circles in London, and the Hungarian corporate empire
of Lőrinc Mészáros in the same paradigm, as analogous examples. While the former was
involved in global international competition in the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal
for several centuries, the latter has a history as a company manager of barely ten years
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and does not extend beyond some small states in the Balkans. The two corporate empires
– despite all their differences not detailed here – are undoubtedly similar in that they per-
formed both political and economic functions. However, while the East India Company
was subject to the British crown only in political matters but was given a free hand in its
economic activities, in the case of the Mészáros corporate group the strings of political and
economic loyalty cannot be untangled.
It would be extremely exciting if, besides such extremely different examples which are
relatively easy to question, Scheiring looked at Hungary’s neighbours as well. I would be
curious to know if the author would use the context of the accumulative state to describe
the corrupt system of Meciar’s Slovakia, built on the secret service and the police, or the
paramilitary, gangster-capitalist state of Milosevic’s Serbia, or even the operation of the
Polish authoritarian state today. It is not entirely clear from the analysis to what extent
the author considers the Hungarian accumulative state to be unique in the region, where
each country embarked on building a market economy from a similar ‘starting position’
in 1990.
Therefore, the problem with applying the concept of the accumulative state in the Hun-
garian context is not that it is ‘too friendly’ with the Orbán regime but that it carries out
conceptual stretching, i.e. an over-expansion of the scope of the concept during the anal-
ysis. In a comparative exercise covering two hundred years, the nature and number of
classes and the real content of their activities can no longer be matched against each other
in such an obvious way as the author assumes, therefore the problem is methodological in
nature.
Dependency theories
The third cornerstone of the book is dependency theory. The author defines it in contrast
to modernisation theory; rightfully so, since dependency theory emerged in response to
the one-sidedness of the latter. However, it seems a bit of overstretching to call the idea of
modernization liberal. It was liberal insofar as the post-World War II era can be considered
liberal. In the 1950s and 1960s, at the time when the two world systems were competing
and coexisting peacefully, modernization theory was not simply a liberal theory, but a
developmental paradigm accepted by many political actors and political scientists of dif-
ferent ideological orientations from Khrushchev to Huntington. For a long time, the main
tenets of modernization theory were shared by liberals, conservatives, socialists alike, and
even by nationalists in emerging countries. Following sharp criticism in the 1970s, the
theory’s renewal was inevitable, then it resurfaced in new waves from the 1980s onwards.
Legitimate criticisms of old modernization theories (too abstract, rejects alternative paths,
assumes linear development, absolutizes the Western development trajectory, adheres to
the nation-state framework as a unit of analysis, etc.) were no longer valid for new mod-
ernization theories.
Dependency theories underwent such renewal as well. The old dependency theory,
associated with André Gunder Frank, saw dependence as a historical determination that
could not be changed through traditional economic policy, and therefore sought to develop
a development strategy that radically breaks with dependence (Frank, 1966). By contrast,
proponents of new dependency theories that surfaced starting from the mid-1970s realized
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that dependence in world economy was a condition that the revolutionary path would
not only fail to remedy but would exacerbate instead. However, dependent development
does not only engender disadvantages, but, in the case of a good development strategy,
it may also present benefits as well. In his book, Gábor Scheiring sometimes contrasts
new dependency theories with old modernization theories. New dependency theories are
much more sophisticated than old modernization theories, but when compared with the
new ones, this no longer holds. The author’s position is thus critical of the system, but not
anti-system: he does not rely on revolutionary, old dependency theories related to Frank,
which consider dependence ab ovo as a trap, but – following Cardoso, Faletto and Peter
Evans – he draws on analyses that interpret dependence as a new opportunity for the
development model (Cardoso & Faletto, 1979; Evans, 1979). The latter no longer leads to
the conclusion that a socialist revolution is in order, but to the development of a left-wing
social democratic programme within the framework of capitalism.
The Latin American examples are often illuminating regarding the post-2010 Hun-
garian political system, especially in understanding its international embeddedness. One
such example may be the concept of the bureaucratic authoritarian state (BA) developed
by Guillermo O’Donnell, which he used to describe the economic policies of the Argen-
tinian dictatorship of the 1970s (O’Donnell, 1988). The characteristic of the BA state was
that it consciously restricted democracy and workers’ rights in order to boost economic
competitiveness, and that it sought to politically marginalize the salaried population. The
author does not analyse this approach, although it is very similar to how he describes the
functioning of the Hungarian accumulative state: If accumulation were not the essence of
the power compromise, then there would be no need to neutralize, i.e. to hamper the or-
ganization of the dissent of those who are disadvantaged by accumulation. The seemingly
neutral term, ‘accumulation’, in fact denotes an aggressive intervention, which implies the
reallocation of goods, including the arbitrary rearrangement of ownership relations.
The new dependency theories examine economic development in the triad of multina-
tional capital, the national bourgeoisie, and the state bureaucracy, and analyse the effects
of possible coalition configurations among the three actors. The power triangle described
by Peter Evans is based on the interplay and changing relationships between transna-
tional capital, local capital, and the ‘state bourgeoisie’ (i.e. the ‘entrepreneurial faction’ of
the state apparatus) (Evans, 1979; 1989). Consequently, based on the alternation of power
cycles, dominant politics may be populist or neoliberal, but the system does not have to
be tied to a single person. The Orbán regime is similar to the personalist regimes of Latin
American countries but differs from others.
Sometimes it seems as if the author’s goal, beyond the analysis of the Hungarian case,
were to carry out a comprehensive critique of the liberal world order. This is indicated by
the fact that he is much more critical of the proponents of modernization theory than of the
proponents of dependency or world-systems theories which emerged in opposition to the
former. This is so even though world-systems theory is methodologically more difficult (or
not at all possible) to apply to explaining the rapid changes taking place in a single coun-
try, because its proponents explain those by the shifts in the world system. Thus, cause
and effect become interchangeable: a shift in the world system may be both a cause and
a consequence in the explanation of a phenomenon. This way theoretical conclusions re-
main tautological (cf. Wilkin, 2016). As the author is also aware, the world-systems theory
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cannot give an adequate answer to the question why democracy collapsed in Hungary –
and why it did not in Slovenia, Romania or Slovakia –, as it applies large units of analysis
and longer historical perspectives.
There is no such danger when it comes to the analysis of international economic
and political dependencies, on the contrary: the research allows us to explore immensely
diverse networks which vary case-by-case. For example, the way the leader of a post-
democratic country in the European periphery is trying to expand its international elbow
room and how he is using the country’s EU membership – in a utilitarian way, regard-
ing it as a bargaining chip – in his politics domestically, in the Balkans, and in relation
to the ‘Eastern opening’. Dependency theory has come a long way in the last fifty years
as it has evolved from a peripheral, Third World-focused, revolutionary Marxist theory
into a dominant development theory paradigm through the emergence of globalization,
the multipolar world order, and networks of interdependence.
e empirical analysis
The virtues of Gábor Scheiring’s book include problem sensitivity, an interdisciplinary
approach and methodological pluralism, which allow him to reach not only theoretical
but also empirical conclusions. In addition to political economic research, he also carried
out empirical sociological research, exploring the operation of the system. Although in
this review I focused primarily on the theoretical foundations of the book, I must mention
the elegance with which the author applies his theoretical questions in empirical research.
This is important because he makes it clear that he considers both theory building and
the empirical exploration of reality to be important for scientific inquiry. He is aware that
reality cannot disappear in theory’s shiny world because, as the Hungarian poet, Mihály
Vörösmarty wrote, ‘He who longs to see / looks not upon the sun.’¹ In this spirit, Scheiring
places great emphasis on the empirical chapters as well, focusing on the economic elite,
the working class and the practical operation of the accumulative state, as well as other
sub-themes relevant for the main point of the book.
Using the metaphor of the revolving door, the author describes the careers of some
members of the economic elite. A common feature of these careers is that in the decades
following the regime change, members of the elite showed up behind the steering wheels
of state administration as well. The author reviews where they came from, what school
they graduated from, where they worked, how these actors switched between the public
and private sectors, and to what extent were they active in the world of national and
international capital. The research revealed that while ‘left-wing’ finance ministers more
likely came from the banking sector, ‘right-wingers’ were less typically from the practical
domains than from academia. Both groups include radical proponents of marketization
and more moderate modernizers, so abstract ideological orientation makes less sense in
economic policy. Scheiring provides an outline of their stories, focusing mainly on well-
known characters, rather than carrying out a systematic analysis, but the connections
exposed are nevertheless revealing. In this form, the first results of the research suggest
a further research hypothesis, conceived in the Gramscian spirit, that the attitudes and
decisions of economic leaders can be explained based on their life paths. This chapter can
¹ Mihály Vörösmarty: To A Dreamer. (Own translation.)
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also be read as a stand-alone case study, but it would be worthwhile to elaborate it in detail
later in a separate book.
Scheiring’s focus, however, is not limited to the elite. In addition to the positional anal-
ysis of the various groups of capitalists, which also shows their proximity to central po-
litical power, he is keen to give voice to the working class. Interviews with workers from
former mining towns shed light on the dramatic changes in the situation of the poorer
segments of the working class. Quotations from the, sometimes shocking, testimonies un-
derline that workers, understandably, hanker for the Kádár regime, which allowed them,
when they were young and strong, to work in communities with a collective spirit and
a strong ethos of equality. Strong family and neighbourhood ties and the internal soli-
darity of socialist brigades remained a positive example for them even when the broader,
more distant framework of their lives was determined by political repression. However,
Durkheimian ‘mechanical solidarity’ between workers (Durkheim, 1984) may have been
so strong because it was defensive in nature (Ágh, 1987). Micro-level solidarity communi-
ties of social self-defence were designed to fend off macro-level mistrust, i.e. the complete
absence of ‘organic solidarity’ known from democracies. They could not trust anyone but
each other.
The true merit of the empirical chapters is that they bring the key statements of the
book close to the reader, which the author substantiates using quantitative and statistical
methods as well. This is all the more necessary because the interviews themselves are
inevitably illustrative in nature and serve to prove and illustrate the story at the same time.
After reading the interviews the reader may feel that something is missing, because they
unanimously convey a clear rejection of the new system after 1989, dissenting voices do not
appear. Respondents assess the new economic situation after the change of regime from the
perspective of losers. The research presented by the author tends to suggest that the Kádár
regime, in the case of an imaginary survival, would have been better for the salaried people,
promising better perspectives for their children than the new democracy that emerged
after the fall of the system. However, the author’s personal life story, which he briefly
shares with readers in the preface, shows that the regime change also provided incredible
opportunities for talented youth from non-middle-class families as well. Posterity has an
ambivalent picture of the Kádár era, representing the system almost simultaneously as a
‘workers’ paradise’ and the rule of ‘labour-buying’ cadre bureaucracy. The interviews in
the book, however, emphasize the first interpretation.
The rhetoric of the post-2010 system suggests that after the era of ‘neoliberal rule,’
the government is now set to protect the Hungarian people: the national bourgeoisie has
formed an alliance with the state bureaucracy against multinational corporations to protect
domestic workers from exploitation. Populism, however, is only meant to cover up what
connects the Orbán regime to the democratic era. In reality, Orbán’s accumulative state –
this time through ‘strategic agreements’ and favouring certain key sectors – continues to
support the raising of foreign capital. It is perhaps not accidental, given that Hungarian
workers are ensured better working conditions at multinational corporations, wages are
higher, and sports and infrastructural subsidies are possible as well, which contribute to
the legitimacy of the system. ‘Don’t pay attention to what I say, pay attention to one thing
only: what I do.’ – that is how Orbán summed up the key to his future political system
before he came to power (Orbán, 2011).
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While the Orbán regime supports its own clientele, the upper-middle class, the church
and spectator sports, a considerable part of the state revenue required for this is gen-
erated by car manufacturing factories and multinational companies which set up their
sites in Hungary. The rest comes from European taxpayers in the form of EU subsidies,
and a smaller portion is transferred home by Hungarians working abroad. A large part of
the Hungarian working class works as blue-collar entrepreneurs, nannies or social care
workers in Western European countries. The working class – supposing we accept this
disputed term as valid – has been voting with its feet as well since 2010: you may choose
between ‘exit’ and ‘loyalty’ because you do not have the opportunity to effectively protest
(cf. Hirschman, 1970).
Finally, before the reader starts blaming workers for the death of Hungarian democ-
racy, the author emphasizes that the revolt of the working class did not entitle Fidesz to
dismantle democracy. Workers’ revolt was not against something, but for something: not
against democracy, but for the greater security promised. The author claims that work-
ers may have been anti-liberal, but they were not anti-democratic. However, the valid-
ity of this statement is questioned precisely by the workers’ interviews conducted by the
author, because interviewees considered Kádár’s dictatorship to be better than the subse-
quent democracy. Could it not be then that they authorized Fidesz to dismantle democracy
in the hope of new job opportunities ensuring existential security?
Maybe they had a different understanding of the concept of democracy. They under-
stood democracy as their own narrower, familial-professional communities, collegial soli-
darity communities, and were uninterested in large structures, the broader horizon, or the
regime itself. They believed that these communities disintegrated after 1989. Contrary to
the optimistic expectations, workers did not see the development of capitalist democracy
as a positive civilizational turn (cf. Sztompka, 1995), but as a process of dehumanization.
On the one hand, they projected the concept of democracy back into the past, into the
local solidarity communities that once existed; on the other hand, they were increasingly
hopeful with regard to political forces that were drumming the primacy of ethnic iden-
tity. They were not seeking democracy as citizens but as dispossessed workers, and they
rightly believed that events in the cloud regions of politics could no longer worsen their
micro-world; maintaining a democratic system at the national level was not their job, they
might have thought, so they had nothing to lose with their revolt.
Scheiring’s book is characterized by comprehensive knowledge of the scholarly litera-
ture, sophisticated analyses, and methodological pluralism. He uses both quantitative and
qualitative approaches and is successful in balancing theory and empirical work. His is an
unusual book: almost all of his key statements might provoke debate, but eventually the
reader concludes that in light of the big picture, Scheiring is right.
And Boki
(Central European University)
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